Common Cause v. FEC (85-0968)

On June 25, 1986, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia issued an opinion in Common Cause v. FEC, a suit in which Common Cause challenged the FEC's dismissal of an administrative complaint, which the organization had filed with the Commission in September 1984 (Civil Action No. 85-0968).[1] In remanding the suit to the FEC, the court ordered the agency to provide: (1) an explanation of the legal standard that the agency had used in making its decision to dismiss the complaint and (2) a statement of reasons demonstrating how the FEC had applied this legal standard to the facts before it.

Background

On August 24, 1984, one day after accepting the Republican Party's Presidential nomination, President Reagan addressed a convention of the Veterans of Foreign Wars (the VFW) in Chicago. During his speech, Mr. Reagan did not expressly mention his candidacy; nor did he solicit contributions to his campaign. Since the Reagan administration viewed the Chicago trip as official business, the administration allowed the government to absorb the travel costs and did not report them to the FEC.

On September 20, 1984, Common Cause filed an administrative complaint with the FEC against the Reagan-Bush '84 General Election Committee (the Reagan campaign), President Reagan's principal campaign committee for the 1984 general election. In the complaint, Common Cause alleged that the travel costs related to President Reagan's Chicago speech constituted "qualified campaign expenses" incurred for Mr. Reagan's publicly funded general election campaign.[2] Consequently, Common Cause claimed that the Reagan campaign had to: (1) pay for and report the costs of the Chicago trip as "qualified campaign expenses" and (2) reimburse the government for using a government airplane to make the trip. On December 24, 1984, the FEC's General Counsel recommended that the Commission find "reason to believe" that the Reagan campaign and its treasurer had violated provisions of the election law and public funding statutes by failing to report these expenses. On January 15, 1985, however, the Commission decided, by a four to two vote, to find "no reason to believe" the Reagan campaign and its treasurer had violated federal election laws. Consistent with past practice, the Commission did not issue a formal statement of reasons for its decision to dismiss Common Cause's administrative complaint.

On March 22, 1985, Common Cause challenged the FEC's dismissal decision by filing suit against the Commission with the district court. In its suit, Common Cause asked the court to declare that the FEC's dismissal of its administrative complaint was contrary to law and to order the agency to act on the allegations in its complaint.

In arguing that the FEC's dismissal was contrary to law, Common Cause said that, in determining whether President Reagan's Chicago trip was campaign related, the Commission should have considered the "totality of circumstances" surrounding his Chicago speech rather than using a narrower review standard, which focused solely on: (1) whether President Reagan's speech expressly advocated his reelection and (2) whether he solicited contributions in conjunction with his speech.

The court's ruling

Although accepting the legal standard which the parties agreed had been applied by the FEC in its dismissal of Common Cause's complaint, the court observed that it still had to "determine whether the agency has presented a rational basis for its decision." In this regard, the court noted that "the record before us prevents that threshold determination." The court therefore remanded the case to the FEC "both for an explanation of the legal standard actually applied and...a statement of reasons demonstrating how the Commission applied such legal standards to the facts before it."

Commissioners' second statements of reasons

In response to the court's second remand order, Commissioners Joan D. Aikens and John W. McGarry submitted a joint statement of reasons, while Commissioner Lee Ann Elliott submitted a separate statement. The fourth dissenting Commissioner in the case, Frank P. Reiche, did not submit a statement of reasons because he left the Commission in April 1985.

On July 15, 1988, the three Commissioners submitted the statements to the court and to Common Cause. While the Commissioners all agreed that President Reagan's speech before the V.F.W.'s annual convention was not campaign related, they were not in unanimous accord concerning the standard that should have been applied to reach this determination. Commissioners Joan D. Aikens and John W. McGarry concluded that they had applied a "totality of circumstances" standard. On the other hand, Commissioner Elliott concluded that, in the case of an officeholder, the "two-pronged" test was appropriate.

