



Council of the
INSPECTORS GENERAL
on INTEGRITY and EFFICIENCY



PRESIDENTIAL TRANSITION HANDBOOK

The Role of Inspectors General
and the Transition to a
New Administration

October 4, 2016



MISSION, VISION, AND VALUES

Improving government-wide efficiency, effectiveness, and integrity and enhancing the professionalism of CIGIE members.

VISION

Advancing good government through collaboration.

VALUES

- Integrity
- Accountability
- Transparency
- Collaboration
- Excellence

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Role of Inspectors General

In accordance with the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended (IG Act),¹ virtually every federal agency has an Inspector General (IG). There are 73 federal IGs. Approximately half are appointed by the President subject to Senate confirmation, and approximately half are appointed by the agency head.

According to the IG Act, the role of an IG is to prevent and detect waste, fraud, and abuse relating to each agency's programs and operations, and to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in the agency's operations and programs.

IGs are nonpartisan and are selected without regard to political affiliations. They have a dual reporting requirement—to their agency heads and to Congress. IGs are required by the IG Act to keep both their agency heads and Congress fully and currently informed about problems and deficiencies in their agencies' programs and operations, as well as the necessity for and progress of corrective action.

Offices of Inspector General (OIGs) are located within their agencies but must conduct their audits, investigations, evaluations, and special reviews independently from their agencies. For example, agency heads may not prevent the IGs from

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West Front of the U.S. Capitol Building, Washington, D.C. (Source: iStock)

¹ Pub. L. No. 95 452, 92 Stat. 1101 (codified at 5 U.S.C. app. 3, §§ 1-13).

initiating, carrying out, or completing any audit, evaluation, or investigation, except in limited circumstances. IGs must maintain their independence, in both reality and in appearance, to provide credible oversight.

Under the IG Act, IGs are given broad statutory authorities, including access to all agency records and information. IGs also have the authority to subpoena relevant documents and information from non-federal organizations and individuals.

IGs should meet regularly with the heads of each agency to foster effective communications. According to the IG Act, IGs must have direct and prompt access to agency heads.

The Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE), to which all 73 IGs belong, provides training for OIG employees; develops policies, professional standards, best practices, and common approaches for the work of the OIGs; and coordinates reviews by OIGs on issues that span multiple agencies.

In 2016, CIGIE established the CIGIE Presidential Transition Working Group to coordinate on behalf of the IG community with eligible Presidential candidates' transition teams and to provide information about the role of federal IGs to the transition teams and to appointees in the new Administration. The CIGIE Presidential Transition Working Group drafted this handbook.

Transition Issues Relating to Inspectors General

Reflecting their independent, nonpartisan role, unlike other political appointees, IGs typically remain in office when Presidential Administrations change. This practice has been followed for the past 35 years.

To sustain the independent role of IGs during the Presidential transition, transition teams should consider scheduling separate briefings by the IGs, parallel to briefings by other senior leaders in their agencies. The transition teams should also pay close attention to the IGs' congressionally mandated management challenges reports—an annual document that explains what the IGs consider as the most important management and performance challenges facing their agencies.

The transition teams should also focus attention, in coordination with the Office of Presidential Personnel, on promptly filling any vacant IG positions. The IG within each agency is a critically important position, and vacant positions should be filled with a permanent IG as quickly as feasible.

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To promote an effective relationship with the IG and to support the mission of the IG, after taking office the head of each agency should consider:

- Scheduling a meeting with the IG to discuss issues affecting the agency, including, significant ongoing and completed IG audits, investigations, and evaluations;
- Establishing a regular meeting schedule with the IG; and
- Sending the agency workforce a message of support for the IG's mission, underscoring IG independence, the IG's right of access to information, employees' duty to cooperate with the IG, and their duty to report illegal conduct and suspected waste, fraud, and abuse to the IG.

