# **ORAL ARGUMENT SCHEDULED FOR NOVEMBER 30, 2018**

No. 18-5227

# UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

## LIBERTARIAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

# FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION,

Defendant-Appellee.

On Certification of Constitutional Questions from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia

# FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION'S MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF SUBJECT-MATTER JURISDICTION

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September 10, 2018

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# GLOSSARY

Add.	Addendum
FEC	Federal Election Commission
FECA	Federal Election Campaign Act
LNC	Libertarian National Committee, Inc.

#### **INTRODUCTION**

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 27(a) and Circuit Rule 27(g), the Federal Election Commission ("FEC" or "Commission") respectfully moves to dismiss this action for lack of Article III standing.

For more than forty years, the Libertarian Party has sought to have Federal Election Campaign Act ("FECA") limits on amounts it may accept in a calendar year declared unconstitutional, but courts have repeatedly rejected those claims. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 20-22 (1976) (per curiam); McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 133-89 (2003), overruled in part on other grounds by Citizens *United v. FEC*, 558 U.S. 310, 366 (2010). In 2013, a claim by the Libertarian National Committee, Inc. ("LNC") that a contribution limit could not be constitutionally applied to bequests from deceased donors was generally rejected, with a panel of this Court finding "[t]he merits of the parties' positions . . . so clear as to warrant summary action." Libertarian Nat'l Comm., Inc. v. FEC, No. 13-5094, 2014 WL 590973, at \*1 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 7, 2014) (per curiam). The district court in that case also came to the conclusion that application of the limit to a bequest with certain atypical characteristics merited consideration under special judicial review procedures, Libertarian Nat'l Comm., Inc. v. FEC, 930 F. Supp. 2d 154, 168-71 (D.D.C. 2013) ("LNC I"), but that part of the matter became moot

while pending before this Court. *See* Order, *Libertarian Nat'l Comm. v. FEC*, No. 13-5088 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 26, 2014) (*en banc*) (Doc. No. 1485531).

Later in 2014, Congress expanded the limit on contributions to national party committees, permitting those committees to raise more money to defray specific types of expenses, which include spending on presidential nominating conventions, national party headquarters, and legal proceedings. The LNC has had substantial expenses in those categories — including a mortgage on its recently acquired headquarters and the substantial sums it spends on its presidential nominating conventions. Because money is fungible, moreover, every dollar of contributions the LNC accepts under the new, higher limits increases dollar-fordollar the amount it can accept into its general account, thereby freeing up funds to use for more political advocacy or any other type of expense.

In October 2014, the LNC learned that one of its longtime supporters, Joseph Shaber, had died, leaving the party a beneficial interest in a trust that was eventually determined to be worth more than \$235,000. The LNC perceived that the new bequest could provide another vehicle for challenging FECA's contribution limits, but the recent statutory amendments meant that FECA did not prevent the LNC from accepting the entirety of its interest in Shaber's estate. The LNC nevertheless chose to accept less than it could have to generate standing for this constitutional challenge. That decision was a self-inflicted injury that cannot support standing. In any event, the declaratory and injunctive relief the LNC first sought in 2016 cannot redress its alleged 2015 injuries. And its claim of competitive injury relative to other political parties is likewise insufficient.

This case should be dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

#### STATEMENT OF FACTS

#### A. FECA's Limits on Contributions to National Party Committees

The LNC is the national committee of the Libertarian Party of the United States. Add. 14, at ¶ 1; *see* 52 U.S.C. § 30101(14); FEC, Types of Political Party Committees, https://www.fec.gov/help-candidates-and-committees/registeringpolitical-party/types-political-party-committees/.

FECA has placed limits on the amount of money that individuals may annually contribute to any national political party committee for more than forty years. *See* 52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(1)(B). Today, FECA creates a two-tiered set of limits for contributions by individuals to national party committees like the LNC. Under the first tier, an individual donor may annually contribute up to an inflationadjusted limit to a national party committee's general account (the "General Party Limit"). *See* 52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(1)(B), (c). During 2015-2016, that limit was \$33,400 per year. Price Index Adjustments for Contribution and Expenditure Limitations, 80 Fed. Reg. 5750-02, 5751 (Feb. 3, 2015). The limit was increased to \$33,900 per year for 2017-2018. Price Index Adjustments for Contribution and

Expenditure Limitations and Lobbyist Bundling Disclosure Threshold, 82 Fed. Reg. 10904, 10905-06 (Feb. 16, 2017).

In 2014, Congress added a second tier of limits through which an individual donor may contribute annually up to 300% of the General Party Limit into any of three specified segregated accounts that national party committees may elect to create (the "Segregated Account Limit"). *See* 52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(1)(B), (a)(9). The segregated accounts may be used to defray expenses incurred with respect to:

- (1) "a presidential nominating convention";
- (2) "the construction, purchase, renovation, operation, and furnishing of one or more headquarters buildings of the party or to repay loans the proceeds of which were used to defray such expenses (including expenses for obligations incurred during the 2-year period which ends on December 16, 2014)"; and
- (3) "the preparation for and the conduct of election recounts and contests and other legal proceedings."

52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(9).

These two tiers apply separately. A single individual may contribute the maximum through the General Party Limit and also the maximum to each of the national party committee's segregated accounts through the Segregated Account Limit. Therefore, an individual could have contributed as much as \$334,000 to a national party committee in 2015 by giving the maximum under the General Party Limit (\$33,400) and to each of the three segregated accounts (\$100,200 x 3).

The Commission has interpreted FECA's contribution limits to apply to a decedent's estate just as those limits would have applied to the decedent were he or she still living and making the contributions directly. *See, e.g.*, FEC Advisory Op. 2015-05 (Shaber), 2015 WL 4978865, at \*2 (Aug. 11, 2015) (citing FEC advisory opinions). If the decedent's donation would exceed the relevant contribution limit, the FEC has concluded that an independent third-party (such as a trustee or escrow agent) may retain the funds and make subsequent contributions in amounts that comply with FECA's limits until the beneficiary's interest is discharged. *Id*.

#### **B.** Joseph Shaber's Gift to the LNC

Joseph Shaber was a long-time LNC donor who died in August 2014. (Addendum ("Add.") 54-56, at ¶¶ 109-117.) Shaber's estate planning documents named the LNC a beneficiary of a trust, which was eventually determined to be worth \$235,575.20. (Add. 55-57, at ¶¶ 115-17, 121.) The LNC first had access to the money from Shaber's bequest in 2015. (Add. 56, at ¶ 119.) Shaber put no restriction on how the LNC was to use the funds, directing his estate representatives to distribute the LNC's share "outright." (Add. 57, at ¶ 123.) In June 2015, these representatives requested that the LNC immediately accept its full share through contributions pursuant to the Segregated Account Limits. (Add. 104-105, 108.) The LNC declined to do so, evidently at least in part to maintain standing for this lawsuit. (Add. 106.) Had the LNC elected to accept its interest in the Shaber estate using the Segregated Account Limits, it could have obtained the full amount in 2015, because the LNC's share was \$235,575.20, which was less than the \$334,000 it could have received annually from a single donor using segregated accounts. Because the LNC refused, however, Shaber's trustee and the LNC agreed to place the balance of the funds exceeding the General Party Limit in escrow to be annually distributed to the LNC pursuant to that limit until the balance is exhausted. (Add. 57-58, at ¶ 128.)

The LNC received its first distribution of \$33,400 from Shaber's gift in February 2015, and it received similar distributions in 2016 and 2017. (Add. 56, 58, at ¶¶ 119, 130-31.) The LNC also received a \$33,900 distribution in January 2018. (*See* LNC Report of Receipts and Disbursements at 38 (Feb. 20, 2018), http://docquery.fec.gov/cgi-bin/fecimg/?201802209094625986.)

#### C. The LNC's Segregated Account Expenses

During the relevant time period, the LNC incurred significant expenses that could have been defrayed through segregated account spending. In April 2014, the LNC purchased a building to serve as its headquarters for \$825,000, including a down payment of \$325,000. (Add. 20, at  $\P$  24; Add. 112.) The LNC has since that time paid a monthly minimum of \$2,900.21 toward mortgage principal and interest (*see* Add. 86-87), and it has also made additional payments to principal (*e.g.*, Add.

86 (lines 32, 34, 37)). Shortly after purchasing the headquarters, the LNC adopted a policy requiring it to budget "at least \$60,000 in . . . odd-numbered year[s] to pay down the principal" in order to pay the balance "as quickly as possible" and to avoid a "balloon payment." (Add. 20, at  $\P$  25.) The LNC failed to meet this target in 2015, raising only \$22,435.63 for headquarters expenses despite projecting more than \$65,000 in fundraising. (Add. 82-84.)

The LNC admits that in 2015, it spent a total of \$80,428.22 on all eligible expenses, including \$340.50 on its 2016 presidential nominating convention, \$7,260.61 on legal proceedings, and \$72,827.11 on its headquarters. (*See* Add. 115; Add. 86 (line 12).) That figure excludes the \$174,031.88 the LNC spent on "office rent, tax, maintenance & utilities" in 2013 and 2014,<sup>1</sup> which Congress included as permissible segregated-account spending. *See* 52 U.S.C.

§ 30116(a)(9)(B).

The LNC's significant spending on segregated-account-eligible expenses continued in 2016, the year this lawsuit was filed. (Add. 21, at ¶ 29.) The LNC's internal accounting documents show that it spent \$220,449,59 on its 2016 presidential nominating convention, \$193,873.52 on its headquarters, and \$52,928

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> This spending is reflected in the LNC's public filings available at https://www.fec.gov/data/disbursements/?committee\_id=C00255695&two\_year\_tr ansaction\_period=2014&recipient\_name=GREENPENZ2600+VIRGINIA+AVE+LLC&data\_type=processed&min\_date=01%2F01%2F2013&max\_date=12%2F31%2F2014.

on legal expenses. (*See* Add. 93-102.) Those expenses were generally consistent with the budget the LNC prepared in the fall of 2015 for its 2016 spending. (Add. 103; *see* Add. 83.)

Had the LNC elected to fully utilize the Segregated Account Limits to defray its actual and planned expenses, the LNC would have accepted Shaber's entire gift of \$235,575.20 by January 1, 2016. The following table reflects the expenses the LNC actually incurred for each category of spending, capped at the maximum contribution the LNC was permitted to receive from a single person under FECA, in 2015 and 2016. The categories for which the LNC's spending exceeded the relevant individual contribution limit are marked with an asterisk.

	1 40		
	2015	2016	Total
<b>General Party Limit</b>	\$33,400.00*	\$33,400.00*	\$66,800
§ 30116(a)(1)(B)			
Convention	\$340.50	\$100,200.00*	\$100,545.50
§ 30116(a)(9)(A)			
Headquarters	\$100,200.00*2	\$100,200.00*	\$200,400.00
§ 30116(a)(9)(B)			
Legal Proceedings	\$7,260.61	\$52,928.47	\$60,189.08
§ 30116(a)(9)(C)			
Total	\$141,201.11	\$286,728.47	\$427,929.58

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The LNC has accepted other contributions into segregated accounts. As of

December 31, 2016, the LNC has accepted at least \$57,918 into its segregated

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> The figure for the 2015 headquarters expenses includes both the amount stated in the Kraus Declaration the LNC supplied in this litigation as well as the amount it reported spending on office rent in 2013 and 2014 in its public filings

headquarters fund. (Add. 19, at ¶ 22.) That money includes contributions that would not have been permissible under FECA prior to the 2014 adoption of the Segregated Account Limits, because the donor had already contributed the maximum under the General Party Limit. (Add. 19, at ¶ 21.)

#### D. **District Court Proceedings**

The LNC filed its complaint in this case on January 25, 2016. Counts I and III of its complaint raise as-applied claims that the First Amendment prohibits the application of the General Party Limit and the Segregated Account Limits to Shaber's donation specifically. (Add. 75-78, at ¶¶ 21-27, 32-34.) Count II alleges that Congress's inclusion of the Segregated Account Limits renders the contribution limits applicable to donations to national party committees facially unconstitutional because they are content-based restrictions on speech. (Add. 77-78, at ¶ 28-31.)

Because Counts I and III are as-applied claims, the LNC's allegations of injury rely on its inability to accept its full share of the Shaber estate into its general account. (See, e.g., Add. 75, 78, at ¶¶ 18-19, 31.) As the LNC alleges, if it could take "immediate control over the balance of the Shaber funds," then "the LNC would substantially improve its ability to advocate and achieve electoral

with the FEC. As explained above, the latter amount may be defraved by segregated account funds pursuant to 52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(9)(B).

success." (Add. 76, at ¶ 26.) With respect to its facial claim in Count II, the LNC asserts that it "has comparatively less use" for segregated account funds than the major parties do and that it must spend much of the money in its general account on achieving ballot access instead of campaigning. (Add. 74, at ¶ 13.) The LNC similarly alleges that "its lack of resources" dissuades "[d]onors, voters, and prospective political candidates who might be attracted to the party's ideology" from supporting it. (Add. 73, at ¶ 12.)

In the district court, the Commission moved to dismiss, arguing that the LNC's decision not to accept its share of the Shaber estate was a self-inflicted injury incapable of supporting standing under Article III. In rejecting this argument, the district court concluded that the LNC's "precise" alleged injury was that it could not "accept the entire bequest for general expressive purposes when the bequest became available in 2015." (Add. 8, 10.) The district court recognized that the LNC would not have suffered a cognizable injury if its expenses for which segregated account contributions could be used were sufficient to free up for general use any portion of the Shaber bequest that it accepted into such a segregated account. (Add. 9-11.) But the court concluded that the LNC's expenses that could be defrayed by segregated account spending were insufficient to "free[] up the full value of the Shaber bequest . . . in 2015." (Add. 11.) In its analysis, the court excluded all of the LNC's substantial headquarters expenditures

from 2013-2014, although FECA permitted those expenses to be reimbursed through segregated account contributions in 2015. (Add. 10.) The district court also excluded all of the LNC's 2016 expenses, although the LNC filed this lawsuit in 2016 when a new set of annual contribution limits applied. (*Id.*)

#### **STANDARD OF REVIEW**

The LNC brought this case pursuant to FECA's special provision for judicial review of constitutional claims, 52 U.S.C. § 30110, which requires the district court to certify non-frivolous constitutional questions to the *en banc* court of appeals, *Holmes v. FEC*, 875 F.3d 1153, 1157 (D.C. Cir. 2017), *cert. denied*, 138 S. Ct. 2018 (2018). This case comes to this Court after such a certification, rather than as an appeal. Regardless of that posture, this Court reviews the question whether the LNC has standing under Article III de novo, and it owes "no deference to the district court's" decision. *Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. Presidential Advisory Comm'n on Election Integrity*, 878 F.3d 371, 377 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 2017); *see In re Cao*, 619 F.3d 410, 414, 421 (5th Cir. 2010).

#### ARGUMENT

The LNC cannot demonstrate that it has Article III standing to pursue any of its claims. "To establish standing, the plaintiff must show (1) it has suffered a 'concrete and particularized' injury (2) that is 'fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant' and (3) that is 'likely' to be 'redressed by a favorable

decision,' i.e., a decision granting the plaintiff the relief it seeks." *Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr.*, 878 F.3d at 376-77 (quoting *Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife*, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992)). The LNC's claims fail at all three steps. First, FECA permitted the LNC to accept the full amount Shaber left to it in 2015, and its choice not to accept that money is a self-inflicted injury incapable of supporting standing. Second, even assuming that the LNC suffered a cognizable injury in 2015, its decision not to file suit until 2016 means that those alleged injuries could not be redressed by the declaratory and injunctive relief it seeks. Third, the LNC's allegations that FECA places it at a competitive disadvantage compared to other political parties do not establish standing because its claimed disadvantage is caused by its inability to convince additional donors to make contributions, not FECA.

