RNC v. FEC (District court 2010)
On March 26, 2010, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia granted the FEC’s Motion for Summary Judgment and denied the Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment in RNC v. FEC. The court concluded that the Plaintiff’s challenge to the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act’s (BCRA) restrictions on political party fundraising conflict with the Supreme Court’s decision in McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003). The court concluded that the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Citizens United v. FEC does not affect McConnell’s holding with respect to BCRA’s limits on contributions to political parties.
Background
Sections 323(a) and (b) of the BCRA, codified at 2 U.S.C. § 441i(a)-(b), prohibit national parties from soliciting, receiving or spending any nonfederal funds. They also require state, district and local party committees to fund certain “federal election activity” (FEA) either with federal funds or with a combination of federal and Levin funds.
On November 13, 2008, the Republican National Committee, the Chairman of the RNC, the California Republican Party and the Republican Party of San Diego County (the Plaintiffs) filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia challenging the constitutionality of these soft money provisions. The Plaintiffs intended to use unlimited nonfederal funds to support candidates in elections where only state candidates appeared n the ballot, and to take part in other activities that the Plaintiffs characterized as insufficiently connected to federal elections. The Plaintiffs argued that the soft money provisions as applied to their intended activities are overly broad and unconstitutional under the First Amendment.
Court decision
In denying the Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment, the court first rejected their argument that it should apply a “strict scrutiny” level of analysis to their claims. The court referenced the Supreme Court’s decision in McConnell which held that the appropriate level of scrutiny for limitations on contributions to candidates and political parties is a “closely drawn” standard that validates regulations if they meet a sufficiently important governmental interest.
Next, the RNC asserted that 323(a) could not constitutionally be applied to activities that are not unambiguously related to the campaign of a particular federal candidate. It also argued that 323(a) violates the First Amendment to the extent that it applies to contributions that would be used for nonfederal elections, and that there was no viable theory of corruption to justify limits on contributions to political parties. It asserted that if it pledged not to sell preferential access to federal officeholders and candidates in exchange for soft-money contributions, it would eliminate McConnell’s concerns about the corrupting influences of soft-money contributions. The court rejected all of these arguments, stating that McConnell not only upheld BCRA’s ban on nonfederal contributions to national political parties, but also held that 323(a) is not overbroad simply because it subjects all funds raised and spent by national parties to Federal Election Campaign Act’s limits. Although the court found that the RNC’s as applied argument may have merit if the selling of access for soft-money contributions were eliminated, it pointed out that in upholding the 323(a) limits, the Supreme Court in McConnell also was concerned about the close relationship between federal officeholders and national parties. The McConnell Court felt that because they were inextricably intertwined, federal officeholders a nd candidates may value contributions to their national parties, and that those contributions have the same tendency to result (or appear to result) in quid pro quo corruption.
Although the court acknowledged that the McConnell opinion is ambiguous as to whether the “unity of interests” rational was an independently sufficient standard to uphold the ban on soft-money contributions to national parties, it stated that it didn’t possess the authority to clarify or refine McConnell’s holding on this issue.
The California Republican Party and the Republican Party of San Diego County claimed that 323(b) unconstitutionally prohibited them from raising soft money contributions to participate in certain federal election activity that does not target, but may incidentally criticize or oppose, federal candidates. The court rejected this claim as already having been considered and rejected in McConnell. The court pointed out that whether 323(b) can be constitutionally applied to a particular state or local party activity depends on whether the activity would provide a direct benefit to a federal candidate, not on who the party’s primary target is. Since the party committees did not deny that the activities could benefit federal candidates, the court r ejected their as-applied challenge.
Finally, the RNC chairman claimed that 323(a) is unconstitutional as applied to his efforts to solicit soft money contributions to the RNC, state parties and state candidates. In rejecting the chairman’s claim, the court stated that, although the chairman, in his individual capacity, may solicit soft-money donations on behalf of state and local party committees and candidates, McConnell upheld 323(a)’s prohibition against national party committees and their officers acting in their official capacities from soliciting or directing soft-money contributions.
On April 2, 2010, the Plaintiffs filed a Notice of Appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court.
The text of the court’s opinion is available on the Commission’s website at https://transition.fec.gov/law/litigation/rnc_opinion_3judge.pdf.
U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, 08-1953 (BMK)(RJL)(RMC).