IGS ARE NONPARTISAN AND ARE SELECTED WITHOUT REGARD TO POLITICAL AFFILIATIONS. THEY HAVE A DUAL REPORTING REQUIREMENT—TO THEIR AGENCY HEADS AND TO CONGRESS. IGS ARE REQUIRED BY THE IG ACT TO KEEP BOTH FULLY AND CURRENTLY INFORMED ABOUT PROBLEMS AND DEFICIENCIES IN THEIR AGENCIES' PROGRAMS AND OPERATIONS, AS WELL AS THE NECESSITY FOR AND PROGRESS OF CORRECTIVE ACTION.

THE ROLE OF INSPECTORS GENERAL



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The Inspector General Act

Following a series of scandals involving fraud in federal programs, Inspectors General (IGs) were created by statute in a few civilian agencies, including the Department of Agriculture (in 1962) and the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (the predecessor to the Department of Health and Human Services) (in 1976). After congressional hearings in the mid-1970s that exposed waste and fraud in executive agencies, Congress enacted the Inspector General Act of 1978 (IG Act), which established IGs in 12 agencies.² Since 1978, the IG Act has been amended several times to provide IGs more authority and to establish IGs throughout the federal government, in virtually every federal agency. To view the current version of the IG Act, visit www.ignet.gov/content/ig-act.

The purpose of the IG Act was to create independent, objective IGs whose responsibility is to prevent and detect waste, fraud, and abuse and to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in each agency's operations.

Currently, there are 73 federal IGs.³ Approximately half are appointed by the President subject to Senate confirmation (called Establishment IGs or PAS IGs), and approximately half (called Designated Federal Entity or DFE IGs) are appointed by the head of the agency, which can be an individual, a board, or a commission. See the Appendix for CIGIE's current membership list, which also identifies Establishment IGs and DFE IGs.

IGs are nonpartisan. According to the IG Act, they must be selected without regard to political affiliation, based solely on "integrity and demonstrated ability in accounting, auditing, financial analysis, law, management analysis, public administration, or investigations."

² Pub. L. No. 95-452 (Oct. 12, 1978), 92 Stat. 1101 (codified at 5 U.S.C. app. 3, §§ 1-13). See Congressional Research Service, *Federal Inspectors General: History, Characteristics, and Recent Congressional Actions* (June 2016), available at www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43814.pdf.

³ There is one additional federal IG, the IG for the House of Representatives, who is not a member of CIGIE.

The IG Act contains congressional notification procedures regarding the removal of IGs.

IGs do not have a term of office.⁴ Establishment IGs can be removed by the President, and DFE IGs can be removed by their agency head. Unlike other political or high-level political appointees, IGs typically remain in office when Presidential Administrations change. Moreover, the IG Act contains congressional notification procedures regarding the removal of IGs. If the President intends to remove or transfer an Establishment IG, or an agency head intends to remove a DFE IG, they must communicate the reasons for the action in writing to both Houses of Congress at least 30 days before the removal or transfer. This provision has only been invoked once.

Role and Authorities of Inspectors General

IGs have a dual reporting requirement—to both the agency head and to Congress. IGs are required to keep both “fully and currently informed” about problems and deficiencies relating to agency programs and operations.

IGs typically brief their agency heads on important audits, investigations, evaluations, and other reviews they conduct. In addition, IGs often testify before congressional committees, and they regularly receive requests from, provide briefings to, and participate in meetings with congressional members and their staffs.

To fulfill their mission, IGs are granted broad authorities. Among other powers, IGs are authorized to:

- Obtain access to information and documents within their agency in relation to any program or operations over which the IG has responsibility;
- Request information or assistance from any Federal, State, or local, agency;
- Subpoena records and documents from any non-federal entity or individual;
- Take statements under oath;
- Have direct and prompt access to the agency head for any purpose pertaining to the IG’s responsibilities; and
- Select, appoint, and employ officers and employees as necessary to carry out the functions, powers, and duties of the OIG.

⁴ The exceptions are the U.S. Postal Service IG (a seven-year term) and the U.S. Capitol Police IG (a five-year term, and may be reappointed for not more than two additional terms).

Inspector General Independence

IGs must perform their audits, investigations, evaluations, and special reviews objectively and independently from the agency.