# I. THE LNC'S ALLEGED INABILITY TO ACCESS SHABER'S CONTRIBUTION IS A WHOLLY SELF-INFLICTED INJURY

The LNC lacks standing to pursue its as-applied claims because the harm it claims to suffer is entirely the product of its own choice not to accept all of the Shaber funds. This Court has "consistently held that self-inflicted harm doesn't satisfy the basic requirements for standing." *Nat'l Family Planning & Reprod. Health Ass'n v. Gonzales*, 468 F.3d 826, 831 (D.C. Cir. 2006). This is so both because a self-inflicted "harm does not amount to an 'injury' cognizable under

Article III" and because the harm is not "fairly traceable to the defendant's challenged conduct." *Id.* 

In the campaign finance context, this means that a recipient's voluntary choice not to accept a permitted contribution cannot create standing to challenge the constitutionality of the applicable limit. In *McConnell*, a group of candidates alleged that they suffered an injury stemming from Congress's decision to raise the ceiling on individual contributions, a decision the candidates claimed was unconstitutional. 540 U.S. at 226-28. The candidates did not "wish to solicit or accept" contributions in amounts permitted by the new limits, allegedly "making it more difficult for them to compete in elections." *Id.* at 228. The Supreme Court rejected this claim, holding that the candidates ' "alleged inability to compete stems not from the operation of" the increased contributions, i.e., their personal choice." *Id.* 

Similar results apply when plaintiffs claim contribution limits are too restrictive. *See Zimmerman v. City of Austin*, 881 F.3d 378, 389-90 (5th Cir. 2018), *petition for cert. filed*, No. 18-93 (U.S. July 17, 2018). In *Zimmerman*, a candidate for local office argued that a city's "aggregate limit" on the amount of contributions a candidate could receive from outside of the relevant constituency was unconstitutional even though he had not himself attempted to solicit

contributions from such donors. *Id.* at 383, 389. In support of standing, the candidate claimed that the aggregate limit caused him to forego making the necessary solicitations because doing so would not have been cost-effective. *Id.* The Fifth Circuit rejected this argument, holding that the candidate's "decision to forego solicitations" was a "self-inflicted injury" that was not "sufficient to confer standing." *Id.* 

It is undisputed here that FECA permitted the LNC to accept its entire share of the Shaber estate at the time it became available. (*See* Add. 78, at ¶ 33.) Under the limits applicable to 2015, FECA permitted the LNC to accept as much as \$334,000 from any single donor by maximizing receipts subject to the General Party Limit and the Segregated Account Limits. Shaber placed no other conditions on the LNC's ability to accept the full amount of his gift; indeed, his estate representatives asked the LNC in 2015 to use the Segregated Account Limits to do so. (Add. 57, at ¶ 123; Add. 104-105; Add. 108.)

The LNC's allegation that it desires to use the funds Shaber left it for "general expressive purposes" because it has "comparatively less use for funds" under the Segregated Account Limits does not make its purported injury any less self-inflicted. (Add. 74-75, at ¶¶ 13, 18.) Money is fungible, and therefore a dollar the LNC raises through the Segregated Account Limits to defray convention, headquarters, or legal proceedings expenses is an extra dollar from the LNC's

general account that becomes available for its general expressive purposes. Add. 25, at ¶ 38; *see Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int'l Union, Local 1000*, 567 U.S. 298, 317 n.6 (2012) ("[O]ur cases have recognized that a union's money is fungible, so even if the new fee were spent entirely for nonpolitical activities, it would free up other funds to be spent for political purposes."). As in *Zimmerman*, the LNC's choice here not to pursue permitted political fundraising because it objects to legal constraints placed on that fundraising does not show a cognizable injury.

As a factual matter, moreover, the LNC's assertion that it does not need or want money to defray segregated account expenses is belied by the record. Even before Congress enacted the Segregated Account Limits, the LNC engaged in project-based fundraising to defray specific, identified expenses. (Add. 16-19, 21, at ¶¶ 10-13, 18-22, 27.) Indeed, it even highlighted the importance of its convention expenses to the Supreme Court when doing so benefitted its theories in a different challenge to FECA. See Brief of the Political Parties, McConnell, No. 02-1727 (and consolidated cases), 2003 WL 21911213, at \*21, \*65-66 (U.S. filed July 8, 2003). The LNC solicited contributions into its "building fund" and "guaranteed" prospective donors that those contributions "must, by law, be spent on buying an office or associated expenses." (Add. 18-19, at ¶ 19.) And it is LNC policy to "completely pay off the headquarters building as quickly as possible" by budgeting "at least \$60,000" every non-election year "to pay down the principal."

(Add. 20, at  $\P$  25.) The Segregated Account Limits provided the LNC with a mechanism to do just that. The LNC chose not to do so.

The record also establishes that the LNC has not hesitated to accept other contributions subject to the Segregated Account Limits. For example, the LNC has accepted more than \$55,000 into its segregated headquarters fund pursuant to those limits. (Add. 19, at ¶ 22.) The LNC could have done the same with Shaber's gift in 2015, but it elected not to do so. These "budgetary choices" cannot serve as the predicate for standing under Article III. *Fair Emp't Council of Greater Wash., Inc. v. BMC Mktg. Corp.*, 28 F.3d 1268, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1994).

# II. THE LNC'S SEGREGATED ACCOUNT EXPENSES IN 2015 AND 2016 COULD HAVE EASILY ABSORBED SHABER'S ENTIRE GIFT

The district court concluded that the LNC's ability to accept the entire Shaber contribution at once using segregated accounts did not ameliorate the LNC's alleged injury because the LNC lacked sufficient expenses in 2015 to "free[] up the full value" of Shaber's gift in that year. (*See* Add. at 11). This conclusion is wrong for two reasons.

First, contrary to FECA's plain text, the district court categorically excluded expenses the LNC incurred for its headquarters in 2013 and 2014. When Congress enacted the Segregated Account Limits, it expressly provided that national party committees could use funds raised into a segregated account to defray headquarters "expenses for obligations incurred during the 2-year period which ends on

December 16, 2014." 52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(9)(B). The LNC's headquarters expenses incurred in those years were directly relevant, because the party could have used funds from segregated account contributions — including amounts from Shaber's estate made available in 2015 — to defray outstanding expenses and thereby offset general account spending.

Second, the district court's exclusion of the LNC's 2016 expenditures was erroneous. "Standing is assessed as of the time a suit commences," *Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. EPA*, 642 F.3d 192, 199 (D.C. Cir. 2011), which in this case was 2016. Therefore, the LNC's 2016 budget expectations and expenditures must be considered for the Court to determine whether the LNC suffered any injury then.

It is undisputed that the LNC's 2016 segregated-account expenses were more than sufficient to offset the full amount of Shaber's gift. As the district court found, the LNC spent "roughly \$467,251.58 on 52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(9)sanctioned expenses in 2016." (Add. 21, at ¶ 29.) That spending was planned. The LNC budgeted \$200,000 in 2016 spending toward its presidential nominating convention, and it actually spent more than \$20,000 above what it had budgeted. (Add. 103.) The LNC also spent \$193,873.52 on its headquarters in 2016, including \$156,802.52 on mortgage and interest alone. (Add. 94, 97.) So the LNC could have freed up far more than its total share of the Shaber estate for general

spending by accepting funds to cover those expenses into a convention or headquarters segregated account. Even accepting the LNC's account of its spending *and* excluding the amount it spent on its headquarters in 2013-2014 (*see* Add. 115-16, at ¶¶ 4-7), the LNC could have exhausted the gift by accepting the maximum limit into its general account and *either* its convention account or headquarters segregated account.

In short, the LNC could have accepted the entire amount Shaber left it by the time this lawsuit was filed. By accepting Shaber's contribution through segregated accounts, the LNC would have been able to defray more of its expenses and would have freed an equal amount in its general account. The LNC's choice not to take that route is a self-inflicted injury.

## III. THE LNC'S ALLEGED INJURY IN 2015 WAS NOT REDRESSABLE IN 2016 OR AFTERWARDS

The LNC's decision not to file suit until 2016 also means that the injury the district court found sufficient cannot be redressed by the declaratory and injunctive relief the LNC now seeks. The district court concluded that the LNC was injured in 2015 by not being able to accept the full amount of Shaber's gift at the time it became available. (*See* Add. at 8, 11.) To remedy this alleged injury, the LNC's complaint seeks only declaratory and injunctive relief; compensatory damages are not at issue. (*See* Add. 78-79.) Time only runs in one direction, however, and the remedies the LNC first sought in 2016 would not remedy any 2015 harm.

"Past exposure to illegal conduct does not in itself show a present case or controversy regarding injunctive relief." O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 495-96 (1974). Thus, when an injunction or declaration could not "conceivably remedy" any past wrong," the plaintiff's alleged injuries are not redressable. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 108-09 (1998); see also Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977) (holding that released prisoners lacked standing to obtain injunctive relief to challenge constitutionality of past incarceration); Nat. Res. Def. Council v. Pena, 147 F.3d 1012, 1021-22 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (holding that plaintiffs' alleged injury of exclusion from past meetings would not be remedied by injunction prohibiting defendant from using materials generated from those meetings); Sykes v. FEC, 335 F. Supp. 2d 84, 92 (D.D.C. 2004) ("A declaratory judgment that portions of FECA are unconstitutional would do nothing to [remedy alleged constitutional violations] that have already occurred.").

Similarly, when this lawsuit was filed in late January 2016, no declaration or injunction could have retroactively allowed the LNC to spend the money from Shaber's gift on general expressive purposes *in 2015*. At most, a court could allow the LNC access to the remaining Shaber funds being held in escrow, but even that would not permit the LNC to access those funds in 2015.

Nor would it be significant for the standing analysis that any similar injury might recur. The LNC contended below that the Commission's "arguments sound

more in mootness than standing" and suggested that its claims fall within the exception for disputes that are capable of repetition, yet evade review. (*See* Add. 12 n.7.) As the Supreme Court has held, however, "that doctrine will not revive a dispute which became moot before the action commenced." *Renne v. Geary*, 501 U.S. 312, 320 (1991); *accord Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs.* (*TOC*), *Inc.*, 528 U.S. 167, 191 (2000) ("[I]f a plaintiff lacks standing at the time the action commences, the fact that the dispute is capable of repetition yet evading review will not entitle the complainant to a federal judicial forum."). It is therefore of no moment that the LNC has identified other current or potential contributions that might exceed the General Party Limit. As to the only contribution at issue in the LNC's complaint, Shaber's, the LNC lacks any redressable injury.

# IV. THE LNC'S ALLEGATIONS OF COMPETITIVE INJURY SIMILARLY FAIL TO SUPPORT ARTICLE III STANDING

The LNC also lacks standing to the extent its claims are dependent on its allegations that FECA's contribution limits in general, and the Segregated Account Limits in particular, place the Libertarian Party at a competitive disadvantage visà-vis other political parties. These allegations cannot support standing in this case.

The fact that other political parties have different expenses does not establish that FECA causes the LNC to suffer a cognizable injury. The LNC alleges that it is harmed by the Segregated Account Limits because its monetary "needs" for the types of expenses that may be defrayed with segregated account funds are "not

commensurate with the needs of the two major political parties." (Add. 74, at  $\P$  13.) That assertion, however, is akin to the oft-rejected argument that a party is harmed because it is at a fundraising disadvantage to its competitors. *See, e.g.*, *McConnell*, 540 U.S. at 227; *FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc.*, 479 U.S. 238, 257 (1986) ("[P]olitical 'free trade' does not necessarily require that all who participate in the political marketplace do so with exactly equal resources."); *Buckley*, 424 U.S. at 48. The Supreme Court rejected that exact argument when the Libertarian Party presented it in *Buckley*. 424 U.S. at 33-34 & n.40 (noting that the "record [was] devoid of support" for the Libertarian Party's claim that FECA's contribution limitations "have a serious effect on the initiation and scope of minorparty and independent candidacies."). There is no reason for this Court to reach a different result.

In any event, the LNC's claims of competitive disadvantage are not fairly traceable to FECA's contribution limits. If the LNC faces higher costs to "secur[e] access to the ballot" than other political parties (Add. 73, at ¶ 12), those costs are imposed by various state election statutes, not FECA. Similarly, the LNC's alleged difficulty in raising sufficient funds is determined not by FECA's limits but by the individual decisions of potential donors. FECA's limits — including the Segregated Account Limits — apply identically to all parties. *See Buckley*, 424 U.S. at 31 (noting that FECA "applies the same limitations on contributions to all

candidates regardless of their present occupations, ideological views, or party affiliations."). From the perspective of candidates and political committees, the "overall effect" of FECA's contribution limits "is merely to require candidates and political committees to raise funds from a greater number of persons." *Id.* at 21-22.

Finally, the LNC's "ability to advocate and achieve electoral success" would not be remedied by striking down the Segregated Account Limits. (*See* Add. 76, at ¶ 26.) As the Supreme Court has recognized, FECA's contribution limits actually "benefit minor-party and independent candidates relative to their major-party opponents because major-party candidates receive far more money in large contributions." *Buckley*, 424 U.S. at 33; *see Albanese v. FEC*, 78 F.3d 66, 68-69 (2d Cir. 1996) ("Indeed, since FECA limits the amounts of contributions that are permissible, the elimination of those ceilings could well place candidates whose constituencies do not include a plethora of wealthy supporters at an even greater disadvantage."). Striking down those limits could actually exacerbate the LNC's funding disadvantage compared to the Democratic and Republican parties.

#### CONCLUSION

The LNC lacks standing to sue under Article III, and this Court should decline to answer the questions certified to it for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

Respectfully submitted,

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September 10, 2018

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FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION 1050 First Street NE Washington, DC 20463 (202) 694-1650

# **CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE**

This motion complies with the type-volume limitation of Fed. R. App. P.

27(d)(2)(B) because it contains 5,162 words, excluding the parts of the motion

exempted by Fed. R. App. P. 27 (d)(2)(B) and 32(f).

The motion also complies with the typeface and type style requirements of Fed. R. App. P. 27(d)(1)(E) because it was prepared using Microsoft Word 14-point Times New Roman.

<u>/s/Jacob S. Siler</u> Jacob S. Siler Attorney Federal Election Commission

# **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

I hereby certify that on this 10th day of September, 2018, I electronically filed the foregoing motion with the Clerk of the Court for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit by using the appellate CM/ECF system. The participants in the case are registered CM/ECF users and service will be accomplished by the appellate CM/ECF System.

> /s/Jacob S. Siler Jacob S. Siler Attorney jsiler@fec.gov

# **CERTIFICATE OF PARTIES AND AMICI CURIAE**

Pursuant to Circuit Rules 27(a)(4) and 28(a)(1)(A), the Federal Election Commission hereby certifies that the Libertarian National Committee, Inc., was the plaintiff in the district court and has been designated as the appellant in this Court. The Federal Election Commission was the defendant in the district court and has been designated as the appellee in this Court. There were no *amici curiae* in the district court. Although no *amici curiae* have yet filed briefs in this Court, the Federal Election Commission has given its consent for the Goldwater Institute and the Institute for Free Speech to participate as *amici curiae* in support of the appellant.

# **ORAL ARGUMENT SCHEDULED FOR NOVEMBER 30, 2018**

No. 18-5227

# UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

## LIBERTARIAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

## FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION,

Defendant-Appellee.

On Certification of Constitutional Questions from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia

# ADDENDUM TO FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION'S MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF SUBJECT-MATTER JURISDICTION

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# ADDENDUM CONTENTS

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8.	Email from Caryn Ann Harlos to "Inc-business@hp.lp.org", Subject: Re: [Lnc-business] Added Mortgage Payment (Nov. 29, 2016) (excerpts) (Docket No. 26-21)
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#### UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

LIBERTARIAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE, INC.,

Plaintiff,

Civil Action No. 16-121 (BAH)

v.

Chief Judge Beryl A. Howell

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION,

Defendant.

#### **MEMORANDUM OPINION**

The plaintiff, the Libertarian National Committee ("LNC"), was left a testamentary bequest by Joseph Shaber in 2015 in the amount of \$235,575.20 but was allegedly unable to accept the bequest in full due to restrictions imposed by the Federal Election Commission Act ("FECA"), *see* 52 U.S.C. §§ 30116 and 30125. The LNC challenges certain aspects of the statutory scheme as unconstitutional and seeks certification of the constitutional issues it raises to the D.C. Circuit *en banc*, pursuant to 52 U.S.C. § 30110.<sup>1</sup> The defendant, the Federal Election Commission ("FEC"), has moved to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) on the ground that LNC lacks standing to bring this suit. This potential Article III issue must be addressed before certifying any question to the D.C. Circuit under § 30110. *See Holmes*, 823 F.3d at 70 ("If the requirements of Article III of the Constitution are satisfied, the district court must 'immediately' 'certify all questions of constitutionality of this Act to the United

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Pursuant to 52 U.S.C. § 30110, "the national committee of any political party" may bring an action "in the appropriate district court" challenging the constitutionality of a FECA provision. Section 30110 further provides that the district court "immediately shall certify" any non-frivolous constitutional challenge to FECA to the court of appeals *en banc*. *Id.*; *see also Holmes v. FEC*, 823 F.3d 69, 71 (D.C. Cir. 2016) ("[D]istrict courts do not certify 'frivolous' constitutional questions to the *en banc* court of appeals." (quoting *Cal. Med. Ass'n v. FEC*, 453 U.S. 182, 192 n.4 (1981))).

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States court of appeals for the circuit involved ... sitting *en banc*."); *see also Republican Party of La. v. FEC*, 146 F. Supp. 3d 1, 8 (D.D.C. 2015) ("This Court may properly dismiss [the plaintiffs'] claims [under analogous Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act] without convening a three-judge panel if [the plaintiffs] lack standing to bring those claims."); *Holistic Candlers & Consumers Ass'n v. FDA*, 664 F.3d 940, 943 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (describing standing as a "threshold jurisdictional question" (quoting *Byrd v. EPA*, 174 F.3d 239, 243 (D.C. Cir. 1999)). For the reasons set out below, the FEC's motion will be denied.

