National Republican Senatorial Committee et al v. Federal Election Commission et al (22-639 / 24-3051 / 24-621)

On June 30, 2026, the United States Supreme Court held that the Federal Election Campaign Act’s (the Act) political party coordinated expenditure limits violate the First Amendment of the United States Constitution.

Background

The Act provides that national party committees and state party committees may make special expenditures in connection with the general election campaigns of federal candidates. These coordinated party expenditures do not count against the contribution limits but are subject to a different set of limits under the Act. These inflation-adjusted limits are based on the office sought and the relevant voting-age population.

On November 4, 2022, the National Republican Senatorial Committee (NRSC), National Republican Congressional Committee (NRCC), then-Senator J.D. Vance, and then U.S. Representative Steven Chabot (collectively plaintiffs), filed suit against the Commission in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio alleging that the Act’s limits on coordinated party expenditures, including those under 52 U.S.C. § 30116(d), violate the First Amendment.

On January 19, 2024, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio certified to the en banc court of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit a constitutional challenge to the Act’s coordinated party expenditure limits.

On September 5, 2024, the en banc U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed that the Act’s limits on coordinated party expenditures do not violate the First Amendment either on their face or as applied to party spending in connection with “party coordinated communications.” In reaching this decision, the Appeals Court relied on the Supreme Court’s 2001 decision in FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431 (2001) (Colorado II) Although the plaintiffs argued that the law and facts have changed since 2001, making Colorado II no longer binding on lower courts, the court concluded that the “key reality is that the Supreme Court has not overruled the 2001 Colorado decision or the deferential review it applied to these provisions of the Act. In a hierarchical legal system, we must follow that decision and thus must deny the plaintiffs’ First Amendment facial and as applied challenges.” The plaintiffs appealed this decision to the United States Supreme Court.

Analysis

The Court noted that the First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no law…abridging the freedom of speech.” The Court has previously ruled that the First Amendment’s protection of free speech has its “fullest and most urgent application precisely to the conduct of campaigns for political office” and that, with respect to campaign related spending, “spending money on one’s own speech must be permitted.” Thus, the Court has determined that political parties, candidates, private individuals, and outside groups may make unlimited independent expenditures during political campaigns.

In Colorado II, the Court justified limitations on spending coordinated by a party committee with its candidates in part to curb a donor’s “undue influence on an officeholder’s judgment, and the appearance of such influence.” In NRSC, the Court's opinion stated that in subsequent cases, including McCutcheon v. Federal Election Comm’n, 572 U. S. 185, 210 (2014) and Federal Election Comm’n v. Ted Cruz for Senate, 596 U. S. 289 (2022), it “squarely rejected undue influence as a permissible basis for the Government to regulate campaign finances and limit political speech” and now recognizes “only one legitimate governmental interest for restricting campaign finances: preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption.” Additionally, the only specific type of corruption that may be targeted is quid pro quo corruption – contributions in exchange for official action

Colorado II’s finding also relied on an anti-circumvention rationale – that an individual donor that wants to donate to a candidate in exchange for official action might give a candidate’s political party a large contribution in excess of the limits on a direct contribution to a candidate. The party could then spend that money in coordination with that candidate’s campaign. However, the NRSC Court said that in McCutcheon, the Court found that other provisions of the Act service the Government’s anti-circumvention rationale. First, the Court said, the earmarking provisions of the Act treat an individual’s contribution to a party that are “in any way earmarked or otherwise directed through an intermediary or conduit” to a candidate as contributions to that candidate and subject to the limits on candidate contributions. Second, the Court said, the disclosure provisions of the Act require candidates and political parties to publicly disclose the contributions they receive and their spending on campaign activities. In McCutcheon, the Court found that disclosure has become a much stronger anti-circumvention tool over time because ‘modern technology’ provides a ‘particularly effective means of arming the voting public with information.’”

Likewise, in this case, the Court found that this combination of the base contribution limits on candidates along with earmarking and disclosure rules “together service the Government’s anti-circumvention interests here – without unduly restricting core political party speech.”

Therefore, the Court overruled Colorado II and held that the Act’s limits on coordinated party expenditures violate the First Amendment. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the Appeals Court and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with the Court’s opinion.

Source: FEC Record — July 2026; September 2024; February 2024; November 2022