Several key provisions of the IG Act seek to ensure IG independence, in both reality and appearance. For example, according to the IG Act, an agency head may not prevent the IG from initiating, carrying out, or completing any audit or investigation, except in very limited circumstances.⁵

Moreover, IGs report only to the agency head or the officer next in rank below the agency head. The IG Act specifies that each IG “shall report to and be under the general supervision of the head of the establishment involved or, to the extent such authority is delegated, the officer next in rank below such head, but shall not report to, or be subject to supervision by, any other officer of such establishment.”

There is no statutory definition of “general supervision.” However, this supervision is limited and may not be exercised in a way that would inhibit IGs’ discretion to perform their mission, to undertake an audit or investigation, to issue subpoenas, or to see these matters through to conclusion.⁶

The Inspector General Reform Act of 2008 contained language to be used in setting the pay of all IGs.⁷ Establishment IGs are compensated at an amount equivalent to level III of the Executive Schedule plus 3 percent. Pay for DFE IGs is set by a formula detailed in the Inspector General Reform Act of 2008, which ensures that the agency head cannot reduce the IG’s pay based on a disagreement with the IG’s work.

In addition, the IG Act requires the IG to have direct and prompt access to the agency head for any purpose related to the performance of the IG’s responsibilities.

⁵ Under the IG Act, the heads of seven agencies (the Departments of Defense, Homeland Security, Justice, and Treasury; the Federal Reserve Board; the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau; and the U.S. Postal Service) may prevent their respective IGs from initiating or completing an investigation or audit, or issuing a subpoena, but only for reasons specified in the IG Act (*see, e.g.*, IG Act, § 8). These reasons include, among others, preserving national security interests, protecting ongoing criminal prosecutions, or limiting the disclosure of information that could significantly influence the economy or market behavior (*see, e.g.*, IG Act, § 8D). If agency heads invoke this power, they must send an explanatory statement to certain congressional committees within 30 days.

⁶ Although a few court decisions have analyzed the “general supervision” language of the IG Act, one case in particular, *United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission v. Federal Labor Relations Authority*, 25 F.3d 229, 235 (4th Cir. 1994), reviewed the legislative history of the “general supervision” language and described the agency head’s supervisory authority over the IG as “nominal.”

⁷ Pub. L. No. 110-409, 122 Stat. 4302.

To ensure independence, each OIG is considered “a separate agency” for certain administrative purposes. For example, many IGs operate their own personnel offices and determine the recruitment, screening, selection, promotion, and discipline of their employees. In addition, many of the larger IGs operate their own information technology networks, separate from the agency’s computer networks.

IGs are also required by law to obtain legal counsel independent of the agency counsel. Specifically, the IG Act requires an IG to obtain legal advice from a counsel who reports directly to the IG, to another IG, or from the organization of federal IGs (the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE)).

According to the IG Act, an IG’s budget requests must be separately identified within their agency budgets when submitted to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and by OMB to Congress. Also, IGs may comment to Congress on the sufficiency of their budgets if the amount proposed in the President’s budget would “substantially inhibit the [IG] from performing the duties of the office.”

In addition, to ensure IGs’ access to relevant information, the IG Act requires IGs to report to their agency heads “without delay” the circumstances of any unreasonable refusal of their information requests. The IG Act also empowers IGs to request information or assistance from any Federal, State, or local government. To ensure IGs have sufficient resources, the IG Act authorizes IGs to enter into contracts and other arrangements to support their work.

Inspector General Reports and Processes

IGs are provided broad latitude to determine the reviews they conduct and the reports they issue.

The IG Act requires Establishment IGs to appoint only two officials—an Assistant Inspector General for Auditing and an Assistant Inspector General for Investigations. There is no corresponding requirement that DFE IGs appoint these officials; in practice, however, this is the model followed by many DFE IGs.

IGs regularly conduct audits of their agency’s programs and operations, including congressionally mandated audits, such as annual Financial Statement Audits and the annual evaluation of information security and privacy programs under the Federal Information Security Modernization Act (FISMA) of 2014. OIG audits also cover the performance of agency contractors and grantees. OIG audits, which are conducted

in accordance with *Generally Accepted Government Auditing Standards* (called the “Yellow Book”), OMB guidance, CIGIE guidance, and other professional standards, can help reduce waste, fraud, abuse, and mismanagement. OIG audits often result in significant taxpayer savings, improved agency effectiveness, and other efficiencies.