#### I. BACKGROUND

The challenged statutory framework is summarized before discussing the particular facts underlying this suit and the LNC's claims.

#### A. FECA's Limits on Contributions to Political Committees

Under FECA, "no person," including, *inter alia*, a testamentary estate,<sup>2</sup> "shall make contributions . . . to the political committees established and maintained by a national political party, which are not the authorized political committees of any candidate, in any calendar year which, in the aggregate, exceed \$25,000." 52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(1). FECA was amended in 2014 to allow individuals to make additional donations of up to three hundred percent of the annual contribution limit set out in § 30116(a)(1) for each of three specified purposes: (1) "expenses incurred with respect to a presidential nominating convention;" (2) "expenses incurred with respect to the construction, purchase, renovation, operation, and furnishing of one or more headquarters buildings of the party;" and (3) "expenses incurred with respect to the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> The FEC has interpreted the word "person" as used in § 30116(a)(1) to include an individual's testamentary estate, *see*, *e.g.*, Pl.'s Opp'n, Ex. C ("FEC Advisory Op. 2015-05"), ECF No. 12-3. The LNC does not challenge this interpretation of the statute, and, in a recent case involving these same parties, this Court explained that the FEC's interpretation is entitled to deference under *Chevron*, *U.S.A.*, *Inc. v. Natural Resources Def. Council, Inc.*, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). *See LNC v. FEC* ("*LNC I*"), 930 F. Supp. 2d 154, 165 (D.D.C. 2013) ("The FEC's interpretation of the statute to include a testamentary bequest appears reasonable, is not seriously challenged by the LNC in its briefs, and is entitled to deference under *Chevron*...").

preparation for and the conduct of election recounts and contests and other legal proceedings." *Id.* § 30116(a)(9)(A)-(C). Donations accepted for the three enumerated purposes under § 30116(a)(9) must be funneled into a "separate, segregated account" and not comingled with other funds. *Id.* 

The contribution limits set forth in § 30116(a)(1) are adjusted for inflation in oddnumbered years such that, at the time this Complaint was filed, the annual limit on a general account contribution was \$33,400, and the annual limit on a segregated account contribution for each of the three segregated accounts was \$100,200. *See id.* § 30116(c). Accordingly, in 2015, the total amount that a party's political committee could accept from any person, including a testamentary estate, was \$334,000.

### B. Bequest to the LNC by Joseph Shaber

The LNC is "the national committee of the Libertarian Party of the United States." Compl. ¶ 1. Its mission is "to field national [p]residential tickets, to support its state party affiliates in running candidates for public office, and to conduct other political activities in furtherance of a libertarian public policy agenda in the United States." *Id.* From 1988 to 2011, Mr. Shaber made small, periodic donations to the LNC. *Id.* ¶ 15. "Unbeknown to the LNC, it was made a beneficiary of the Joseph Shaber Revocable Living Trust U/T/D February 11, 2010." *Id.* ¶ 16. Upon his death on August 23, 2014, Mr. Shaber's trust became irrevocable, with the LNC's share amounting to\$235,575.20. *Id.* ¶ 17. No restrictions were placed on how the LNC could utilize the bequest, and the trustee maintains that it is "entirely up to the LNC how it wishes to apply the distribution." *See* Def.'s Mot. Dismiss at 6–7, ECF No. 9 (quoting Letter from Trustee's Counsel to FEC (dated June 15, 2015), available online at http://saos.fec.gov/ aodocs/1317218.pdf (last visited Dec. 27, 2016)).

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On February 23, 2015, the trustee distributed \$33,400 of the bequest to the LNC's general account. *Id.* ¶ 19. LNC asserts that it "would [have] accept[ed] and spen[t] the entire amount of the Shaber bequest for its general expressive purposes" but for FECA's contribution limits. *Id.* ¶¶ 18–19. On May 6, 2015, the trustee requested an advisory opinion from the FEC as to whether the remainder of the bequest could be placed in a third-party escrow account for annual disbursements pursuant to \$ 30116(a)(1). The FEC approved the trustee's request on August 11, 2015. *See generally* FEC Advisory Op. 2015-05. In January 2016, the LNC accepted another \$33,400 of the Shaber bequest from escrow for deposit into the party's general purpose account. Compl. ¶ 20. Thus, as of the filing of the complaint, approximately \$168,775.20 of the bequest remained in escrow. *See* Def.'s Mot. Dismiss at 7; Pl.'s Opp'n Def.'s Mot. Dismiss ("Pl.'s Opp'n") at 20, ECF No. 12 (referencing \$168,000 in escrow).

#### C. The LNC's Claims

The LNC's complaint alleges in three counts that application of the § 30116 contribution limits to the Shaber bequest "violates the First Amendment speech and associational rights of the LNC and its supporters," *id.* ¶ 27 (Count I), and that the segregated accounts scheme, which allows parties to accept larger donations for three specified purposes only, amounts to a contentbased restriction on speech, both on its face and as applied to the Shaber bequest *id.* ¶¶ 31, 34 (Counts II and III); *see also* Pl.'s Opp'n at 8 ("[P]rivileging large donations based on their purposes—as if a party would be corrupted by a \$33,401 donation for general purposes, but not a \$312,000 donation for conventions, buildings, and lawyers[—]is an irrational content-based speech restriction."). The LNC seeks "[a]n order permanently enjoining [the FEC] . . . from enforcing 52 U.S.C. §§ 30116 and 30125, either generally or in relation to the Shaber [b]equest," in addition to "[d]eclaratory relief consistent with the injunction." *Id.*, Prayer for Relief ¶¶ 1–2.

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# Add. 4

## II. LEGAL STANDARD

"Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction," possessing 'only that power authorized by Constitution and statute." *Gunn v. Minton*, 133 S. Ct. 1059, 1064 (2013) (quoting *Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am.*, 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994)). Indeed, federal courts are "forbidden . . . from acting beyond our authority," *Network IP*, *LLC v. FCC*, 548 F.3d 116, 120 (D.C. Cir. 2008), and, therefore, have "an affirmative obligation 'to consider whether the constitutional and statutory authority exist for us to hear each dispute," *James Madison Ltd. ex rel. Hecht v. Ludwig*, 82 F.3d 1085, 1092 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (quoting *Herbert v. Nat'l Acad. of Scis.*, 974 F.2d 192, 196 (D.C. Cir. 1992)).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) is the proper vehicle for moving to dismiss a complaint due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Absent subject-matter jurisdiction over a case, the court must dismiss it, Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3); *Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp.*, 546 U.S. 500, 506–07 (2006), and the burden of establishing any jurisdictional facts to support the exercise of the subject matter jurisdiction rests on the plaintiff, *see Hertz Corp. v. Friend*, 559 U.S. 77, 96–97 (2010); *Moms Against Mercury v. FDA*, 483 F.3d 824, 828 (D.C. Cir. 2007). A court "may consider materials outside the pleadings" in determining whether jurisdiction exists. *Jerome Stevens Pharm., Inc. v. FDA*, 402 F.3d 1249, 1253 (D.C. Cir. 2005); *see also Belhas v. Ya'Alon*, 515 F.3d 1279, 1281 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (examining materials outside the pleadings in ruling on a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction).

With regard to standing, Article III of the Constitution restricts the power of federal courts to hear only "Cases" and "Controversies." U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. "The doctrine of standing gives meaning to these constitutional limits by 'identify[ing] those disputes which are appropriately resolved through the judicial process." *Susan B. Anthony List v. Drie haus*,

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134 S. Ct. 2334, 2341 (2014) (alterations in original) (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)); Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1146 (2013) ("One element of the case-or-controversy requirement' is that plaintiffs 'must establish that they have standing to sue." (quoting *Raines v. Byrd*, 521 U.S. 811, 818 (1997))). As the Supreme Court has explained, "the irreducible constitutional minimum of standing contains three elements." Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 560. First, the plaintiff must have suffered an "injury in fact," *i.e.*, "an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical." Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Second, there must be "a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of," *i.e.*, the injury alleged must be fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant. Id. Finally, it must be likely that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. Id. at 561. In analyzing whether a party has standing, the Court "must be 'careful not to decide the questions on the merits for or against the plaintiff, and must therefore assume that on the merits the plaintiff[] would be successful in [its] claims." In re Navy Chaplaincy, 534 F.3d 756, 760 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (quoting City of Waukesha v. EPA, 320 F.3d 228, 235 (D.C. Cir. 2003)).

#### III. DISCUSSION

In considering the FEC's motion to dismiss the LNC's complaint for lack of standing, a recent case in this Court involving the same parties is instructive since, in that case, the LNC was found to have standing to challenge the predecessor provision to § 30116(a). *See LNC v. FEC* (*"LNC I"*), 930 F. Supp. 2d 154, 163 (D.D.C. 2013) (Wilkins, J.).<sup>3</sup> The *LNC I* Court explained that "[t]he LNC satisfies the core elements of Article III's case-or-controversy requirement,

Add. 6

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> FECA was transferred from Title 2 to Title 52 on September 1, 2014. Thus, *LNC I* refers to 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1), which is currently codified at 52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(1).

because it alleges an injury connected to the FEC's conduct—the prevention of obtaining immediate control of the entire . . . bequest—that would be redressed by a favorable decision." *Id.* 

The FEC advances two arguments in an apparent effort to show why *LNC I*'s standing analysis does not apply here, but neither argument is persuasive.<sup>4</sup> First, relying on the 2014 amendment to § 30116, which established the segregated accounts scheme and therefore increased the total amount a person may donate to a political committee in a given year, the FEC asserts that the LNC's injury is self-inflicted because the LNC *could* accept the full bequest but has chosen not to. Second, and in the alternative, the FEC argues that even if not self-inflicted, the alleged injury, which the FEC construes as a competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis the two major political parties, is not a valid injury in fact under binding precedent, that actors in the political marketplace, not FECA, caused LNC's claimed competitive disadvantage, and that a favorable decision from this Court is not likely to redress the claimed injury. The FEC's arguments are addressed *seriatim*.

#### A. Self-Inflicted Injury

"[S]elf-inflicted harm doesn't satisfy the basic requirements for standing" since it is neither a "cognizable" injury nor "fairly traceable to the defendant's challenged conduct." *Nat'l Family Planning & Reproductive Health Ass'n, Inc. v. Gonzalez*, 468 F.3d 826, 831 (D.C. Cir. 2006); *accord Afifi v. Lynch*, 101 F. Supp. 3d 90, 110 (D.D.C. 2015); *Ellis v. Comm'r of IRS*, 67 F. Supp. 3d 325, 336–37 (D.D.C. 2014), *aff'd sub nom. Ellis v. C.I.R.*, 622 Fed. App'x 2 (D.C. Cir. 2015). According to the FEC, the LNC has *chosen* not to accept the entire Shaber bequest even though it could and, consequently, any injury suffered by the LNC is self-inflicted and

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Notably, while referencing *LNC I* for various propositions, the FEC fails to engage with *LNC I*'s most pertinent holding that the LNC had standing to challenge the contribution limits applicable to testamentary estates.

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thereby insufficient to establish standing. Def.'s Mot. Dismiss at 10–14. As support, the FEC points out that § 30116(a) permits the LNC to accept immediately the entire balance of the bequest by funneling funds beyond the general spending account into the special-purpose segregated accounts. *See id.* at 11. Indeed, FECA allows a committee of a national party to accept, in addition to \$33,400 for general spending, \$100,200 for the party's presidential nominating convention, \$100,200 for work on the party headquarters, and \$100,200 for legal fees, which, when combined, far exceeds the balance in the escrow account. *See id.* ("FECA allows the LNC in 2016 to receive a total of \$334,000 from any one donor."). Accordingly, the FEC contends that the alleged harm flows from the LNC's choice not to deposit the funds into segregated accounts.<sup>5</sup>

The FEC's argument papers over the nuance in the LNC's claims. The LNC does not argue that the amended statutory scheme allowing a party to accept a contribution as large as \$334,000 prohibits the LNC from accepting the entire Shaber bequest in one lump sum. Rather, the LNC alleges that the harm is due to the restriction on the political committee's inability to accept the entire bequest for *general expressive purposes* when the bequest became available in 2015. *See* Compl. ¶¶ 18–19; PL's Opp'n at 8 ("LNC's injury is that it cannot accept money—from Shaber's bequest and from other donors—for spending as it wishes.") (emphasis in

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> The FEC's reliance on *Sykes v. FEC*, 335 F. Supp. 2d 84, 87 (D.D.C. 2004), *see* Def.'s Mot. Dismiss at 10– 11; Def.'s Reply at 7, is misplaced. According to the FEC, "[i]n the campaign finance context, any harm allegedly arising from a political actor's voluntary choice notto accept contributions that FECA allows it to accept is a selfinflicted injury that cannot support standing." Def.'s Mot. Dismiss at 10. In *Sykes*, the plaintiff, a Green Party candidate for Senate, challenged FECA's tacit authorization of out-of-state campaign contributions. *Sykes*, 335 F. Supp. 2d at 85. He argued that FECA's silence as to out-of-state contributions injured his opportunity to compete in the Senate race, *id.* at 88–89, even though he had not actually received any out-of-state contributions, *id.* at 87. This Court held, *inter alia*, that the plaintiff had not established an injury in fact and therefore lacked standing to sue because he had challenged FECA's "*failure to restrict* out-of-state contributions" as opposed to "[a] portion[] of FECA which *directly restricted* his own campaign activity." *Id.* at 89 (emphasis in original). Here, § 30116 "directly restrict[s]" the LNC's ability to accept the Shaber bequest. Accordingly, the discussion in *Sykes* about the standard for asserting an injury in fact does not support the FEC's position.

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original). Thus, the fact that the LNC could accept the entire bequest by utilizing its segregated accounts does not eliminate the alleged harm. The precise harm alleged confers a sufficient injury in fact to sustain standing. *See Wagner v. FEC*, 717 F.3d 1007, 1010 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 2013) ("Our constitutional jurisdiction is clear. Because Appellants declare that they would make political contributions but for section 441c [52 U.S.C. § 30119's predecessor provision], they have Article III standing. Section 441c allegedly deprives them of a legally protected interest (making a political contribution) that an order of this court declaring section 441c unenforceable would remedy."); *Republican Party of La. v. FEC*, \_\_\_\_ F. Supp. 3d \_\_\_\_, No. 15-cv-1241, 2016 WL 6601420, at \*4 (D.D.C. Nov. 7, 2016) (three-judge panel) ("The state party's inability to use corporate funds in its possession for additional [federal election activity] in which it would like to engage qualifies as a concrete injury.").

The FEC, however, advances an additional theory as to why the LNC's injury is selfinflicted. *See* Def.'s Mot. Dismiss at 12. The FEC suggests that "LNC's public disclosure reports show that it actually spends significant amounts on expenses for which Segregated Account funds may be used" and, therefore, the LNC "could have spent the entire bequest during this election cycle had it chosen to do so." *Id.* According to the FEC, "the LNC spent in excess of \$940,000 on its Alexandria building headquarters" during the 2014 election cycle, *id.*, and spent \$120,000 on its 2014 national convention, *id.* at 12–13. At the time the FEC moved to dismiss this case, "the LNC has spent approximately \$63,000 on its headquarters" during the 2016 election cycle. *Id.* at 13; *see also* Def.'s Notice Supplemental Jurisdictional Facts at 2, ECF No. 18 ("Since the parties completed briefing, the LNC has filed public disclosure reports with the FEC confirming that it has in fact spent at least as much money on segregated account purposes in 2016 as it would have received from the bequest."). Based on these spending sums,

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the FEC posits that "[i]f the LNC were to accept the remaining \$168,775.20 of the Shaber bequest into its Segregated Accounts and spend it on its convention, building, or legal expenses, that same amount from the LNC's General Account would become available for other purposes—including advocacy and elections." *Id.* at 13–14. The FEC thus contends that the LNC's alleged injury "is not an injury in fact but a mere 'self-inflicted budgetary choice." *Id.* at 14 (quoting *Envtl. Integrity Project v. McCarthy*, 13-cv-1306, 2015 WL 5730427, at \*8 (D.D.C. Sept. 29, 2015)).