Commissioners Aikens and McGarry

The Commissioners stated their views that, in determining whether an officeholder's speech was campaign related, the Commission "has consistently applied a 'totality of circumstances' test, involving examination of external factors." While they agreed that an examination of the elements of the "two-pronged" test was a necessary first step, they maintained that they had to "look further to the timing, the setting and the purpose of the event as integral components of the 'totality of circumstances' test and as necessary to the ultimate determination that certain activity is or is not campaign-related." Citing agency precedents, the Commissioners stated that their use of the "totality of circumstances" standard was "totally consistent with the approach recommended by the General Counsel in his Report...and adopted by the Commission in many advisory opinions."[3]

Based on these standards, the Commissioners concluded that President Reagan's speech was made in performance of his official duties, rather than to further his reelection. The speech did not expressly advocate President Reagan's election or solicit contributions to his campaign. Nor did the timing, setting or purpose of the President's speech support the complainant's allegations that the speech was campaign related.

With regard to the timing of the speech, the Commissioners noted that the V.F.W. convention was an annual event and that the invitation to attend it had been extended to President Reagan six months before the Republican National Convention. They concluded, "To argue that the timing of this appearance makes it a campaign event would mean that no incumbent President could make an official appearance to perform officeholder duties after the renomination."

Commissioner Elliott

In explaining her view that the Commission should apply only the "two-pronged" test to determine whether President Reagan's speech was campaign-related, Commissioner Elliott stated that "an officeholder's speech will be considered campaign-related if it expressly advocates the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate or solicits contributions on behalf of a federal candidate. This 'two-pronged' test is sensible and workable Commission precedent and has repeatedly been held a permissible construction of the Act. Further, the 'two-pronged' test avoids subjective or imponderable considerations when evaluating an officeholder's speech."

Commissioner Elliott cited as precedent for the test the Supreme Court's decision in Buckley v. Valeo, as well as a series of other federal court cases and FEC actions, including Commission advisory opinions.4 The Commissioner noted that "the reasonableness of this policy is enhanced when viewed against 11 years of even-handed application."

Commissioner Elliott concluded that the totality of circumstances approach "is really not applicable for officeholders. Its objective elements are already part of the 'two-pronged' test's legal inquiry into 'express advocacy' and its subjective elements are too vaporous upon which to rest a legal conclusion."

Finally, the Commissioner stated that the "totality of circumstances" test could not be appropriately applied to the Reagan speech. In the past, the Commissioner explained, this test had been applied only to (1) nonincumbent candidates, (2) officeholders who were engaging in activities that were not normally part of their duties and (3) officeholders who were invited to make appearances as candidates, rather than in their official capacities. Commissioner Elliott therefore concluded that "following Counsel's recommendation in this case would not have been following Commission precedent."

Commissioner Elliott found that, based on the "two-pronged" test, President Reagan had not made a campaign-related speech at the convention. "I concluded that the speech [did] not advocate the re-election of the President or the defeat of his opponent...His appearance was that of a head-of-state and his remarks were on issues of importance to America 's veterans."

Joint Stipulation of Dismissal

On September 27, 1988, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia issued a joint stipulation of dismissal in which Common Cause and the FEC agreed to the dismissal, with prejudice, of the suit.

In the joint stipulation of dismissal, Common Cause did not abandon its position that the FEC's action on the administrative complaint was contrary to law. Nor did the FEC abandon its position that its dismissal of the complaint was reasonable.

FOOTNOTES:

[1] See also Antosh v. FEC (85-1410).

[2] FEC regulations define "qualified campaign expenses" as those expenditures made during the reporting period to further the general election campaign of a publicly funded Presidential candidate. See 11 CFR 9002.11.

[3] For example, the Commissioners cited as precedent Advisory Opinions 1977-42, 1977-54, 1978-4, 1978-15, 1980-16, 1980-22, 1981-37, 1982-15, 1982-56 and 1984-13.

[4] For example, the Commissioner cited as precedent Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 84 n. 112 (1976) and Advisory Opinions 1977-42, 1977-54, 1978-4, 1979-25, 1980-16, 1980-22, 1980-89 and 1981-37.

Source:   FEC Record — October 1988; August 1986