Many IGs have also established offices that perform inspections or evaluations of their agency’s programs and operations, which can also improve the performance and effectiveness of agency operations, as well as reduce waste, fraud, abuse, and mismanagement. These reviews are conducted according to CIGIE’s *Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation* (called the “Blue Book”).

IG audits and evaluations often make recommendations to management for improvement. Although an IG cannot compel agency management to implement any recommendation, the agency is required to respond to each IG recommendation and state whether it agrees or disagrees with the recommendation. The status of an IG’s recommendations must be included in each IG’s Semiannual Report to Congress. In addition, IG recommendations are often the subject of congressional inquiry and hearings. IGs regularly testify before Congress about their reports, their recommendations, and their view of management corrective actions in response to IG recommendations.

IGs also conduct criminal, civil, and administrative investigations related to the employees, programs, operations, grants, and contracts of their agencies. The subjects of an investigation may be agency employees, contractors, or consultants, or any person or entity involved in alleged wrongdoing affecting the agency’s programs or operations.

With regard to criminal investigations, the IG Act gives many, but not all, OIGs law enforcement authority to assist in such criminal investigations.⁸ These authorities include the ability to carry firearms while engaging in official duties; to make arrests without a warrant; and to seek and execute warrants for arrests, searches of premises, and seizures of evidence. OIGs refer evidence of criminal violations to the Department of Justice for possible prosecution or recovery of monetary damages and penalties.

OIG audits, which are conducted in accordance with Generally Accepted Government Auditing Standards (called the “Yellow Book”), OMB guidance, CIGIE guidance, and other professional standards, can help reduce waste, fraud, abuse, and mismanagement.

⁸ Some IGs are granted law enforcement authority through the IG Act, while other IGs require an initial determination of eligibility by the Attorney General. See IG Act, § 6(e). A small number of IGs were granted law enforcement authority through other laws.

With regard to administrative investigations, IGs report the results of these investigations to agency management officials for consideration of disciplinary or remedial action.

In addition, several IGs have created offices that conduct special reviews, combining the multidisciplinary skills of investigators, auditors, evaluators, and lawyers. These special reviews are often hybrid reviews, involving potential misconduct by agency employees as well as systemic evaluations of an agency program or operation. Examples of such special reviews are the Department of Justice OIG's review of the treatment of detainees after the 9/11 attacks and the Peace Corps IG's review of the death of a Peace Corps volunteer in China.

Each IG is authorized to receive complaints relating to potential misconduct or waste, fraud, or abuse in connection with agency programs and operations. The IG may not disclose the identity of an agency employee who makes such a disclosure without the employee's consent, except when disclosure is "unavoidable" during the course of the investigation. Other laws also restrict the disclosure of complainants' identities, and most IGs allow complainants to request confidentiality or file complaints anonymously.

Many OIGs manage an OIG Hotline to receive and process complaints about fraud, waste, or abuse related to agency programs and operations. Although some of the tens of thousands of calls made each year to IG Hotlines are misdirected, frivolous, or otherwise not productive, many lead to IG investigations and audits that result in prosecutions, cost savings, and efficiency recommendations.

Under the IG Act, OIGs also help protect whistleblowers from retaliation for protected disclosures. Federal law explicitly prohibits government personnel from retaliating against an employee who acts as a whistleblower by reporting suspected waste, fraud, or abuse to the OIG. In addition, the IG Act requires Establishment IGs to appoint a Whistleblower Protection Ombudsmen to educate agency employees about the prohibitions on retaliation for protected disclosures.

To further facilitate the reporting of waste, fraud, or abuse to IGs, each agency homepage must contain a direct link to the Web site of the agency's IG.

Transparency is a key attribute of IG work. The IG Act requires OIGs to post public audit and evaluation reports (or portions of them) on the OIG's website. IG reports must be posted on their public websites not later than three days after being made publicly available.