The FEC's argument has some surface-level appeal, but does not stand up to scrutiny. The LNC's precise injury is that it was not permitted to accept the Shaber bequest in full, when it became available, to spend on federal election activities. *See* Compl. ¶ 18 ("LNC would accept and spend the entire amount of the Shaber bequest for its general expressive purposes, including expression in aid of its federal election efforts."). Since the bequest became available in 2015, the LNC's 2014 and 2016 expenditures are of no moment.<sup>6</sup> Likewise, as the LNC points out, "FECA's limits apply per annum," PL's Opp'n at 13, so the LNC's total spending in a given election cycle is a red herring. What matters is that in 2015, LNC spent no money on a presidential nominating convention, \$72,827.11 on its headquarters, and \$7,260.61 on legal proceedings, totaling \$80,872.72 in segregated purpose spending. Decl. of Robert Kraus, Operations Director, Libertarian National Committee, Inc. ¶¶ 5–7, ECF No. 13. On these undisputed attestations, if the LNC had accepted the entire bequest when it became available by

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> The LNC contends that even if the entire bequest has been accepted into segregated accounts, it still would not have freed up the same amount of money for expressive purposes. *See* Pl.'s Resp. Notice of Supplemental Juris dictional Facts at 2, ECF No. 19 ("Worse still, the FEC's math doesn't add up."). The Court need not resolve this factual dispute given that the LNC's 2016 expenditures are irrelevant for standing purposes. The Court also need not address the LNC's argument that "the FEC bars political parties from making strategic withdrawals from testamentary bequest trusts," Pl.'s Opp'n at 9, and thus would not permit the LNC to accept the bequest into segregated accounts in order to free up funds in the general account for other purposes. Even if the FEC did prohibit this, the dispositive and undisputed allegation here is that the LNC did not spend an amount equivalent to the remaining bequest funds on segregated account purposes in 2015.

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taking \$33,400 of the bequest into its general account and the remainder (approximately \$168,000, *see* Def.'s Mot. Dismiss at 7; Pl.'s Opp'n at 20) into segregated purpose accounts, the LNC would have accepted more into its segregated purpose accounts than it spent on its building, presidential nominating convention, and legal expenses in 2015. Due to this overage, accepting the entire bequest would not have freed up the full value of the Shaber bequest for engaging in federal election activities and resulted in the alleged injury in 2015. *See Elrod v. Burns*, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976) ("The loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury."). The FEC's argument that the LNC's injury was self-inflicted thus fails.

### **B.** Competitive Disadvantage

The FEC argues that "[e]ven if the LNC's choice to forego [sic] immediate acceptance of the Shaber bequest is not to blame for its claimed competitive injury, that alleged injury cannot support the LNC's standing for three independent reasons." Def.'s Mot. Dismiss at 15. First, under *Buckley v. Valeo*, 424 U.S. 1, 48 (1976) and *McConnell v. FEC*, 540 U.S. 93, 227 (2003), "LNC's claim that it is competitively disadvantaged and so must use the Shaber bequest to achieve electoral success fails to allege a valid injury in fact." *See* Def.'s Mot. Dismiss at 15. Second, the LNC's alleged competitive disadvantage is not caused by FECA but by decisions of private actors in the political marketplace. *Id.* at 15–17. Finally, a favorable decision by this Court would not remedy the alleged injury but instead would exacerbate the injury by giving the major parties access to more money. *Id.* at 17–19.

These arguments are predicated on the FEC's characterization of the LNC's alleged injury as stemming from a "competitive disadvantage . . . against its major party rivals." *Id.* at 2. In suggesting that the LNC's alleged injury is a competitive disadvantage, the FEC cherry-picks

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certain phrases from the LNC's complaint referencing the party's interest in competing with other parties. *See* Def.'s Mot. Dismiss at 8 (citing Compl. ¶¶ 12–14, 26). The Complaint does allege that, "[u]nlike its two major competitors, the Libertarian Party's national committee is forced to spend the bulk of its resources securing access to the ballot, leaving comparatively little for actual campaigning—an expensive activity in and of itself." Compl. ¶ 12; *see also id.* ¶ 13 ("[T]he LNC has comparatively less use for funds intended to support national conventions, a headquarters building, or attorney fees."). Further, the Complaint alleges that "[i]n the absence of the Party Limit's application to the Shaber bequest, the LNC would substantially improve its ability to advocate and achieve electoral success by taking immediate control over the balance of the Shaber funds." *Id.* ¶ 26.

The Court agrees with the LNC that "the Commission does not afford the Complaint a fair reading." PL's Opp'n at 18; *see also id.* at 19 ("The Libertarian Party certainly does *not* argue that the First Amendment requires a level electoral playing field, free of the advantages that speakers may have owing to their resources." (emphasis in original)). The phrases the FEC relies on are included in the Complaint to explain why the LNC sought to accept the entire bequest into its general purpose account when the bequest became available and why accepting the bequest into the segregated accounts was not an adequate substitute. *See id.* at 19. As noted above, the LNC clearly articulates the injury suffered to be the inability to accept the entire Shaber bequest, when it became available in 2015 to engage in election activities, including various forms of expressive conduct. *See* Compl. ¶¶ 14, 18–19. Accordingly, the FEC's arguments that the LNC's alleged injury is not cognizable, not caused by the FEC, and not redressable are premised on a mischaracterization of the alleged injury and therefore fail.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> The LNC suggests that the FEC's arguments sound more in mootness than standing and then proceeds to argue that the claims as serted here fall within the "capable of repetition, yet evading review" exception to mootness.

# **IV. CONCLUSION**

The LNC has standing to challenge FECA provisions that restricted immediate access to the full amount of a bequest for expressive activities. That the LNC could accept the entire bequest by depositing the funds into segregated accounts does not alter this analysis because the LNC alleges that it wishes to use the funds for expressive activities. Accordingly, the FEC's motion to dismiss is denied. The parties shall submit jointly, within twenty days, a schedule to govern further proceedings in this matter.

Date: January 3, 2017



Digitally signed by Hon. Beryl A. Howell DN: cn=Hon. Beryl A. Howell, o, ou=Chief Judge, U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, email=Howell\_Chambers@dcd.uscourts.gov, cuS Date: 2017.01.03 10:36:43 -05'00'

BERYL A. HOWELL Chief Judge

*See id.* at 14–18 (citing *Honeywell Int'l v. NRC*, 628 F.3d 568, 576 (D.C. Cir. 2010)). The FEC argues in reply that "[b]ecause the LNC lacks standing, its assertion that its claims are capable of repetition yet evading review is beside the point." Def.'s Reply at 9 n.4. Mootness has been an issue in past litigation between these two parties concerning FECA's contribution limits. *See generally LNC v. FEC*, No. 13-5088, Order (D.C. Cir. Mar. 26, 2014), ECF No. 1485531 (en banc) (unpublished). In the earlier case, however, the LNC had accepted or was able to accept the entire bequest—into its general account—by the time the case reached the D.C. Circuit. *See* FEC's Suggestion of Mootness at 1, *LNC I*, No. 13-5088 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 3, 2014) ("As of January 1, 2014, however, the LNC has either already received, or can immediately accept the entire bequest."). Here, thousands of dollars remain in escrow, waiting to be distributed into the LNC's general account. Accordingly, the LNC's claims are not moot, *see Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Kerry*, No. 16-5015, 2016 WL 7439010, at \*2 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 27, 2016) (reversing the district court's dismissal on mootness grounds because the plaintiff "ha[d] not 'been given everything [they] asked for" (quoting *Noble v. Sombrotto*, 525 F.3d 1230, 1241 (D.C. Cir. 2008))), and the Court need not address the LNC's arguments concerning the capable of repetition yet evading review exception to mootness.

#### **APPENDIX**

### FINDINGS OF FACT<sup>17</sup>

### I. The Parties

- The Plaintiff, Libertarian National Committee, Inc. ("LNC"), is the national committee of the Libertarian Party of the United States. Pet.'s Mot. Cert., Decl. of Nicholas Sarwark, Chair, LNC, Inc. ("Sarwark Decl.") ¶ 1, ECF No. 24-17; Def.'s Answer & Affirmative Defenses ("Def.'s Answer") ¶ 1, ECF No. 22.
- 2. The Defendant, Federal Election Committee ("FEC"), is the federal government agency charged with the administration and enforcement of the Federal Election Campaign Act ("FECA"), 52 U.S.C. § 30101 *et seq.* Pet.'s Complaint ("Compl.") at 3, ECF No. 1. The FEC has exclusive jurisdiction with respect to the civil enforcement of such provisions. *Id.* §§ 30106(b)(1), 30109. The FEC also has the authority to make rules and regulations necessary to carry out the FECA, *id.* §§ 30107(a)(8), 30111(a)(8), 30111(d), and to issue advisory opinions concerning the application of FECA and prescribed regulations, *id.* §§ 30107(a)(7), 30108.
- 3. The LNC is a "not-for-profit organization incorporated under the laws of the District of Columbia." Sarwark Decl. ¶ 1. "The LNC has 15,031 active paid sustaining donors, and 137,451 members, in all 50 states and the District of Columbia." *Id.* at ¶ 2. "Over half a million registered voters identify with the Libertarian Party in the states in which voters can register as Libertarians." *Id.*

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> The Court's findings of fact are taken from the parties' proposed findings of fact and responses thereto. *See* Pet.'s Mot. Cert., Ex. A, Pet.'s Facts Submitted for Cert. ("Pet.'s Proposed Facts"), ECF No. 24-3; Def.'s Opp'n, Attach. 2, Def.'s Resps. Pet.'s Proposed Facts, ECF No. 26-2; Def.'s Opp'n, Attach. 3, Def.'s Proposed Findings of Fact ("Def.'s Proposed Facts"), ECF No. 26-3; Pet.'s Reply, Attach. 1, Pet.'s Resps. Def.'s Proposed Facts, ECF No. 27-1. To the extent that objections were lodged to any proposed factual finding, those objections are sustained, denied, or resolved as reflected in the factual findings included in this Appendix.

"[Forty-eight] partisan officeholders and 111 non-partisan officeholders across the country are affiliated with the Libertarian Party." *Id.* 

- 4. "Founded in 1971, the Libertarian Party has yet to elect a federal office holder, and no current federal office holder is affiliated with the Libertarian Party." *Libertarian Nat'l Comm., Inc. v. FEC* (*"LNC I"*), 930 F. Supp. 2d 154, 172 (D.D.C. 2013) (Wilkins, J.) (citation omitted).
- 5. "The LNC's purpose is to field national Presidential tickets, to support its state party affiliates in running candidates for public office, and to conduct other political activities in furtherance of a libertarian public policy agenda in the United States." *LNC I*, 930 F. Supp. 2d at 172 (citation omitted); Sarwark Decl. ¶
  3.
- The LNC "facilitates mutual contacts between contributors and federal candidates," and "assists candidates in their efforts to win federal office." Def.'s Opp'n, Ex. 2, Pet.'s Resps. Def.'s First Set Requests for Admissions at 10, ECF No. 26-6.
- 7. To achieve its political goals, the LNC organizes affiliate parties in all fifty states and runs candidates for public office "with the goal of reducing government control over individuals' lives." Def.'s Opp'n, Ex. 6, Dep. of Nicholas Sarwark ("Sarwark Dep.") at 28:4–10, ECF No. 26-10. The LNC nominates candidates for president and vice president on behalf of the Libertarian Party every four years. *Id.* at 48:2–7, 49:8–11.
- 8. "Even if a Libertarian Party candidate does not win a federal election, the LNC generally views it as positive if its candidate gets more votes than the margin of

victory between the two major-party candidates and thus affects the outcome of the election." *LNC I*, 930 F. Supp. 2d. at 173 (citation omitted). That is because such a result might cause a candidate of a major party to listen to the Libertarian Party's position in the future or reconsider his or her own position, "since the party would have demonstrated that a sizeable percentage of the electorate agrees with the Libertarian Party and wants to see more Libertarian public policies." *Id.* (internal quotations omitted).

9. In a 2006 letter to prospective donors, the LNC stated that

[o]ne of the most significant achievements of the year was our candidates being identified as the deciding factor in control of the U.S. Senate. This led to positive press coverage in the *Washington Post* and many other news outlets. Our impact in these important elections even led to an article in *The Economist* titled "Libertarians Emerge as a Force." Clearly, it was a good year for our party.

*Id.* at (citation omitted).

### **II.** The LNC's Fundraising and Spending On Segregated Account Expenses

- 10. In some of its fundraising solicitations, the LNC has told potential contributors that their contributions will only be used for specific expenses. Sarwark Dep. at 13:8–14:6, 40:11–21. Some donors have informed the LNC that they will only give money if they are told what the money will be used for. *Id.* at 21:18–22:3. Such project-based fundraising is often more effective for the LNC than asking for "unearmarked" money. *Id.* at 22:18–23:4.
- The LNC "earmarks" certain contributions to specify that those contributions are only to be used for particular categories of expenses. *Id.* at 13:20–14:6. Those earmarks include funds for "ballot access." *Id.* at 14:14–15:19. This may include

litigation over whether the Libertarian candidate will appear on a ballot in a particular election. *See id.* at 15:7–19.

- 12. The LNC maintains a "Legal Offense Fund" that is used to finance "proactive litigation" on behalf of the LNC. *Id.* at 40:11–14; *see also* Def.'s Opp'n, Ex. 8, LNC Legal Offense Fund Email, ECF No. 26-12. To raise money for this fund, the LNC has sent solicitations to potential contributors asking them specifically to donate to finance proactive litigation. LNC Legal Offense Fund Email at 2. In one such solicitation, LNC Chair Nicholas Sarwark wrote: "I promise you that every dollar we receive from this fundraiser will be spent on legal offense." *Id.* at 3.
- The LNC also maintains a segregated account for a "building fund," which it operates pursuant to 52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(9)(B). Sarwark Dep. at 14:14–15; Sarwark Decl. ¶ 29.
- 14. The LNC does not place donations into its segregated purpose building account unless the donors specifically earmark their donations for building purposes. *Id.*"Of course, mortgage payments and payments for other expenses related to the building may be made from LNC's general account as circumstances warrant." *Id.*
- 15. "The Libertarian Party's headquarters building makes an architectural statement that is consistent with the party's mission. LNC would not occupy a headquarters building that would make an unsuitable architectural statement." *Id.* ¶ 30.

- 16. "The Libertarian Party occasionally places political signs in its headquarters windows, or on the lawn in front of the building, but is prohibited by city ordinance from placing outdoor signage on its building." *Id.* ¶ 31.
- News reports indicate that major cities typically bid to host the presidential nominating conventions of the two major legacy parties. *See, e.g.*, Chris Brennan, *Democrats to Convene in Philly in 2016*, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER (Feb. 13, 2015),

http://www.philly.com/philly/news/politics/20150213\_Source\_\_Philadelphia\_to\_ host\_2016\_Democratic\_Convention.html; Andrew J. Tobias, *Cleveland Chosen to Host 2016 Republican National Convention*, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER (July 8, 2014),

https://www.cleveland.com/open/index.ssf/2014/07/cleveland\_gop\_convention\_a nnou.html.

- 18. The LNC solicits directly for the building fund. Def.'s Opp'n, Ex. 30, LNC Building Fund Solicitation Letter, ECF No. 26-34. On April 26, 2014, the LNC sent a solicitation to contributors asking for contributions to this fund, which the LNC has also referred to as the David F. Nolan Memorial Headquarters Office Fund. *Id.* at 1. The solicitation explained that "[a]ll funds raised go into a separate account and are dedicated to the Nolan Memorial Headquarters Office, and will be restricted for use toward the associated purchase, furnishing, renovation, and moving expenses." *Id.* at 3.
- On April 4, 2013, the LNC sent an email to potential contributors soliciting contributions to its building fund that explained that "every dollar contributed to

the David F. Nolan Memorial Building Fund must, by law, be spent on buying an office or associated expenses – or it must be returned to you, the donor." Def.'s Opp'n, Ex. 32, LNC Building Fund Email at 2, ECF No. 26-36. The email noted "that means your donation is guaranteed to be used <u>only</u> for the Building Fund." *Id.* (emphasis in original).

- 20. The LNC has offered recognition for people who contributed to the building fund at certain levels. Sarwark Dep. at 20:1–11. Specifically, the LNC offered to allow contributors to the building fund to name certain rooms in the LNC's headquarters or place their name on plaques to be displayed in those rooms. *Id.* at 18:15–19:1.
- 21. The LNC has accepted money into an account authorized by 52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(1)(B) and (a)(9) that it could not have accepted prior to the specialized purpose regime's creation because the donor had already contributed the maximum amount in unrestricted funds. *See, e.g.*, Sarwark Dep. at 12:10–13:1; Pet.'s Proposed Facts.
- 22. As of December 31, 2016, the LNC accepted a total of \$31,508 in contributions to a segregated account for its headquarters. Def.'s Opp'n, Ex. 1, Decl. of Paul C. Clark II, Federal Election Commission ("Clark Decl.") ¶ 13 tbl.2, ECF No. 26-5; Pet.'s Mot. Cert., Attach. 22, Decl. of Paul C. Clark II ¶ 13 tbl.2, ECF No. 24-22. One donor, Michael Chastain, donated \$26,410.01 into the LNC's segregated building fund in 2017. Pet.'s Mot. Cert., Attach. 20, Decl. of Michael Chastain ("Chastain Decl.") ¶ 4, ECF No. 24-20.

