Clifton v. FEC

On May 20, 1996, the U.S. District Court for the District of Maine invalidated the FEC's regulations on voting records and voter guides because they regulate issue advocacy and therefore go beyond the FEC's authority.

On June 6, 1997, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit declared invalid two parts of those regulations. The court declared the voting record regulation at 11 CFR 114.4(c)(4) invalid only insofar as the FEC may purport to prohibit mere inquiries to candidates and the voter guide regulation at 11 CFR 114.4(c)(5) invalid only insofar as it limits contact with candidates to written inquiries and replies and imposes an equal space and prominence restriction.

The plaintiffs petitioned the court for a rehearing in this case, but that petition was denied on June 27, 1997. The FEC filed a petition for rehearing and suggestion for rehearing en banc on July 21, 1997.

On February 23, 1998, the Supreme Court denied Maine Right to Life Committee's petition for certiorari in this case.

On April, 30, 1998, on remand from the appeals court, the district court declared the Commission's "electioneering message" provisions of its regulations governing voting guides to be invalid because they were inseverable from those struck down by the appeals court.

Background

The Maine Right to Life Committee (MRLC) is a nonprofit membership corporation established for the purpose of advocating pro-life stances. MRLC uses its corporate funds to create and distribute to its members and the general public voter guides and voting records. Robin Clifton is a Maine voter who wishes to receive this information.

FEC regulations at 11 CFR 114.4(c)(4) and (5) make it illegal for a corporation or labor organization to distribute voting records or voter guides to the general public if such materials expressly advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate or if the organization consults or coordinates with any candidates concerning the content or distribution of such materials. At 11 CFR 114.4(c)(5)(ii), the FEC lists additional restrictions for voter guides, such as prohibiting a corporate or labor organization from contacting a candidate (except through written questions to which a candidate may respond in writing) and requiring the organization to give all candidates for a particular office an equal opportunity to respond.

MRLC argued that the regulations were too restrictive, exceeding the FEC's statutory power and chilling First Amendment rights. The FEC contended that it had the authority to regulate corporate expenditures for voting records and voter guides if there was coordination with a candidate about the preparation, contents and distribution of such materials.

District court decision

The court pointed out that the ban on direct corporate contributions had been upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court in Buckley v. Valeo on the grounds that the government's interest in preventing corruption or its appearance outweighs First Amendment concerns. On the other hand, based on the Supreme Court's opinions in Buckley and FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc. (MCFL), the court said that corporate spending cannot be limited unless it expressly advocates the election or defeat of a particular candidate. "In other words," the court concluded, "spending on issue advocacy... cannot be limited." The question the court addressed was whether a corporation's contact with a candidate when preparing a voter guide or voting record would transform permissible issue-advocacy spending into a prohibited contribution.

To answer the question, the court examined two provisions of the Federal Election Campaign Act (the Act). In §441a, the Act sets dollar limits on contributions, and for this purpose "contribution" is defined to include "expenditures made by any person in cooperation, consultation, or concert, with, or at the request or suggestion of, a candidate, his authorized political committees, or their agents." 2 U.S.C. §441a(a)(7)(B)(i).

The other provision, §441b, prohibits corporate "contributions" and "expenditures," which are defined to include "any direct or indirect payment...or anything of value" provided "to any candidate...in connection with any [federal] election." 2 U.S.C. §441b(b)(2). The district court cited the MCFL Court 's interpretation of Section 441b as prohibiting payments (including indirect payments) made "on behalf of candidates." The district court stated: "That is the statutory and interpretive language on which the FEC's new regulations must be based."

The court said that the FEC, in relying on Section 441a as its authority for the challenged regulations, had "misinterpreted the Supreme Court's teachings." The district court pointed out that, in Buckley, the Supreme Court upheld the dollar limitations on contributions because limits on amounts given to a candidate are not the same as limits on direct political speech. "Here," the district court said, "both the disbursements and the speech are direct political speech by the MRLC, not by the candidate. They are thus at the heart of the [Supreme] Court's First Amendment concerns." (Emphasis in original.)