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Each IG also must issue Semiannual Reports to Congress detailing, among other items, significant problems and deficiencies identified by the IG during the preceding six-month period, listing current and pending OIG recommendations, identifying cost savings from their reports, and summarizing prosecutorial referrals made during the period. As noted above, under the IG Act, the report also must describe any disagreement with significant management decisions.



Agency IGs must issue Semiannual Reports to Congress detailing significant problems and deficiencies during the preceding six-month period.

In addition to the Semiannual Report to Congress, IGs have other mandatory reporting requirements, such as annual audits of agency financial statements, annual evaluations of information security programs and practices, annual discussion of the top management challenges in their agencies, and annual reports on agency improper payments. A list of the most significant recurring mandatory reporting requirements, including the source of the requirement and the due dates for the required reports, is contained in the Appendix to this handbook.

Several congressional committees have standing requests to OIGs to report periodically on the status of open and unimplemented OIG recommendations, matters referred to the Department of Justice for possible prosecution, and any challenges OIGs are encountering involving agency delays or refusals to provide access to information.

The IG Act also authorizes an IG to report “immediately” to the agency head when the IG becomes aware of “particularly serious or flagrant problems, abuses, or deficiencies relating to the administration of programs and operations.” In turn, the agency head must transmit the report—and any comments—to the appropriate committees or subcommittees of Congress within seven calendar days. In practice, this so-called “Seven-Day Letter” is a powerful tool available to the IG in compelling circumstances requiring immediate congressional attention, but it has rarely been used.

Recoveries and Cost Savings

IG reports and investigations regularly contribute to significant recoveries and cost savings to taxpayers. CIGIE’s FY 2015 annual report to the President will report that the combined work of approximately 13,000 federal OIG employees resulted in significant improvements to the economy and efficiency of programs government-wide, with potential savings totaling approximately \$36.5 billion.⁹ Based on the OIG community’s aggregate budget of approximately \$2.7 billion, these potential savings represent about a \$14 return on every dollar invested in OIGs.

The potential savings total includes: \$26.3 billion in potential savings from audit recommendations agreed to by management and \$10.2 billion from investigative receivables and recoveries.

In addition, OIGs strengthened agency programs through:

- 5,280 audit, inspection, and evaluation reports issued;
- 24,246 investigations closed;
- 545,504 hotline complaints processed;
- 5,717 indictments and criminal information;
- 5,553 successful prosecutions;

⁹ Compiled from CIGIE’s Fiscal Year 2015 information.

- 1,861 successful civil actions;
- 7,244 suspensions or debarments; and
- 4,501 personnel actions.

In addition, IGs regularly make recommendations to agency management for improvement in the operations and programs of the agency. Although the agency is not required to implement the recommendations, the agency must respond to the recommendations, and IGs report open recommendations in their Semiannual Report to Congress. IG recommendations regularly result in more efficient and effective programs, in addition to the monetary recoveries discussed above.

The Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE)

CIGIE is the coordinating entity for federal IGs. Congress established CIGIE as an independent entity within the Executive Branch with passage of the Inspector General Reform Act of 2008.

CIGIE's mission is to address integrity, economy, and effectiveness issues that transcend individual Government agencies. For example, CIGIE coordinates cross-cutting projects among OIGs on issues that span multiple agencies. CIGIE also seeks to increase the professionalism and effectiveness of OIG personnel by developing policies, standards, and common approaches among OIGs. A key initiative in this area is the CIGIE Training Institute, which includes an Audit, Inspection & Evaluation Academy, an Inspector General Criminal Investigator Academy, and a Leadership and Mission Support Academy, which train employees from throughout the OIG community.

CIGIE has also established a series of committees to coordinate among IGs. One such committee is the CIGIE Integrity Committee, which is responsible for investigating allegations against IGs, their senior staff, and OIG employees acting with the knowledge of the IG or whose alleged misconduct is related to an allegation against the IG.

CIGIE has a panel to recommend to the Office of Presidential Personnel and to agency heads suitable candidates for vacant IG positions. For a list of vacant IG positions as of September 19, 2016, see page 18.