- 23. The purpose of the LNC's headquarters "is to provide full-time, professional support for the on-going political activities of the [p]arty." Def.'s Opp'n, Ex. 11, LNC Policy Manual at 48, ECF No. 26-15. The activities of the LNC's headquarters include record keeping, member services, development activities, external communications, and political action. *Id.* at 48–49.
- 24. In 2014, the LNC purchased a building to serve as its headquarters. LNCBuilding Fund Solicitation Letter at 1. The purchase price was \$825,000. *Id.* at 2.
- 25. "Among the LNC's goals is to completely pay off the headquarters building as quickly as possible, and in any case prior to the 2024 due date of a balloon payment. [To] that end, the LNC budgets at least \$60,000 in . . . odd-numbered year[s] to pay down the principal, and undertakes fundraising efforts dedicated specifically towards that purpose. Accordingly, LNC expects that it would pay off the mortgage well before 2024. However, the LNC's goals at times exceed its budget, and budget targets are not always met." Sarwark Decl. ¶ 28.
- 26. The LNC holds a presidential nominating convention once every four years immediately preceding a presidential election. Sarwark Dep. at 48:2–4. The purpose of these conventions is to conduct party business, including hearing reports from various LNC committees regarding changes to the national party bylaws, changes to the national party platform, election of officers and at-large members of the LNC, the election of the judicial committee, and occasional adoption of public policy resolutions. *See id.* at 48:12–49:7. In addition, Libertarian candidates for president and vice president are nominated at presidential nominating conventions. *Id.* at 49:8–11.

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- The LNC engages in fundraising specific to expenses that would be incurred for presidential nominating conventions. *Id.* at 49:12–50:13.
- 28. "All, or very nearly all, of the Libertarian Party's expenses for holding its presidential nominating conventions are incurred and paid for in the year in which the convention is held. Occasionally . . . minor expenses related to presidential nominating conventions . . . are pre-paid in the year preceding the presidential nominating conventions. No expenses related to holding presidential nominating conventions are incurred in the two years following a year in which the [LNC] holds a presidential nominating convention." Sarwark Decl. ¶ 34.
- 29. During discovery, the LNC provided an expense report for years 2013 through 2016. Def.'s Opp'n, Ex. 7, LNC Account QuickReport, ECF No. 26-11. While the description of costs were not specifically tailored to the exact language of the segregated account provision in FECA, in general, the LNC spent roughly \$467,251.58 on 52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(9)-sanctioned expenses in 2016. *Id.* at 30.
- 30. The LNC's total budget for program expenses and cost of support and revenue, including fundraising, was \$1,406,400 in 2014, Def.'s Opp'n, Ex. 22, LNC 2014
  Budget, ECF No. 26-26, \$1,304,246.33 in 2015, Def.'s Opp'n, Ex. 9, LNC 2015
  Budget, ECF No. 26-13, and \$2,263,183 in 2016, Def.'s Opp'n, Ex. 10, LNC 2016 Budget, ECF No. 26-14.
- 31. Between December 16, 2014, and December 31, 2016, national party committees have accepted a total of \$129,997,590 into their specialized purpose accounts. Clark Decl. ¶ 13 tbl.2. The national party committees affiliated with the Democratic Party have accepted a total of \$41,510,551; the national party

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committees affiliated with the Republican Party have accepted a total of \$88,455,532; and the LNC has accepted \$31,508. *Id.* No other national committee of any political party reported segregated account contributions as of December 31, 2016. *Id.* ¶ 14.

### III. The FECA's Specialized Purpose Regime

- 32. Potential donors may forego making a contribution to the national committee of a political party, or reduce the amount of their contribution, if the uses of that contribution are restricted. *See* Sarwark Decl. ¶ 10; *see, e.g.*, Pet.'s Mot. Cert., Attach. 19, Decl. of Chris Rufer ("Rufer Decl.") ¶¶ 5–7, ECF No. 24-19; Chastain Decl. ¶¶ 5–7; Pet.'s Mot. Cert., Attach. 21, Decl. of William Redpath ("Redpath Decl.") ¶ 5, ECF No. 24-21.
- 33. "LNC is unaware of any documentary evidence comparing the corrupting potential of restricted, [specialized-purpose] contributions with the corrupting potential of unrestricted, general purpose contributions." Sarwark Decl. ¶ 11.
- 34. During discovery in this litigation, the LNC posed the following interrogatory to the FEC: "[P]lease describe in detail all evidence tending to support the proposition that a maximum allowable contribution to one of the separate, segregated accounts provided for in 52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(9) is less corrupting than a contribution that exceeds the unrestricted, general purpose contribution limits by one dollar." Pet.'s Mot. Cert., Ex. B, Def.'s Objections & Resps. Pet. LNC's First Discovery Requests ("Def.'s First Objections & Resps.") at 15, ECF 24-4. The FEC responded: "The FEC cannot respond to this interrogatory because it rejects the premise that a contribution of any particular dollar value is

'corrupting' but that lower values are not 'corrupting.' Moreover, the FEC cannot completely answer this interrogatory, as discovery is ongoing. Nevertheless, the FEC is aware of case law, publicly available secondary material, and simple logic which dictates that parties may prefer unrestricted contributions to those that may only be used in connection with particular expenses. The FEC is also aware of LNC's allegations that 'the LNC has comparatively less use for funds intended to support national conventions, a headquarters building, or attorney fees' and therefore 'needs' unrestricted funds 'in order to directly speak to the electorate.' Compl. ¶ 13. Additional evidence may be uncovered through continuing discovery in this case." *Id.* at 15–16.<sup>18</sup>

35. During discovery in this litigation, the LNC posed the following interrogatory to the FEC: "Please describe the likelihood that an individual's contribution of \$101,700 to the national committee of a political party, restricted for the purpose of funding a headquarters building, election contests, or a presidential nominating convention, would create the same or greater appearance of corruption as an unrestricted contribution in the amount of \$33,901 by that individual to the same national committee of a political party." Pet.'s Mot. Cert., Ex. C, Def.'s Objections & Resps. Pet.'s Second Discovery Requests ("Def.'s Second Objections & Resps.") at 6, ECF 24-5. The FEC responded: "[L]arger contributions [to political parties] are generally more likely to lead to actual or

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> The LNC proposed to certify only the following fact: "The FEC . . . rejects the premise that a contribution of any particular dollar value is 'corrupting' but that lower values are not 'corrupting.'" Pet.'s Proposed Facts ¶ 30 (citation omitted). The FEC noted that the LNC's proposed fact excerpted from a longer interrogatory response, and argued that "[t]o the extent this proposed fact is certified . . . the FEC's full response should in fairness be included. *See* FED. R. EVID. 106." Def.'s Resps. Pet.'s Proposed Facts at 15.

apparent quid pro quo arrangements and can do so regardless of how the funds are ultimately used, but unrestricted funds contributed to a political party may be used for activities that maximally benefit federal candidates and thus may pose a relatively more acute danger of actual and apparent corruption." *Id.* at 7.<sup>19</sup>

- 36. During discovery in this litigation, the LNC posed the following interrogatory to the FEC: "Please explain why a maximum allowable contribution to one of the separate, segregated accounts provided for in 52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(9) may be less corrupting than a contribution that exceeds the unrestricted, general purpose contribution limits by one dollar." Def.'s First Objections & Resps. at 17. The FEC responded in part: "Although *all* contributions to political parties can create the risk of corruption or its appearance regardless of the way that money is ultimately spent, Congress could have permissibly concluded that contributions to a political party that directly benefit a particular candidate or can be spent directly on a particular election contest pose an especially acute risk warranting a lower dollar limit." *Id.*<sup>20</sup>
- 37. The FEC takes the position that "Congress could have permissibly concluded" that unrestricted donations to a political party pose greater risk than restricted donations, Def.'s First Objections & Resps. at 17, as it believes that "unrestricted

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> The LNC proposed to certify only the following fact: "[L]arger contributions [to political parties] are generally more likely to lead to actual or apparent *quid pro quo* arrangements and can do so regardless of how the funds are ultimately used ...." Pet.'s Proposed Facts ¶ 31 (alteration in original) (citation omitted). The FEC objected that the proposed fact "omits the context of the FEC's interrogatory response," and argued that "[t]o the extent this proposed fact is certified, the FEC's full response should in fairness be included. *See* FED. R. EVID. 106." Def.'s Resps. Pet.'s Proposed Facts at 15–16.

The LNC proposed to certify only the following fact: "[*A*]*ll* contributions to political parties can create the risk of corruption or its appearance regardless of the way that money is ultimately spent." Pet.'s Proposed Facts ¶ 32 (emphasis in original) (citation omitted). The FEC objected that the proposed fact "omits the context of the FEC's interrogatory response," and argued that "[t]o the extent this proposed fact is certified, the FEC's full response should in fairness be included. *See* FED. R. EVID. 106." Def.'s Resps. Pet.'s Proposed Facts at 16.

funds contributed to a political party may be used for activities that maximally benefit federal candidates and thus may pose a relatively more acute danger of actual and apparent corruption," Def.'s Second Objections & Resps. at 7.

- 38. "Every dollar received through the separate, segregated accounts provided for in 52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(9) potentially frees up another dollar in the recipient's general account for unrestricted spending." Def.'s First Objections & Resps. at 12; Sarwark Decl. ¶ 12.
- 39. "[A] political party may in some circumstances value a contribution with use restrictions more highly than a smaller contribution without such restrictions." Sarwark Decl. ¶ 13; see also Def.'s Second Objections & Resps. at 4.
- 40. During discovery in this litigation, the LNC posed the following interrogatory to the FEC: "Please describe the likelihood that a political party would value a contribution with use restrictions more highly than a smaller contribution without such restrictions." Def.'s Second Objections & Resps. at 7. The FEC responded in part: "[U]nrestricted funds contributed to a political party may be used for activities that maximally benefit federal candidates and thus will generally be more highly valued. A political party may value a higher contribution with use restrictions in some circumstances, however, such as in the case of a contribution that the party may use to defray expenses for which it knows it must pay and for which it would otherwise have trouble raising funds. The party may value that contribution more than a smaller contribution that comes with no use restrictions but is easier to replicate through other fundraising efforts."<sup>21</sup> Id. at 8.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> The LNC proposed to certify only the following fact: "A political party may value a higher contribution with use restrictions in some circumstances . . . such as in the case of a contribution that the party may use to defray

- 41. During discovery in this litigation, the LNC requested that the FEC admit the following: "An individual's contribution of \$101,700 to the national committee of a political party, even if restricted for the purpose of funding a headquarters building, election contests, or a presidential nominating convention, may create the same or greater appearance of corruption as an unrestricted contribution in the amount of \$33,901 by that individual to the same national committee of a political party." Def.'s Second Objections & Resps. at 5. The FEC "denie[d] that the requested admission is true as a general matter but admit[ted] that the hypothetical scenario described in the request may occur in some circumstances, for the reasons provided and subject to the general caveats in the response to Request
  - 27." Id. In responding to the LNC's Request 27, the FEC asserted:

Given the close connection and alignment of interests between national party committees and federal officeholders, larger contributions are generally more likely to lead to actual or apparent quid pro quo arrangements and can do so regardless of how the funds are ultimately used. See, e.g., Republican Party of La. v. FEC, 219 F. Supp. 3d 86, 97 (2016) (citing McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 154-55 (2003)), aff'd 137 S. Ct. 2178 (2017). The danger of actual and apparent quid pro quo corruption can, however, be relatively more acute when funds are used for activities that provide direct benefits to federal candidates. Id. at 96 (citing McConnell, 540 U.S. at 166-71). Because unrestricted funds contributed to a political party may be used for activities that maximally benefit federal candidates, including campaign advertisements in coordination with candidate campaigns, political parties will generally value them higher and such contributions pose a relatively more acute danger of quid pro quo corruption. Subject to those general caveats, the Commission admits that a political party may in

expenses for which it knows it must pay and for which it would otherwise have trouble raising funds. The party may value that contribution more than a smaller contribution that comes with no use restrictions but is easier to replicate through other fundraising efforts." Pet.'s Proposed Facts ¶ 39 (alteration in original) (citation omitted). The FEC "object[ed] to this proposed fact to the extent that it omits the full context of the FEC's interrogatory response," and argued that "[t]o the extent this proposed fact is certified, the FEC's full response should in fairness be included. *See* FED. R. EVID. 106." Def.'s Resps. Pet.'s Proposed Facts at 20.

some circumstances value a contribution with use restrictions more highly than a smaller contribution without such restrictions."

Def.'s Second Objections & Resps. at 3–4.<sup>22</sup>

- 42. During discovery in this litigation, the LNC requested that the FEC admit the following: "Were a national committee of a political party planning to spend at least \$101,700 from its general account in a given year for any of the purposes for which separate, segregated accounts are provided in 52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(9), a \$101,700 contribution received in one of the separate, segregated accounts would have the same effect as an unrestricted \$101,700 contribution." Def.'s Second Objections & Resps. at 5. The FEC "object[ed] to this request for admission as vague and ambiguous insofar as it does not define the 'effect' to which the request alludes." *Id.*
- 43. During discovery in this litigation, the LNC posed the following interrogatories to the FEC: (1) "Please describe the likelihood that an individual's contribution of \$101,700 to the national committee of a political party, restricted for the purpose of funding a headquarters building, election contests, or a presidential nominating convention, would create the same or greater appearance of corruption as an unrestricted contribution in the amount of \$33,901 by that individual to the same national committee of a political party," Def.'s Second Objections & Resps. at 6; and (2) "Please describe the circumstances under which an individual's

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> The LNC proposed to certify only the following fact: "An individual's contribution of \$101,700 to the national committee of a political party, even if restricted for the purpose of funding a headquarters building, election contests, or a presidential nominating convention, may create the same or greater appearance of corruption as an unrestricted contribution in the amount of \$33,901 by that individual to the same national committee of a political party." Pet.'s Proposed Facts ¶ 40. The FEC objected that the proposed fact "omits the full context of the FEC's [] response," and argued that "[t]o the extent this proposed fact is certified, the FEC's full response should in fairness be included. *See* FED. R. EVID. 106." Def.'s Resps. Pet.'s Proposed Facts at 20.

contribution of \$101,700 to the national committee of a political party, restricted for the purpose of funding a headquarters building, election contests, or a presidential nominating convention, would create the same or greater appearance of corruption as an unrestricted contribution in the amount of \$33,901 by that individual to the same national committee of a political party." Id. at 8. The FEC responded to both interrogatories, in part, "that a particular within-limit contribution to the segregated account of a national committee of a political party could appear as corrupt as or more corrupt than a lower contribution to that committee's general account that exceeds the general account limit, depending on circumstances such as the identity of the contributor and the receiver, the policy interests of the contributor, the current status of relevant policies, the financial needs and goals of the receiver including as to the types of spending for which segregated account funds might be used and the public knowledge of those matters, the receiver's relative ability to raise funds for different proposed uses, and whether any relevant policy changes happen close in time to the contribution." Id. at 7, 9.23

- 44. No parties, apart from the Libertarian, Democratic, and Republican Parties, have reported any segregated purpose accounts to the FEC. Clark Decl. ¶ 14.
- 45. Between 2014 and 2016, the Democratic National Committee ("DNC") reported receiving \$12,255,964 for its segregated convention account, \$3,901,490 for its

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup> The LNC proposed to certify only the following facts: (1) "[A] particular within-limit contribution to the segregated account of a national committee of a political party could appear as corrupt as or more corrupt than a lower contribution to that committee's general account that exceeds the general account limit," and (2) "[I]t is . . . possible that a particular contribution below the general account limit may have an appearance of corruption that exceeds that of a higher contribution to a segregated account." Pet.'s Proposed Facts ¶¶ 42, 43 (alterations in original) (citations omitted). The FEC objected to both proposed facts on the ground that they "omit[] needed context from the cited FEC discovery response." Def.'s Resps. Pet.'s Proposed Facts at 21,22.

segregated headquarters account, and \$6,764,189 for its segregated recount account. Clark Decl. at 5 tbl.2.

