Common Cause v. Schmitt; FEC v. Americans for Change

Background

On July 1, 1980, Common Cause filed suit against Americans for Change and several of its officers in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia . Common Cause alleged that defendants had made (or were about to make) independent and coordinated expenditures in violation of 26 U.S.C. §9012(f), which prohibits unauthorized political committees from making expenditures of more than $1,000 on behalf of a publicly funded Presidential candidate. Common Cause asked the court to uphold the constitutionality of Section 9012(f) as applied to defendants' alleged expenditures.

On July 11, the Commission was allowed to intervene in the Common Cause suit and moved to dismiss the action on the grounds that the Commission had exclusive jurisdiction over civil enforcement of the alleged violations and that Common Cause lacked standing to bring suit. Four days later, the Commission filed suit, alleging that the defendant political committees (which claimed to be independent of candidate Reagan's campaign) planned to spend large sums in support of the Republican Presidential candidate's general election campaign. The FEC also asked the court to uphold the constitutionality of 9012(f) as applied to defendants' expenditures. On September 24, 1980, the district court consolidated the two suits for argument before the court.

FEC's argument

In the motion it filed for summary judgment, the FEC rejected the defendants' argument that the Supreme Court's decision in Buckley v. Valeo invalidated Section 9012(f). The FEC pointed out that the constitutional protection accorded political communications is not the same in every context. Citing the Supreme Court's rulings on the public funding program in Buckley v. Valeo (424 U.S. 1, 96, 99 and 101 (1976)) and in Republican National Committee v. FEC, the FEC maintained that the Court had confirmed the governmental interest served by the contribution and expenditure limits contained in the Presidential public funding program. The FEC argued that, in a similar vein, Section 9012(f) closed off "...the only major avenue by which enormous amounts of aggregate wealth and private financing could be interjected into a scheme designed to encompass only public funding, while avoiding any direct and substantial infringement of protected rights by permitting individuals independent expenditures and by limiting its [Section 9012(f)'s] reach to only those campaigns where candidates have chosen public financing as an alternative to private funding." The FEC maintained that if the defendant committees' "...stated intentions [came] to fruition, namely to raise and expend on behalf of the general election campaign an amount approximately double that which Mr. Reagan and Mr. Bush have accepted in public financing, the Congressional purpose in enacting this legislation would clearly be subverted, with the taxpayer left footing the bill."

The FEC noted that the legislative history demonstrates that Congress was principally concerned with ensuring the effectiveness of the overall limitations imposed upon those candidates accepting public funding [1]. As stated by Senator Taft in support of his amendment to limit committee expenditures, Section 9012(f)'s purpose was "...to prevent any political committees from being formed as a subterfuge so that they can go beyond the authorization of the committees and make expenditures that were not within the limitations of the expenditures which are in the bill."

The FEC further argued that the limited restrictions of Section 9012(f) were constitutional as applied to defendants "...because public funding of a general election presidential campaign is an option which is chosen by candidates in place of unlimited private funding." Additionally, the provision did not abridge free speech rights because "...the transformation of [political committee member] contributions into political debate involves speech by someone other than the contributor (Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 21), thereby removing political committee expenditures from the core of individual political expression." (See California Medical Association v. FEC, Opinion at 9 n. 5, 10, 15; Mott v. FEC, Opinion at 7.)

Defendant committees' argument

In their motion for summary judgment in the suit, defendants argued that the independent expenditures in question were a form of free speech and, as such, were protected by the First Amendment. They contended that, in its Buckley v. Valeo decision (424 U.S. 1 (1976)), the Supreme Court had held that statutory limits on the amounts which individual citizens or groups could spend on independent communications in political campaigns were an impermissible restraint on First Amendment freedoms. Defendants argued, therefore, that Section 9012(f) could be interpreted as prohibiting only coordinated expenditures authorized or requested by a candidate.

District court decision

In its opinion of August 28, 1980, the court ruled on the claims made by the FEC and Common Cause in the consolidated suits. In its rulings on the FEC's claims, the three-judge court determined that Section 9012(f) did apply to defendants' activities. The court concluded, however, that the defendants' proposed expenditures constituted "independent expenditures" which, under Buckley v. Valeo, could not be limited. The court said, "The compelling governmental interest to fight electoral corruption is insufficient, here, as in Buckley, to justify what amounts to a direct limitation on political speech.... Whereas a Presidential candidate, by accepting public funds, may choose...to do without unlimited contributions and expenditures, the candidate's public supporters have a separate, protected right to express themselves, individually or jointly. This preserves free access and full participation in the public debate."

Since it had ruled on the constitutionality of Section 9012(f) in the FEC's suit, the court dismissed that portion of Common Cause's suit (Count I) as moot. The court also dismissed Count II of the Common Cause suit, which had sought enforcement of provisions of the Act allegedly violated by defendants. The court stated that the Commission had been vested by Congress with exclusive jurisdiction over enforcement of the Act. The court did not, however, rule on Common Cause's standing to bring suit.

Supreme Court hearing

On February 23, 1981, the Supreme Court agreed to consolidate the cases of FEC v. Americans for Change, Americans for an Effective Presidency and Fund for a Conservative Majority (Civil Action No. 80-1754) and Common Cause v. Harrison Schmitt (Civil Action No. 80-1609).

On January 19, 1982, the Supreme Court, in a 4 to 4 split vote, left standing the earlier decision by the district court. (U.S. Supreme Court Nos. 80-1067 and 80-847)

FOOTNOTE:

[1] See also Fund for a Conservative Majority v. FEC (80-1609) and FEC v. National Conservative Political Action Committee (83-2823).

Source: FEC Record— March 1982 and April 1981. Common Cause v. Schmitt, 512 F. Supp. 489 (D.D.C. 1980) (three-judge court), aff'd by an equally divided court, 455 U.S. 129 (1982), petition for further relief denied, (D.D.C. Oct. 19, 1983) (three-judge court) (unpublished opinion).