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
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CIGIE also coordinates and communicates an OIG position to Congress on potential legislation affecting the IG community. For example, CIGIE has advocated for full OIG access to information necessary to accomplish IG responsibilities. In June 2016, the House of Representatives passed the Inspector General Empowerment Act of 2016, H.R. 2395, which clarifies that IGs must have full and prompt access to all agency records, allows IGs to subpoena federal contractors and former government employees under certain circumstances, and allows IGs to match data across agencies to help uncover wasteful spending. A similar bill, S.579, is under consideration by the Senate.

OIGs work closely with the OMB. The OMB Deputy Director for Management serves as CIGIE's Executive Chair, signifying the strong partnership between the Executive Branch's management and performance mission with the OIG's independent oversight mission. Through CIGIE, the OIG community also meets periodically with the Government Accountability Office to share work plans, deconflict work projects, and discuss matters of mutual interest.

CIGIE annually reports to the President on the combined work of approximately 13,000 federal OIG employees, which results in significant improvements to the economy and efficiency of programs government-wide.



TRANSITION ISSUES
RELATING TO INSPECTORS GENERAL



TRANSITION ISSUES RELATING TO INSPECTORS GENERAL

Historically, because of their nonpartisan, independent status, IGs have remained in office when Presidential Administrations change.

The first Presidential Administration change after the passage of the IG Act was in 1980, when President Reagan was elected. His Administration asked for the resignation of all Presidential appointees, and did not make an exception for IGs. This created controversy and concern that the removal of IGs gave the appearance of an attempt to politicize these independent, nonpartisan offices. Congressional representatives explained, for example, that it was not intended the IGs be automatically removed on a wholesale basis without regard to their individual merits whenever there was a change in Administrations. In response, the Reagan Administration decided to reappoint several of the dismissed IGs.

Since that time, every President has exempted IGs as a group from the requirement that political appointees resign when Administrations change.

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The Role of Inspectors General in the Transition to a New Administration

IGs can perform, and have performed in the past, a valuable role during Presidential transitions. Based on their experience and ongoing work, IGs are a valuable source of information about the key issues that will confront the new Administration's management team. They, and their staffs, have deep institutional and historical knowledge about the challenges facing their agencies.

In the past, the transition teams for many agencies have met individually with the IG of that agency for a briefing on the IG's ongoing and recently completed work, as well as the IG's view of the important issues within the agency that will confront the new Administration. It is useful for the transition teams to meet with the IG of that agency early in the transition process. Reflecting the IGs' independence and unique perspective on their agency, transition teams should meet with the IGs separate from their meetings with other management officials from that agency.

A critical document for the transition team to review is an annual document created by many IGs on the top management challenges within their agency. The Reports Consolidation Act of 2000 requires most IGs to report annually on their agencies' top management and performance challenges. This IG document typically provides a list of the top challenges, the IG's description of the challenges and the agency's progress in addressing each challenge, and a summary of ongoing and completed OIG work that relates to the challenge. This document can provide an extremely useful overview for the transition team and new Administration appointees in understanding the scope of the issues they will confront in each agency. CIGIE encourages transition teams, and new leadership of each agency, to obtain this document and discuss with IGs their assessment of these challenges.

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New Administration Officials' Interaction with Inspectors General

Once a new Administration takes office, it is critical for each IG and the agency's leadership to have regular and candid communications. After leadership of an agency is appointed, it is important that they establish regular communications with the IG of the agency.

Many agency heads and deputy agency heads meet monthly with their IG. Those meetings enable the IG to inform the agency leadership about ongoing OIG work, the results of completed work, the status of open recommendations from IG audits and evaluations, and the scope and status of major investigations. IGs are also able to answer questions about the processes and procedures the OIGs use in their work. In addition, the agency heads are able to discuss their priorities and their views on IG reviews that could be valuable for agency programs. IGs can raise any impediments to their work or any areas that the IG believes management needs to focus attention on for corrective action. On these and other issues, effective and regular communication between agency leadership and the IG is important to establish an effective and candid relationship.