- 46. Between 2014 and 2016, the Republican National Committee ("RNC") reported receiving \$23,817,038 for its segregated convention account, \$26,367,459 for its segregated headquarters account, and \$5,992,015 for its segregated recount account. Clark Decl. at 5 tbl.2.
- 47. Between 2014 and 2016, the DNC's individual contributions, not including many contributions accepted in the segregated purpose accounts, totaled \$189,112,962.62. See DNC Year-End FEC Reports at 3, line 11(a)(iii), http://docquery.fec.gov/cgi-bin/fecimg/?\_15951133010+0 (last visited June 28, 2018) (for 2014), http://docquery.fec.gov/cgi-bin/fecimg/?\_201601299004933424+0 (last visited June 28, 2018) (for 2015), http://docquery.fec.gov/cgi-bin/fecimg/?\_201706019055202873+0 (last visited June 28, 2018) (for 2016).
- 48. Between 2014 and 2016, the RNC's individual contributions, not including many contributions accepted in the segregated purpose accounts, *see supra* ¶ 46, totaled \$266,758,900.34. RNC Year-End FEC Reports at 3, line 11(a)(iii), http://docquery.fec.gov/cgi-bin/fecimg/?\_15970244221+0 (last visited June 28, 2018) (for 2014), http://docquery.fec.gov/cgi-bin/fecimg/?\_201603229011936493+0 (last visited June 28, 2018) (for 2015); http://docquery.fec.gov/cgi-bin/fecimg/?\_201701319042260933+0 (last visited June 28, 2018) (for 2016).

- 49. In 2016, the RNC's individual contributions, not including many contributions accepted in the segregated purpose accounts, *supra* ¶ 46, totaled \$89,643,729.23.
  2016 RNC Year-End FEC Report at 3, line 11(a)(iii), http://docquery.fec.gov/cgi-bin/fecimg/?\_201701319042260933+0 (last visited June 28, 2018).
- 50. "Unrestricted funds are more valuable to national party committees and their candidates than funds that may only be used for particular categories of expenses." FEC's Proposed Facts at 9.
- 51. The RNC and Donald J. Trump for President, Inc., entered a joint fundraising agreement during the 2016 presidential election. *See* Def.'s Opp'n, Ex. 34, Excerpt of Production from Republican National Committee to the Def.'s Subpoena to Produce Documents, ECF No. 26-38. According to that agreement, any donations to the joint fundraising committee that exceeded the maximum that could be donated to Trump's campaign would be allocated first to RNC's general operating account up to the General Party Limit. *Id.* at 8. Only after the contributor reached the General Party Limit would contributions be allocated to RNC's segregated accounts pursuant to the Segregated Account Limit. *Id.*
- 52. The specialized purpose limit applicable to national party committees' legal expenses allows parties to engage in litigation without having to reduce their general political advocacy. For example, RNC spokeswoman Cassie Smedile recently explained that paying for legal expenses "with funds from a pre-existing legal proceedings account [] [did] not reduce by a dime the resources we can put towards our political work." Def.'s Opp'n, Ex. 35, Matea Gold, *RNC Taps Legal*

Account to Help Pay for Lawyers for President Trump and Son Donald Jr. in Russia Probes, WASH. POST. (Sept. 20, 2017), ECF No. 26-39.

# IV. Political Parties and Quid Pro Quo Corruption

- 53. Because of the close relationship between parties and candidates, contributions to parties can lead to the actuality and appearance of quid pro quo corruption. National political parties are "inextricably intertwined" with their federal officeholders and candidates, with whom they "enjoy a special relationship and unity of interest." *McConnell v. FEC*, 540 U.S. 93, 145, 155 (2003) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), *overruled by Citizens United v. FEC*, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). In fact, "[t]here is no meaningful separation between the national party committees and the public officials who control them." *Id.* at 155 (citations omitted).
- 54. "Once elected to legislative office, public officials enter an environment in which political parties-in-government control the resources crucial to subsequent electoral success and legislative power. Political parties organize the legislative caucuses that make committee assignments." *Id.* at 156 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Thus, "officeholders' reelection prospects are significantly influenced by attitudes of party leadership," *id.* (citing Krasno & Sorauf Expert Report), and an individual Member's stature and responsibilities vary dramatically depending on whether his party is in the majority or in the minority.
- 55. Parties are not like regular political committees. Non-connected committees "do not select slates of candidates for elections," "determine who will serve on legislative committees, elect congressional leadership, or organize legislative

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caucuses," but these activities count among the parties' core responsibilities. *Id.* at 188 ("Political parties have influence and power in the Legislature that vastly exceeds that of any interest group. . . . [P]arty affiliation is the primary way . . . voters identify candidates," and therefore parties have special relationships with those who hold public office.). "A primary goal of all the major political parties is to win elections." *Cao v. FEC*, 688 F. Supp. 2d 498, 527 (E.D. La.), *aff'd sub nom. In re Cao*, 619 F.3d 410 (5th Cir. 2010); *see also id.* ("The ultimate goal of a political party is to get as many party members as possible into elective office, and in doing so to increase voting and party activity by average party members." (quoting declaration of former Representative Meehan)).

56. This overriding purpose makes political parties particularly susceptible to contributors who want to create a quid pro quo relationship with an officeholder.

As the Supreme Court has explained:

Parties are []necessarily the instruments of some contributors whose object is not to support the party's message or to elect party candidates across the board, but ratherto support a specific candidate for the sake of a position on one narrow issue, or even to support any candidate who will be obliged to the contributors.

*FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm'n*, 533 U.S. 431, 451–52 (2001); *see also id.* at 452 ("[W]hether they like it or not, [parties] act as agents for spending on behalf of those who seek to produce obligated officeholders."); *id.* at 455 ("In reality, parties . . . function for the benefit of donors whose object is to place candidates under obligation, a fact that parties cannot escape. Indeed, parties' capacity to concentrate power to elect is the very capacity that apparently opens them to exploitation as channels for circumventing contribution and coordinated spending limits binding on other political players.").

- 57. The national committees of the two major parties—the Democratic Party and the Republican Party—are "both run by, and largely composed of, federal officeholders and candidates." *McConnell*, 540 U.S. at 155. "The President typically controls his party's national committee, and once a favorite has emerged for the presidential nomination of the other party, that candidate and his party's national committee typically work closely together." *McConnell v. FEC*, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 697 (D.D.C. 2003) (Kollar-Kotelly, J.). The leaders of the two major parties are also the parties' federal candidates, officeholders, and important Congressional leaders. *Id.* at 469 ("[T]he internal structure of parties permits, for example, former U.S. Senator D'Amato, who chaired the [RSCC] from 1995–97, to at the same time serve as chair of the Senate Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Committee.") (alterations in original) (citation omitted).
- 58. Similarly, LNC officials have run for federal office as Libertarian Party candidates while holding their offices with the LNC. For example, William Redpath is currently an at-large member of the LNC, and he previously served as the LNC's national chair from July 2006 through May 2010 and as the LNC's treasurer three times. Redpath Decl. ¶ 1. Redpath ran as a Libertarian Party candidate for United States Senate in 2008 and for United States House of Representatives in 2010 and 2014. *Id.* As national chair, Redpath was the LNC's "chief executive officer . . . with full authority to direct [the LNC's] business and

affairs." *LNC I*, 930 F. Supp. 2d at 178 (citation omitted). The LNC's rules do not bar its leaders from also running for federal office. *Id*.

- 59. The public record contains significant evidence of actual and apparent quid pro quos involving contributions to national, state, and local parties. In the 1930s, Congress enacted restrictions on contributions to national political parties in light of the notorious "Democratic campaign book" scandal, in which federal contractors were forced to buy books at hyper-inflated prices from the Democratic party to assure that they would continue to receive government business. 84 CONG. REC. 9598-99 (1939) (statement of Rep. Taylor); see also Wagner v. FEC, 793 F.3d 1, 11–12 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (en banc) ("Congressman J. Will Taylor pointed to the coercion of contractors in the celebrated Democratic campaign book scandal as a prime example of political immorality and skullduggery that should not be tolerated. 84 CONG. REC. 9598-99 (1939). Representative Taylor recounted that, at the behest of the Democratic National Committee, party representatives paid visits to government contractors, reminding each one of the business he had received from the Government and explaining that the contractor was expected to buy a number of the party's souvenir convention books—at \$250 each—in proportion to the amount of Government business he had enjoyed." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
- 60. In 1976, Armand Hammer was fined and placed on probation after pleading guilty to making an illegal contribution to President Nixon's reelection campaign. David Rampe, *Armand Hammer Pardoned by Bush*, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 15, 1989), http://www.nytimes.com/1989/08/15/us/armand-hammer-pardoned-by-bush.html.

Mr. Hammer contributed \$54,000 to the Nixon re-election campaign in the names of others, friends of a subordinate at Occidental Petroleum. *Id.* The subordinate was convicted of concealing the source of the contribution. *Id.* In 1989, Mr. Hammer made contributions exceeding \$100,000 to the Republican Party and another \$100,000 to the Bush-Quayle Inaugural Committee. Marc Lacey, *Political Memo; Resurrecting Ghosts of Pardons Past*, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 4, 2001), http://www.nytimes.com/2001/03/04/us/political-memo-resurrectingghosts-of-pardons-past.html. Shortly afterward, on August 14, 1989, President George H.W. Bush pardoned Mr. Hammer for his illegal contribution to President Nixon's reelection campaign. *Id.*; David Hoffman, *Bush Signs Pardon for Armand Hammer*, WASH. POST (Aug. 15, 1989),

https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1989/08/15/bush-signs-pardonfor-armand-hammer/b6cb4260-bbb1-40ae-a9d6-7f67ef4a7226/. In comparing the pardon to President Bill Clinton's later pardon of Marc Rich, Representative Henry Waxman observed that "'[t]he appearance of a quid pro quo is just as strong in the Hammer case as in the Rich case, if not stronger, since Mr. Hammer himself gave the contribution." Lacey, *supra*.

61. In 1988, Edwin Cox, Jr. pled guilty to bank fraud by falsifying collateral on an \$80 million loan. *Bank Fraud Guilty Plea*, N.Y. TIMES (June 17, 1988), http://www.nytimes.com/1988/06/17/business/bank-fraud-guilty-plea.html. According to CNN's matching of Cox family members with contribution records, from 1980 to 2000 that family contributed approximately \$200,000 to campaigns of President George H.W. Bush, his relatives, and Republican campaign committees. Kelly Wallace, Former President Bush Granted Last Minute Pardon to Contributor's Son, CNN (Mar. 7, 2001, 1:57 PM),

http://www.cnn.com/2001/ALLPOLITICS/03/07/bush.pardon/. In addition to contributing to these various campaigns, Cox's father, Texas oilman Edwin L. Cox, Sr., coordinated political support for the pardon. *See id.* On November 24, 1992, former White House chief of staff James Baker wrote to the White House counsel, copying the president, that "[f]ormer Texas Gov. Bill Clements called me and asked me whether or not the president would consider a pardon for Edwin Cox, son of Ed Cox, who is a longtime supporter of the president's." *Id.* On January 18, 1993, two days before leaving the White House, President Bush pardoned Mr. Cox for his bank fraud conviction. *Id.* After the pardon, Edwin Cox, Sr. donated at least \$100,000 to the George Bush Presidential Library. *Id.*; Michael Weisskopf, *A Pardon, a Presidential Library, a Big Donation*, TIME (Mar. 6, 2001), http://content.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,101652,00.html (noting that Edwin Cox, Sr.'s "name is etched in gold as a 'benefactor,' those whose donations amount to between \$100,000 to \$250,000").

- 62. In *McConnell*, the record documented that, as one former senator described,
  "[1]arge soft money contributions in fact distort the legislative process. They affect what gets done and how it gets done. . . . [M]ake no mistake about it—this money affects outcomes." 251 F. Supp. 2d at 496 (quoting Sen. Rudman).
- 63. As another Senator testified:

It is not unusual for large contributors to seek legislative favors in exchange for their contributions. A good example of that which stands out in my mind because it was so stark and recent occurred on the next to last day of the 1995-96 legislative session. Federal

Express wanted to amend a bill being considered by a Conference Committee . . . . This was clearly of benefit to Federal Express, which according to published reports had contributed \$1.4 million in the last 2-year cycle to incumbent Members of Congress and almost \$1 million in soft money to the political parties. I opposed this in the Democratic Caucus, arguing that even if it was good legislation, it should not be approved without holding a hearing, we should not cave in to special interests. One of my senior colleagues got up and said, 'I'm tired of Paul always talking about special interests; we've got to pay attention to who is buttering our bread.' I will never forget that. This was a clear example of donors getting their way, not on the merits of the legislation, but just because they had been big contributors. I do not think there is any question that this is the reason it passed.

*McConnell*, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 482 (quoting former Sen. Simon); *see also Colo. Republican*, 533 U.S. at 451 n.12 (quoting Senator Simon's statement that "I believe people contribute to party committees on both sides of the aisle for the same reason that Federal Express does, because they want favors. There is an expectation that giving to party committees helps you legislatively.").

64. In July 1995, the Department of Interior denied an application by three bands of Wisconsin Indian tribes to open a casino in Hudson, Wisconsin. S. REP. No. 105-167, pt. 1, at 44–45 (1998). Initially, the application was approved by a branch office of the Bureau of Indian Affairs ("BIA"). *Id.* at 44. A wealthy group of neighboring tribes in Minnesota, who operated a competing casino, hired a prominent lobbyist and former DNC treasurer, who spoke personally with President Clinton and officials of the DNC. *Id.* Following their meeting, DNC officials promised to talk to the White House and have them contact Secretary of the Interior Bruce Babbitt. *Id.* at 45. Meanwhile, a career BIA employee had drafted "a 17-page analysis recommending approval of the Hudson application." *Id.* According to testimony provided to a Senate Committee, Secretary Babbitt

felt pressure from the White House to make a determination quickly on the application and was aware of tribal "political contributions" to the DNC and state Democratic parties. Id. (recalling that Secretary Babbitt remarked to the applicant tribes' attorney, "Do you have any idea how much these Indians, Indians with gaming contracts . . . have given to Democrats? . . . [H]alf a million dollars."). Ultimately, the application was denied. Id. In the four months following the application's denial, "the opposition tribes contributed \$53,000 to the DNC and the DSCC . . . an additional \$230,000 to the DNC and the DSCC during 1996, and . . . more than \$50,000 in additional money to the Minnesota Democratic Party." Id. "There is strong circumstantial evidence that the Interior Department's decision to deny the Hudson application was caused in large part by improper political considerations, including the promise of political contributions from opposition tribes." Id., pt. 2, at 3168; see also id. at 3193 ("From all the circumstances, there appears to be a direct relationship between the activities of the Department of the Interior and contributions received by the DNC and DSCC from the opposition tribes."). Political donations to the DNC and the Minnesota Democratic Party "apparently *succeeded* in purchasing government policy concessions." Id., pt. 1, at 45 (emphasis in original); see also McConnell, 540 U.S. at 164–65,165 n.61 (discussing the episode in connection with of the governmental interests underlying § 30125(b)).