The court concluded that the FEC had based the challenged regulations on too broad an interpretation of the §441b prohibition on corporate expenditures. The court said that the voter guide regulations mistakenly hinge on whether a corporation has had any contact with a candidate rather than on whether the voter guide conveys issue advocacy on behalf of a candidate (which would be an acceptable interpretation). Under the voting record regulations, MRLC would be in violation of §441b if it included an explanation solicited from a candidate concerning apparent inconsistencies in his or her voting record. The court stated: "...it is a distortion of the English language to say that [such an activity] would turn the MRLC's publication...into spending 'on behalf of' a candidate."

In concluding that the FEC had overstepped its authority in promulgating 11 CFR 114.4(c)(4) and (5), the court pronounced that, "as long as the Supreme Court holds that expenditures for issue advocacy have broad First Amendment protection, the FEC cannot use the mere act of communication between a corporation and a candidate to turn a protected expenditure for issue advocacy into an unprotected contribution to the candidate."

Appeals court decision

The appeals court found that to avoid First Amendment concerns, it would construe 2 U.S.C. §441b narrowly. Under this construction, both the Commission's restriction on oral contact between MRLC and candidates and its insistence that voter guides provide equal space to candidates were unlawful.

The appeals court found that the FEC's requirement of equal space was a "content-based" restriction because it would affect the content of the MRLC's voting guides. The court said that "[T]here is a strong First Amendment presumption against content-affecting government regulation of private citizen speech, even where the government does not dictate the viewpoint." The court cited a case where the Supreme Court struck down Florida's "right of reply" statute, which guaranteed political candidates equal space to reply to criticism printed in the Miami Herald.[1]

With regard to the Commission's requirement that contact between corporations and candidates be limited to written communications when such corporations are preparing voter guides, the court said that the regulation treads "heavily upon the right of citizens, individual or corporate, to confer and discuss public matters with their legislative representatives or candidates for such office." The court said that such a ban on communications served as a "handicap" for discourse between legislators-and would-be legislators-and those they wish to represent.[2]

With respect to both regulations, the court rejected the FEC's argument that such restrictions were justified to prevent illegal corporate contributions to candidates. While the court acknowledged the Commission's legitimate concern with uncovering prohibited contributions, it said that the agency should be able to investigate such impermissible actions through its enforcement proceedings.

The court did not take up MRLC's challenge to the regulation concerning "electioneering message" and instead referred the matter back to the district court. The court concluded that at the district court level there had been inadequate briefing as to the content, purpose and severability of these regulations.

District court decision on remand

The district court declared the Commission's "electioneering message" provisions of its regulations governing voting guides to be invalid because they are inseverable from those struck down by the appeals court. The sections in question-11 CFR 114.4(c)(5)(ii)(D) and (E)-state that voter guides prepared on the basis of written responses from candidates to questions posed by a corporation or labor organization (1) must not include an "electioneering message" and (2) may not score or rate the candidates' responses in a way that conveys an "electioneering message."

Both the Commission and Clifton agreed that the "electioneering message" provisions were not severable from the portions of the FEC's voter guide regulation that had been declared invalid.

Supreme Court action

On February 23, 1998, the Supreme Court denied Maine Right to Life Committee's petition for certiorari in this case.

FOOTNOTES:

[1] Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 256 (1974).

[2] In a dissenting opinion, Senior Circuit Judge Hugh H. Bownes wrote that the written-contact-only regulation does not infringe on the First Amendment. Citing Buckley v. Valeo, the judge said that the Supreme Court had acknowledged that some governmental interests outweigh the possibility of constitutional infringement. He wrote: "At this stage of American history, it should be clear to every observer that the disproportionate influence of big money is thwarting our freedom to choose those who govern us. This sad truth becomes more apparent with every election. If preventing this is not a compelling governmental interest, I do not know what is."

Source:   FEC Record — July 1998; August 1997; July 1996. Clifton v. FEC, 927 F. Supp. 493 (D.Me. 1996), 114 F.3d 1309 (1st Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1036 (1998).