In this regard, agency cooperation with the IG, including full access to agency information and employees, is essential for an IG to be effective. The new agency head should consider sending the agency workforce a message of support for the role of the OIG, emphasizing the duty of agency employees to cooperate with OIG audits,

evaluations, and investigations; the OIG's right of access to information; and each employees' duty to report illegal conduct and suspected waste, fraud, and abuse to the IG. The tone of agency cooperation and support for the role of the IG is set from the top of an agency.

Filling Inspector General Vacancies

The IG is a critically important position within each agency. Although the IG has the potential to significantly improve the performance of each agency, the IG may not be among the first positions that transition teams or the new Administration act to fill when taking office. However, it is important for the new Administration to focus on filling vacant IG positions expeditiously. In the past, IG positions have often remained vacant for significant periods of time, generating concern and criticism. Although Acting IGs have performed admirably in many cases, a confirmed IG is in a much better position to effectively fulfill the responsibilities of the office.

Pursuant to a requirement in the IG Act, CIGIE provides recommendations to the White House or the appropriate appointing authority for the vacant IG positions. CIGIE has established a committee that reviews potential IG candidates and submits recommendations of qualified candidates for vacant IG positions.

The following is a list of current IG vacancies, by date vacated (as of September 19, 2016).

Agency	Appointment Type	Date Vacated
Department of the Interior	PAS	December 2011
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation	PAS	September 2013
Export-Import Bank of the United States	PAS	June 2014
Central Intelligence Agency	PAS	February 2015
Department of Commerce	PAS	June 2015
Department of Energy	PAS	October 2015
Department of Defense	PAS	January 2016
U.S. Postal Service	DFE	February 2016
Office of Personnel Management	PAS	February 2016
Social Security Administration	PAS	May 2016
National Security Agency	PAS	May 2016
Committee for Purchase From People Who Are Blind or Severely Disabled	DFE	Created in FY 2016 Omnibus

The IG is a critically important position within each agency.

APPENDIX

APPENDIX

CIGIE Inspector General Offices

CIGIE’s public website provides contact information for most OIGs, including links to each OIG’s public website: <https://www.ignet.gov/content/inspectors-general-directory>.

OIGs in Establishment Agencies

Agency for International Development	Department of Veterans Affairs
Corporation for National and Community Service	Environmental Protection Agency and the Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board
Department of Agriculture	Export-Import Bank of the United States
Department of Commerce	Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Department of Defense	Federal Housing Finance Agency
Department of Education	General Services Administration
Department of Energy	National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Department of Health and Human Services	National Reconnaissance Office
Department of Homeland Security	National Security Agency
Department of Housing and Urban Development	Office of Personnel Management
Department of the Interior	Small Business Administration
Department of Justice	Social Security Administration
Department of Labor	Tennessee Valley Authority
Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors	Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration
Department of Transportation	U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Department of the Treasury	U.S. Railroad Retirement Board

OIGs in Designated Federal Entities

Amtrak	Federal Maritime Commission
Appalachian Regional Commission	Federal Trade Commission
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and Consumer Financial Protection Bureau	Legal Services Corporation
Committee for Purchase From People Who Are Blind or Severely Disabled	National Archives and Records Administration
Commodity Futures Trading Commission	National Credit Union Administration
Consumer Product Safety Commission	National Endowment for the Arts
Corporation for Public Broadcasting	National Endowment for the Humanities
Defense Intelligence Agency	National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency
Denali Commission	National Labor Relations Board
Election Assistance Commission	National Science Foundation
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission	Peace Corps
Farm Credit Administration	Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
Federal Communications Commission	Postal Regulatory Commission
Federal Election Commission	Smithsonian Institution
Federal Labor Relations Authority	U.S. International Trade Commission
	U.S. Postal Service
	U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission

Other OIGs

There are also Inspectors General established pursuant to statutes other than the IG Act. These statutes may incorporate some, but not necessarily all, of the provisions of the IG Act.