65. Between 1995 and 1996, Roger Tamraz contributed approximately \$300,000 to the DNC and various state Democratic parties to gain support for an oil-pipeline project in the Caucuses, which was opposed by the National Security Council ("NSC") and other executive branch agencies. See generally S. REP. NO. 105-167, pt. 2, at 2907–31. NSC staff developed a policy of denying Mr. Tamraz "high-level U.S. Government access" to discuss the pipeline. Id. at 2911. To circumvent this policy, Mr. Tamraz met with DNC officials and began contributing to the DNC and state Democratic parties. See id. at 2912–13. All told, "by the end of March 1996 Tamraz had made contributions totaling \$100,000 to the Virginia Democratic Party, \$25,000 to the Virginia Legislative Conference, \$20,000 to [Richard] Molpus['s] campaign [for governor of Mississippi], \$25,000 to the Louisiana Democratic Party, and \$130,000 to the DNC." Id. at 2913–14. In addition, Mr. Tamraz contributed "10 [or] 20' thousand dollars either to Senator [Ted] Kennedy's campaign or to the Massachusetts Democratic Party." Id. at 2915. DNC officials "went to great lengths in an attempt to provide Tamraz the 'political leverage' he sought in his Caspian ventures." *Id.* at 2913. Their efforts included providing pressure from White House and Department of Energy officials to change the U.S. Government's position on the pipeline. See id. at 2928–30. While Mr. Tamraz was not ultimately successful "in persuading the U.S. Government to support his pipeline," the Committee Report notes he "succeeded through his political contributions, and apparently the promise of additional donations, in enlisting senior United States officials in his attempt to change the working group's policy on Caspian energy issues." *Id.* at 2930. Undeterred by his White House rebuke, Mr. Tamraz also approached officials at the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, an independent U.S. Government agency whose president was Ruth

Harkin. *Id.* at 2929. Mr. Tamraz contributed "\$35,000 to the Iowa Democratic Party at the request of Ruth Harkin's husband, Senator Tom Harkin of Iowa." *Id.* 

- 66. As explained by the D.C. Circuit in *Wagner v. FEC*, there were a "series of quid pro quos" made by the former lobbyist Jack Abramoff and former Representative Bob Ney. 793 F.3d 1, 15 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
- 67. Abramoff, who pled guilty in 2006 to corruption charges and served time in prison, has written a book about how he and fellow lobbyists made campaign contributions to a range of political committees as part of a strategy to obtain political favors. *See generally* JACK ABRAMOFF, CAPITOL PUNISHMENT: THE HARD TRUTH ABOUT WASHINGTON CORRUPTION FROM AMERICA'S MOST NOTORIOUS LOBBYIST (2011).
- 68. Abramoff's book describes a 1995 meeting involving former House Majority Whip Tom DeLay and executives from Microsoft. *Id.* at 64–65. The issue being discussed was "software program encryption export." *Id.* Once "DeLay expressed his general support for their positions and reminded [the executives] that it was likely to be the Republicans who would defend the freedom they required to develop their company," he made a "soft appeal for political contributions from the company." *Id.* at 65. When one of the executives "firmly brushed off" the solicitation, DeLay delivered a "stern message": he told the executives a story about an earlier time when Walmart had suffered by refusing to "sully their hands" by making a contribution. *Id.* That refusal backfired a year later when Walmart could not get DeLay to "sully his hands" with a request to get a highway ramp near one of their stores. *Id.* Once DeLay related this story,

the "quivering executives" "finally got the joke." *Id.* "A \$100,000 check was soon delivered to the [National] Republican Congressional Committee, and Microsoft's relationship with the American right commenced." *Id.* 

69. In 2002, in exchange for former Representative Ney's commitment to add to the Help America Vote Act ("HAVA") language to reopen a casino owned by the Tiguas, a Texas Indian tribe that Abramoff represented, Abramoff arranged for lavish contributions to be made by tribal officials to or on Ney's behalf, including at least \$32,000 in contributions "to Ney's campaign and political . . . committees." James V. Grimaldi & Susan Schmidt, *Lawmaker From Ohio Subpoenaed in Abramoff Case*, WASH. POST (Nov. 5, 2005), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-

dyn/content/article/2005/11/04/AR2005110401197.html; FEC Opp'n, Ex. 38, Factual Basis for Plea of Robert W. Ney ("Ney Factual Proffer") ¶ 10(a)(ii), ECF No. 26-42; *see* FEC Opp'n, Ex. 37, Factual Basis for Plea of Jack A. Abramoff ("Abramoff Factual Proffer") ¶¶ 20, 22, ECF No. 26-41. On March 20, 2002, Ney agreed to "move forward" with the plan to slip into the HAVA an "abstruse" sentence drafted by Abramoff's office that "would magically open the doors to the Tigua casino." ABRAMOFF, *supra*, at 197–198, 205–06; *id.* at 198 (referencing the abstruse sentence: "Public Law 100-89 is amended by striking section 207 (101 Stat. 668, 672)"); *see also* Ney Factual Proffer ¶ 10(a)(ii). Abramoff had the Tiguas make "substantial campaign contributions." Ney Factual Proffer ¶ 9(d) (admitting receipt of substantial campaign contributions from Abramoff's clients in exchange for performing official acts). Furthermore, on March 22, 2002, two days after the agreement, the Tiguas donated another \$30,000 to the National Republic Senatorial Committee ("NRSC"). NRSC Report of Receipts and Disbursements at 871, http://docquery.fec.gov/cgi-bin/fecimg/?22020272668 (last visited June 28, 2018); *see also* ABRAMOFF, *supra*, at 197 (noting a strategy to prepare for a "backlash" through a strategy of "Tigua contributions to the Republican Party," which would help "construct a cadre of supporters"). According to Abramoff, Senator Christopher Dodd gave his "assent" in mid-April 2002 to the plan "and a request for a \$50,000 contribution to the Democrats in Dodd's name." ABRAMOFF, *supra*, at 206; *see also id.* at 206, 210 (explaining that Abramoff's associate assured Abramoff that he would cover the requested contribution "from the budget the Tiguas had provided him," and that neither of them considered that this "'contribution' was, in fact, merely a bribe;" according to Abramoff, Senator Dodd reneged when he later got "cold feet").

70. In his book, Abramoff described his approach to lobbying:

As a lobbyist, I thought it only natural and right that my clients should reward those members who saved them such substantial sums with generous contributions. This quid pro quo became one of the hallmarks of our lobbying efforts. . . . Since the tribes I represented lived and died by what the Congress did to and for them, and since they had comparatively unlimited funds, we were in the position to deliver millions of dollars in legal political contributions, and did.

ABRAMOFF, *supra*, at 90; *see also McConnell*, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 495 (quoting an affidavit of the lobbyist Daniel Murray: "I advise my clients as to which federal office-holders (or candidates) they should contribute and in what amounts, in order to best use the resources they are able to allocate to such efforts to advance their legislative agenda. Such plans also would include soft money contributions

to political parties and interest groups associated with political issues."); id. ("To

have true political clout, the giving and raising of campaign money for candidates

and political parties is often critically important." (quoting lobbyist Wright

Andrews)).

71. Abramoff also explained:

The regularity with which my staff would return from congressional offices with request for funds, on the heels of our asking for help should have disturbed me, but it didn't. It was illegal and wrong, but it didn't register as abnormal in any way. I was so used to hearing senator so-and-so wants \$25,000 for his charity, or representative X wants \$50,000 for the Congressional Campaign Committee, that I would actually double check with my staff when they didn't request lucre for the legislators. The whole process became so perfunctory it actually seemed natural.

ABRAMOFF, supra, at 206.

# V. The LNC's Major Donor Network

72. "Just like the major parties, the LNC offers its donors membership in various major-donor groups that provide 'certain perks' and benefits. For example, an LNC donor can become a member of the 'Chairman's Circle' for \$25,000 annually or \$2,500 monthly, and in return, receive '[d]irect contact with [the] National Chair, POTUS [President of the United States] nominee, or significant L[ibertarian] P[arty] candidate during [the] campaign season.' Chairman's Circle members also receive 'VIP Seating . . . with [the] National Chair, LNC officer, special guest, or POTUS nominee at [the] National Convention banquet or other events.' The LNC also offers membership in major-donor groups for annual donors of \$15,000 ('Select Benefactor'), \$5,000 ('Beacon of Liberty'), \$2,500 ('Pioneer of Freedom'), or \$1,500 ('Lifetime Founder'). In addition to

predetermined benefits, LNC staff has the 'discretion to create and bestow additional benefits' upon its major-donor group members." *LNC I*, 930 F. Supp. 2d at 179–80 (citations omitted); *see also* LNC Policy Manual at 36–38.

- 73. "The LNC offers a monthly pledge program in which donors can agree to give a recurring monthly contribution to the LNC, and the LNC will automatically charge the donor's credit card or checking account. The monthly pledges continue indefinitely until the donor decides to end the donations." *LNC I*, 930 F. Supp. 2d at 180 (citations omitted).
- 74. "Members of the LNC's top five major-donor groups are also granted membership in the LNC's 'Torch Club,' which entitles members to attend a special Torch Club event at the LNC's national convention. The Libertarian Party's federal candidates can attend this special event so long as they are also Torch Club members, and William Redpath attended the event while serving as the LNC's national chair and running as a Libertarian Party candidate for federal office." *LNC I*, 930 F. Supp. 2d at 180 (citations omitted); *see also* LNC Policy Manual at 38.
- 75. "The LNC offers the benefits of major-donor-group membership as an inducement to hopefully have people increase their contributions. And the inducement has worked, as the groups have been effective in attracting larger donations for the LNC. Donations from the relatively small group of donors who are members of the LNC's major-donor groups account for a substantial percentage of LNC revenue." *LNC I*, F. Supp. 2d at 181 (internal quotations and citations omitted).

- 76. "The LNC could potentially grant someone membership in one of its major-donor groups, such as the Chairman's Circle, if the person showed the LNC his or her will providing for a bequest large enough to qualify for membership or if the person threatened to revoke such a bequest." *Id.* at 187 (citation omitted).
- 77. "If individuals informed the LNC that they intended to leave the LNC a bequest upon death, the LNC would be thankful to them for possibly leaving a gift for the LNC someday, since the LNC needs more money. And the LNC would be grateful to these potential future donors for the possible contributions even though the donors could revoke their bequests before death." *Id.* (internal quotations omitted and citation omitted).
- 78. "[I]ndividuals have bequeathed very large amounts of money to non-profit organizations. For example, in 2005, the National Rifle Association received a \$1 million bequest from a member and donor. And in 2003, philanthropist Joan Kroc bequeathed more than \$200 million to National Public Radio, an amount almost double its then-annual budget." *Id*.at 182 (citations omitted).
- 79. "Philanthropists recognize that there is potential to raise great sums of money via bequests. For example, in 2009, Bill Gates and Warren Buffet started an effort to convince the 400 wealthiest Americans to pledge 'at least 50% of their net worth to charity during their lifetimes or at death." *Id.* (citation omitted). In 2015, Facebook founder Mark Zuckerberg and his wife committed to giving 99% of their Facebook shares—then valued at more than \$45 billion—to charity during their lives. Vindu Goel & Nick Wingfield, *Mark Zuckerberg Vows to Donate 99% of His Facebook Shares for Charity*, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 1, 2015),

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https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/02/technology/mark-zuckerberg-facebookcharity.html.

- 80. "Many non-profit organizations have sophisticated planned-giving programs that solicit bequests and other forms of planned giving, such as the National Rifle Association, the Nature Conservancy, the American Civil Liberties Union, and the NAACP Legal Defense Fund. Planned-giving consultants advise groups looking to increase their fundraising on how to more effectively solicit bequests." *LNC I*, F. Supp. 2d at 182–83 (citations omitted).
- 81. "Political parties are 'primarily concerned with electing their candidates' to office." *Id.* at 178 (quoting *McConnell*, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 469 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.)). "They have no economic interests apart from this ultimate goal, and thus 'the money they raise is spent assisting their candidates' campaigns." *Id.* (quoting *McConnell*, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 469–70 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.)). As a former member of Congress explained:

The ultimate goal of a political party such as the Democratic Party is to get as many Party members as possible into elective office, and in doing so to increase voting and Party activity by average Party members. The Party does this by developing principles on public policy matters the Party stands for, and then by finding candidates to run for the various political offices who represent those principles for the Party. When the Party finds its candidates, it tries to raise money to help get like-minded people to participate in the elections, and to try to get the Party's candidates the resources they need to get their message out to voters.

Id. at 178–79.

82. "Similarly, it is the LNC's mission to move public policy in a Libertarian

direction by . . . nominating candidates for political office that are Libertarian and

trying to get them elected. It is the LNC's goal to have a Libertarian president

and a Libertarian Congress and Libertarians elected to governorships and state general assemblies, state legislatures. As the LNC told a donor in 2003, the LNC is in the business of winning elections and the donor's gift goes towards making that happen." *LNC I*, 530 F. Supp. 2d at 179 (internal quotations and citations omitted).

- 83. "The LNC spends the bulk of its resources on obtaining access to the ballot for its candidates. Obtaining ballot access is probably the most important thing the [LNC] does, since the LNC's role in this electoral system is to field as many candidates . . . as possible for federal and state and local offices[.]" *Id.* (internal quotations and citations omitted). "Thus, the LNC funds petition drives for the party's federal candidates and works closely with its presidential candidate's campaign on ballot-access issues." *Id.* (citations omitted).
- 84. "In order to receive financial support from the LNC, Libertarian Party candidates must be certified as Libertarian candidates by the governing board of the party in their state and must not support any Presidential ticket other than the Libertarian Party's presidential ticket. The LNC has the power to take the Libertarian Party nomination away from a presidential ticket that fails to conduct its campaign in accordance with the party's platform." *LNC I*, 930 F. Supp. 2d at 179 (citations omitted); *see also* LNC Policy Manual at 43.
- 85. "Individuals have bequeathed contributions directly to federal candidates and their authorized political committees." *LNC I*, 930 F. Supp. 2d at 190 (citation omitted). "Such contributions are subject to FECA's limit on contributions to

'any candidate and his authorized political committees.'" *Id.* (quoting 52 U.S.C.§ 30116(a)(1)(A)).

- 86. For example, the Estate of Louise Welch made a \$2,600 contribution to Yarmuth for Congress in 2013. Clark Decl., Ex. B, FEC Form 3X, ECF No. 24-22. In 2007, the Estate of Shirley Bogs made a \$2,100 contribution to Kucinich for President 2008. Clark Decl. ¶ 15, tbl.6. And in 2006, the Estate of William G. Helis made a \$2,100 contribution to Committee to Re-Elect Bobby Jindal. *Id.*
- 87. "Before BCRA banned soft-money donations to national party committees in 2002, the committees could accept the full amount of a bequest from an estate so long as the committees designated the amount in excess of FECA's contribution limit as soft money—that is, funds purportedly to be used for non-federal-election purposes." *LNC I*, 930 F. Supp. 2d at 183.
- 88. "As a result, when soft-money donations to national party committees were legal, estates were able to donate the entire amount of a large bequest in one lump sum. For example, in 2002, the Estate of Martha Huges donated \$390,000 from a bequest to the DNC. In 1999, the Estate of Lola Cameron donated \$141,988 from a bequest to the RNC. In 1997, the Estate of Gwendolyn Williams donated \$133,829 from a bequest to the DNC. And in 2002, the Estate of Joan Shepard donated \$80,000 to the RNC." *Id.* at 183 (citations omitted).

# VI. The Specialized Purpose Regime's Impact on the LNC

89. "The Libertarian Party's ability to influence elections is in some measure related to its ability to raise and expend money." Sarwark Decl. ¶ 53. "The LNC needs, and would prefer, to spend its funds in order to directly speak to the electorate

about its ideology and political mission, to support its candidates, and to build its institutional capability, including its ability to regularly qualify for the ballot in various states." *Id.* 

- 90. "LNC's ability to solicit donations depends in part on having adequate financial resources on hand." *Id.* at ¶ 54. "Donors, voters, and prospective political candidates who might be attracted to the party's ideology are nonetheless dissuaded from supporting the party by its lack of resources." *Id.*
- 91. Absent the annual contribution limit, the LNC would utilize donations exceeding such limit for political expression, including improving the party's access to ballots, promoting awareness of the party and its ideology, and supporting candidates for state and federal office. *Id.* ¶ 56.
- 92. "The LNC is confident that it could identify and develop additional donors who would give beyond the base annual contribution limit (currently \$33,900), but refrain from doing so because it is illegal to give larger amounts without restriction and they do not perceive sufficient value in donations that carry the government's purpose restrictions." *Id.* ¶ 58. "The LNC would also be better able to attract larger testamentary bequests if the donors would know that a larger portion of their bequest would be immediately effective." *Id.*

### VII. Testamentary Contributions

- 93. "[I]t is possible for a bequest to raise valid anti-corruption concerns," as the LNC has "concede[d]." *LNC I*, 930 F. Supp. 2d at 166.
- 94. As a general matter, nothing prevents a living person from informing the beneficiary of a planned bequest about that bequest. FEC's Proposed Facts at 8.

- 95. In the past, "associates of a decedent who has left a bequest for a national party committee [have] inform[ed] specific federal officeholders or candidates of the bequest." *LNC I*, 930 F. Supp. 2d at 188. "In 2009, an attorney representing the co-trustees of a trust holding a bequest of over \$100,000 for the Democratic Party wrote a letter to United States Senator Frank Lautenberg informing him of the bequest." *Id.* "The attorney stated that his 'good friend and accountant' who 'had interactions with [the Senator] in his role as a director of Holy Name Hospital' suggested that he alert the Senator to the bequest." *Id.* at 189 (alteration in original) (citations omitted). "The attorney sent Senator Lautenberg a copy of the trust documents and in doing so highlighted the fact that the bequest was for more than \$100,000." *Id.*
- 96. "In April 2009, the LNC learned that it was to receive a \$10,000 bequest from the estate of James Kelleher." *Id.* "Upon learning of the bequest in an e-mail, the LNC's then-national chair asked, 'Whom do we thank?,' even though Kelleher was deceased." *Id.* (citations omitted). "According to the LNC, in the case of a bequest it 'would be reasonable to thank anybody who was helping to [e]ffect the donation' to the LNC, including '[p]ossibly the executor. Possibly the estate administrator or the estate attorney." *Id.* (alterations in original) (citations omitted). "As the LNC sees it, '[s]omebody is doing something to give \$10,000 to the [LNC], even if a penny is not coming out of their pocket, it is not inappropriate and mighty inexpensive to say thank you." *Id.* (alterations in original) (citations in original) (citations of the complexity of the complexity of the complexity of the complexity of the complexity.

operations directed a colleague to send a thank you note to the executor of the Kelleher estate." *Id.* (citations omitted).