OIGs	Authorizing Legislation
Architect of the Capitol	2 U.S.C. § 1808
Central Intelligence Agency	50 U.S.C. § 3517
Government Printing Office	44 U.S.C. § 3901
Library of Congress	2 U.S.C. § 185
Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community	50 U.S.C. § 3033
Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction	National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-181, § 1229(b) (Jan. 2008)
Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program	Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, § 121 (Oct. 3 2008)
U.S. Capitol Police	2 U.S.C. § 1909
U.S. Government Accountability Office	31 U.S.C. § 705

Office of Inspector General Major Reporting Requirements

The following list sets forth many of the recurring reporting requirements applicable to most OIGs. OIGs are required to post publically available reports on their websites within 3 days of issuance.

Report/Requirement Source	Subject Matter	Frequency	Next Report Deadline
OIG Semiannual Report to Congress Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended	Semiannual report summarizing the activities of the OIG during the immediately preceding six-month period.	Semiannual Report: April 30 and October 31 to the Agency Head; who must transmit the report to the appropriate Congressional Committee no later than 30 days after receipt by the agency head.	October 31, 2016
Financial Statement Audit Chief Financial Officer Act of 1990, Accountability of Tax Dollars Act of 2002, and Government Management Reform Act of 1994	Agencies that have an IG shall audit each financial statement prepared in accordance with applicable generally accepted government auditing standards covering all accounts and associated activities of each office, bureau, and activity of the agency.	Annual	November 15, 2016
Annual FISMA Reviews Federal Information Security Management Act	Report results of OIG annual IT security reviews of agency programs and systems.	Annual	November 2016
Agency Management and Performance Challenges Reports Consolidation Act of 2000	Report or statement summarizing the most serious management and performance challenges facing the agency, and briefly assess the agency's progress in addressing those challenges.	Annually	November 15, 2016
Purchase and Travel Card Oversight Report Government Charge Card Abuse Prevention Act of 2012	The IG is required to: (1) Submit a joint report on purchase card violations semi-annually; (2) conduct periodic (minimum annually) risk assessments of the agency's purchase card program; and (3) submit an annual purchase and travel card audit recommendation status report.	(1) Semiannually in January and July; (2) Annually; and (3) Annually	January 31, 2017

Report/Requirement Source	Subject Matter	Frequency	Next Report Deadline
<p>Improper Payment Reporting Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act of 2010</p>	<p>Report determining whether the agency is in compliance with: (1) publishing an annual financial statement; (2) if required, conducted a program specific assessment for each program or activity; (3) if required, published improper payment estimates for all programs and activities; (4) published programmatic corrective action plans; (5) published improper payment reduction targets; (6) reported an improper payment rate of less than 10 percent for each program and activity for which an estimate was published.</p>	<p>Annually</p>	<p>May 2017</p>
<p>Report on Federal Entities Cyber Threat Indicators Consolidated Appropriations (FY 2016) - Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015</p>	<p>The IG of the appropriate Federal entities, in consultation with the IG of the Intelligence Community and The Council of Inspectors General on Financial Oversight, jointly submit to Congress an interagency report on the actions of the executive branch of the Federal Government relating to cybersecurity information sharing.</p>	<p>Every two years</p>	<p>December 18, 2016</p>
<p>Council of Inspectors General on Financial Oversight Annual Report The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act</p>	<p>The Council of Inspectors General on Financial Oversight is required to report annually about concerns and recommendations, as well as issues that may apply to the broader financial sector.</p>	<p>Annually</p>	<p>2017</p>
<p>Accountability for Federal Funding Report Digital Accountability and Transparency Act of 2014 (DATA Act)</p>	<p>The IG, in consultation with the Comptroller General, issues a report assessing the completeness, timeliness, quality, and accuracy of data sampled and the implementation and use of data standards by the Federal agency.</p>	<p>Every two years (Last reporting deadline November 2021)</p>	<p>November 15, 2017</p>

WITH THEIR DEEP INSTITUTIONAL AND HISTORICAL KNOWLEDGE ABOUT THE CHALLENGES FACING THEIR AGENCIES, INSPECTORS GENERAL ARE A VALUABLE SOURCE OF INFORMATION ABOUT THE KEY ISSUES THAT WILL CONFRONT THE NEW ADMINISTRATION'S MANAGEMENT TEAM.



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