- 97. The LNC has been informed by living persons that those persons planned to make large bequests to the LNC. Those persons include Michael Chastain (value of bequest estimated to be between \$500,000 and \$1,000,000) and Dominick Frollini (value of bequest estimated to be between \$25,000 and \$75,000). Chastain Decl.
  ¶ 8; Def.'s Opp'n, Ex. 12, Frollini LNC Estate Planning Email, ECF No. 26-16.
- 98. Another living person, William Redpath, has informed the LNC that he would leave a large bequest, with a value estimated at \$1.1 million, to fund a trust charged with furthering ballot access and electoral reform, but that he would prefer to leave an unrestricted contribution if it would not be subject to the current FECA contribution limits. Redpath Decl. ¶¶ 3–5.
- 99. "If a national party committee discovered that an individual planned to bequeath it a contribution or donation, the national party committee, its candidates, or officeholders could, in exchange, grant that individual political favors." *LNC I*, 930 F. Supp. 2d at 186. "A bequest may also help friends or family of the deceased in securing meetings with federal officeholders and candidates." *Id.* at 166.
- 100. "An individual can revoke a request before death, and . . . this possibility creates an incentive for a national party committee to limit the risk that a planned bequest will be revoked." *Id.* at 186. "An individual's revocable promise to bequeath a contribution" in the future "could cause that political party, its candidates, or its office holders to grant political favors to the individual in the hopes of preventing

the individual from revoking his or her promise." FEC's Proposed Facts at 7. Political committees "could feel pressure to . . . ensure that a (potential) donor is happy with the committee's actions lest [that donor] revoke the bequest." *LNC I*, 930 F. Supp. 2d at 167.

- 101."A living person may alter his or her estate planning documents at any time before death for any reason, including that a candidate, office holder, or political party votes or takes a political position contrary to the person's wishes." FEC's Proposed Facts at 8.
- 102. Estates have contributed more than \$3.7 million in bequeathed funds to recipients that must file reports with the FEC, according to FEC records dating from 1978 through August 2, 2017. Clark Decl. ¶¶ 1–4. The actual amount of bequeathed funds is likely even higher, because reporting entities are not required to inform the FEC that a particular contribution they received came from a bequest, and if they choose to do so anyway, they are not required to report this information in any standardized manner. *Id.* ¶ 5. For example, the LNC's disclosures regarding the Shaber bequest at issue in this litigation do not indicate that the contributions are the result of a bequest. *Id.* "As a result, Shaber's bequest to the LNC is not reflected in the totals described above." *Id.* Bequests, therefore, are likely underreported to the FEC. *See id.*
- 103.National political party committees have reported bequeathed contributions that exceeded the General Party Limit. Clark Decl. ¶ 6 & tbl.1. For example, the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee ("DCCC") received \$206,955.46 between 2014 and 2016 in bequeathed contributions from Robert

Bohna. *Id.* at tbl.1. The DCCC "accepted \$167,992.06 of the total bequest on December 31, 2014, with \$32,400 of that amount going to the DCCC's general account, and the remainder going to the type of segregated accounts described in 52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(9): \$38,392.06 of the contribution went into the DCCC's building fund, and \$97,200 went to the DCCC's recount fund." *Id.* ¶ 7. "In 2015, the DCCC accepted an additional \$32,400 of the bequest into its general fund." *Id.* "In 2016, the DCCC accepted an additional \$6,563.40 into its general fund." *Id.* 

- 104."On January 13, 2017, the [RNC] accepted a total of \$100,000 from the Estate of Richard Peter Belden by accepting \$33,400 into its general account and \$66,600 into its headquarters account." Clark Decl. ¶ 8.
- 105. "The [DNC] accepted \$32,400 from the Ronald L. Gabriel Trust in 2013 and again in 2014." Clark Decl. ¶ 9. "In 2015, DNC accepted \$45,243.96 from the same trust by accepting \$32,400 into its general account and an additional \$12,843.96 into its convention account." *Id.*
- 106. The "DNC also accepted \$50,000 from the Sarah Weatherbee Trust on April 4, 2015, with \$33,400 of that amount going to the DNC's general account and \$16,600 going to its convention account." *Id.* ¶ 10. "The next year, DNC accepted an additional \$9,723.30 into its convention account." *Id.*
- 107. The "LNC accepted \$30,800 from the Estate of Raymond Groves Burrington in 2012 and again 2013. In 2014, the LNC accepted \$15,744.75 from the same estate." *Id.* ¶ 11.

108. In 2010, the trustee of a trust holding a \$200,000 bequest to the DNC wrote a

letter to the then-chair of the DNC stating:

Due to the fact that mid-term elections are upon us, I [am] working to get this [contribution from the decedent's bequest] out to you as quickly as possible. I know it would be important to my friend, Michael Buckley, who we called "Buckley." Of course I cannot speak with him, as he is deceased, but both of us were kindred spirits with regard to our political views and had many, many discussions on politics. As you can see by the fact that he left the [DNC] 25% of his estate, it was a very important thing to him. While I believe he would want you to use the money in the way you think best, it is my heartfelt belief that he would want this year's money going towards defeating Carly Fiorina and Meg Whitman in California. Buckley was a former employee of Hewlett Packard under the reigns of Carly Fiorina and he was not silent with regard to how he felt about her. I think he would be actively campaigning against her and Meg Whitman, if he were alive today.

LNC I, 930 F. Supp. 2d at 188 (alteration in the original) (citation omitted). "The

trustee then asked the DNC to let her know if the money would in fact be used to

help defeat Fiorina and Whitman, because the decedent's 'friends would be

pleased to know."" Id.

# VIII. Joseph Shaber's Bequest

- 109.Between 1988 and 2011, Joseph Shaber made donations to the LNC in amounts ranging from \$10 to \$300. Pet.'s Mot. Cert., Ex. E, Joseph Shaber Gift History, ECF 24-7. The most that Mr. Shaber donated to the LNC at any time during that period was \$300 in March 1997. *Id.* Between June 2011 and November 2012, Shaber donated \$100 per month to the LNC. *Id.* In May 2012, he donated an additional \$100. *Id.*
- 110.In total, Mr. Shaber made 46 donations totaling \$3,315 to the LNC. Id.
- 111.Mr. Shaber's contributions to the LNC made him eligible to be a life member of the LNC in 2012. Sarwark Dep. at 78:12–18.

- 112."On May 20, 2013, LNC sent Joseph Shaber an invitation to attend a VIP reception to be held on July 12, 2013, to raise money for the David F. Nolan Building Fund." Def.'s Opp'n, Ex. 5, Joint Stipulation ¶ 3, ECF No. 26-9; *see also* Def.'s Opp'n, Ex. 14, LNC Invitation, ECF No. 26-18. This event was held in conjunction with FreedomFest, a large, annual convention for conservatives and libertarians. *See* Sarwark Dep. at 81:11–19; LNC Invitation at 3. The LNC typically participates in FreedomFest by having a table at the event and organizing breakout sessions to attempt to recruit and solicit donors. Sarwark Dep. at 82:1–10. Libertarian candidates frequently attend the event. *Id.* at 82:11–13.
- 113.Mr. Shaber was included on LNC in-house mailing lists, Def.'s Opp'n, Ex. 3, Pet.'s Resps. Def.'s Interrogatories at 1, ECF No. 26-7, to which the LNC sends communications soliciting contributions, Sarwark Dep. at 17:7–21, 70:14–73:12. Mr. Shaber responded to some of these solicitations with contributions to the LNC. *See* Joseph Shaber Gift History.
- 114.By April 2012, Mr. Shaber had contributed \$750 to Ron Paul's campaign in the Republican presidential primary. *See* Def.'s Opp'n, Ex. 21, Shaber Contribution Receipt, ECF No. 26-25. Although Ron Paul was then running for the Republican nomination, he later switched to the Libertarian Party after leaving federal office. *LNC I*, 930 F. Supp. 2d at 173.
- 115. Without the LNC's knowledge, the LNC was made a beneficiary of the Joseph Shaber Revocable Trust under a trust dated February 11, 2010. Sarwark Decl. ¶35.

- 116. The size of Mr. Shaber's gift to the LNC was contingent upon a variety of factors, including the value of Mr. Shaber's property and whether he would have grandchildren at the time of his passing. *See* Pet.'s Mot. Cert., Ex. G, Notice of Irrevocable Trust, ECF No. 24-9.
- 117.Mr. Shaber died on August 23, 2014, rendering the trust irrevocable. *Id.*; Pet.'s Mot. Cert., Ex. F, Escrow Agreement at 1, ECF No. 24-8; Pet,'s Mot. Cert., Ex. H, FEC Advisory Opinion 2015-05, ECF No. 24-10.
- 118.Mr. Shaber's death prevents him from engaging in political expression,
  association, or support. Def.'s First Objections & Resps. at 4; Sarwark Decl. ¶
  43.
- 119. The LNC first had access to money from Shaber's bequest in 2015, and took the maximum \$33,400 allowed for unrestricted purposes, in compliance with the FECA's general purpose limit, in February of that year. Decl. of Robert Kraus, Operations Director, LNC ("Kraus Decl.") ¶¶ 2, 4, ECF No. 12-4; FEC Advisory Opinion 2015-05 at 1–2.
- 120.By the terms of the trust, the LNC was named as the specific beneficiary of a \$50,000 monetary gift, plus a residual beneficiary of 25% of the remaining trust estate after specific distributions were made. Notice of Irrevocable Trust at 4–5. The LNC was also a contingent beneficiary of an additional 25% of the residue of Mr. Shaber's trust estate, which it would receive if Mr. Shaber died with no grandchildren. *Id.* Mr. Shaber did not have any grandchildren at the time of his death. Def.'s Opp'n, Ex. 29, Email from Michelle Lauer to William Hall at 1, ECF No. 26-33.

- 121.It was finally determined in September 2015, that The LNC's share of the Shaber trust was \$235,575.20. Escrow Agreement at 1.<sup>24</sup>
- 122. The LNC had sent Mr. Shaber a fundraising appeal related directly to its headquarters building. Sarwark Decl. ¶ 36.
- 123.Mr. Shaber specified that the LNC should take his bequest "outright." Notice of Irrevocable Trust at 5.
- 124. The FEC is unaware of any condition or limitation attached by Mr. Shaber to his bequest to the LNC. Def.'s First Objections & Resps. at 5.
- 125. The FEC is unaware at this time of any quid pro quo arrangement related to Mr. Shaber's bequest to the LNC. Def.'s First Objections & Resps. at 3.
- 126. The Trustee of Shaber's Trust could not impose restrictions on Mr. Shaber's bequest that Mr. Shaber did not himself place. FEC Advisory Opinion 2015-05 at 2.<sup>25</sup>
- 127. The LNC would accept and spend the entire amount of the Shaber bequest for its general expressive purposes, including expression in aid of its federal election efforts. Sarwark Decl. ¶ 38.
- 128.On September 15, 2015, the Trust and the LNC agreed to deposit the remaining \$202,175.20 due to the LNC into an escrow account. Def.'s Opp'n, Ex. 27, Escrow Agreement at 10, ECF No. 26-31. The escrow agent, First International Bank & Trust, has control over the annual distributions to the LNC in amounts

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup> Other aspects of the record suggest that the LNC's share of the Shaber trust was \$225,000. *See* FEC Advisory Opinion 2015-05 at 1–2. The parties seem to agree that the LNC's share of the trust was \$235,575.20, however, *see* Def.'s Resps. Pet.'s Proposed Facts at 33, and thus the Court so finds.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup> The FEC Advisory Opinion notes that "[t]he request [for an advisory opinion] states that Ms. Shaber, as trustee, has no power to require that the [LNC] accept its share in a way not required by the Settlor," though does not present this assertion as a fact. FEC Advisory Opinion 2015-05 at 2 (alterations omitted).

equal to the limitations of federal campaign finance law, 52 U.S.C § 30116(a)(1)(B). *Id.* at 1. The Escrow Agreement instructs the Escrow Agent to invest the funds in the escrow account in bank accounts or certificates of deposit, with all interest accruing to the benefit of the national Libertarian Party, and to annually disburse the funds to LP at the maximum allowed permitted by contribution limits. *Id.*; Sarwark Dep. at 93:15-19. The agreement explicitly provides that LP may challenge the legal validity of the contribution limit, and demand payment of the full amount remaining in the account should its challenge succeed. Escrow Agreement at 2.

- 129. To LNC's knowledge, neither Mr. Shaber nor anyone related to him or acting on his behalf has had any relationship with the LNC, its officers, board members, or candidates, apart from Mr. Shaber's contribution history. Sarwark Decl. ¶ 41.
- 130.The LNC received a contribution of \$33,400 on behalf of Mr. Shaber from the escrow account on January 29, 2016. Def.'s Opp'n, Ex. 19, 2016 Itemized Receipts, ECF No. 26-23.
- 131. The LNC has also received its maximum contribution from the Shaber trust for 2017. Def.'s Opp'n, Ex. 18, 2017 Itemized Receipts, ECF No. 26-22.
- 132. The LNC is prohibited from pledging, assigning, or otherwise obligating the anticipated contributions before they are disbursed. FEC Advisory Opinion 2015-05 at 4 n.5 (citing FEC Advisory Opinion 2004-02).
- 133. Aside from pursuing its ideological and political mission, the LNC has provided nothing of value to Mr. Shaber, or to anyone else, in exchange for his bequest to the LNC. Sarwark Decl. ¶ 42.

134.Upon learning of the Shaber bequest, the LNC removed Mr. Shaber from the membership rolls. Sarwark Decl. ¶ 44.

# IX. Other Potential Donors To The LNC

- 135. The LNC solicits potential contributors to include the LNC as a beneficiary in donors' estate planning materials. *See* Def.'s Opp'n, Ex. 25, LNC Legacy
  Libertarians Email, ECF No. 26-29. On March 27, 2017, the LNC sent an email to 140,322 people on its contact list informing them that the party had started a planned giving program for people who want to designate the Libertarian Party as a beneficiary in their will. Pet.'s Resps. Def.'s Interrogatories at 4. The email noted that the "Libertarian Party will honor these generous supporters by listing their names on a permanent plaque at our headquarters." *Id*.
- 136.In response to this email, Nick Frollini wrote to the LNC to explain that he had designated the LNC as a beneficiary in his will and that he estimated his bequest would be worth "between \$25,000 and \$75,000 at the time of [his] passing."
  Frollini LNC Estate Planning Email at 1. The LNC's Head of Development, Lauren Daugherty, responded to the email with an invitation to have dinner with the LNC's national chair. *Id.* Frollini did not ultimately attend the dinner. Sarwark Dep. at 68:2–4.
- 137. "If contribution limits did not apply to bequests, the LNC would increase its outreach about its planned giving program to its members who have a high capacity for giving." Pet.'s Resps. Def.'s Interrogatories at 4. "Planned giving would take a more prominent place in the LNC's donor cultivation via in person meetings, online correspondence, and traditional mail." *Id.*

138."Among the donations that the LNC would solicit and accept in excess of the base annual contribution limit (currently \$33,900) would be donations from donors who have already given the base annual contribution limit but stand ready to give more for unrestricted purposes if it were legal to do so, including Chris Rufer, Michael Chastain, the Shaber escrow, the forthcoming Clinard escrow, and, at some point, the Redpath and Chastain estates." Sarwark Decl. ¶ 57.

### a. Chris Rufer

- 139.Chris Rufer is a Libertarian who desires "to maximize the ideals of the Libertarian Party and to see them implemented through political action." Rufer Decl. ¶ 1.
- 140.Rufer believes that "the Libertarian Party is the only organization that seeks to directly participate in and control the government, with the aim of steering its functions according to libertarian principles." *Id.* ¶ 1. Therefore, he "regularly donate[s] money to the [LNC], and to Libertarian candidates." *Id.* In 2016 alone, Rufer "donated over \$900,000 to directly support the election of the LNC's candidates." *Id.*
- 141.Rufer "trust[s] the LNC to effectively spend funds advancing its mission, which [he] support[s]." *Id.* ¶ 2. He wishes to "maximize LNC's unrestrained ability to advocate its message, and further [his] participation in the LNC's mission, by donating as much as [he is] comfortably able to the LNC to be spent freely in the LNC's judgment." *Id.* "The government's contribution limitations are below the amount [Rufer] would freely give the LNC this year, and in future years, to be spent as the LNC sees fit." *Id.*

- 142.Rufer says he wishes "to donate money to the [LNC] to advance its mission, not to obtain access to or the gratitude of any candidates or officeholders." *Id.* ¶ 3.
  Rufer has "no expectation of receiving any special access to candidates or officeholders if [he] were to donate over \$33,900 to the [LNC] in any given year, to be spent for a particular purpose or without restriction." *Id.*
- 143.Rufer has "donated over \$280,000 directly to the LNC over the years, including the maximum amounts allowed by law for unrestricted purposes this year, and in 2012, 2013, and 2016." *Id.* ¶ 4.
- 144.Rufer "understand[s] that the government now allows [him] to donate up to
  \$339,000 to the LNC per year, but not if the money would be spent as the LNC
  wishes." *Id.* ¶ 5. "Any additional money [Rufer] would donate this year beyond
  the \$33,900 he has already donated would come with government-imposed
  strings." *Id.* Accordingly, Rufer is "not giving the LNC any additional money for
  the year." *Id.*
- 145.Rufer does "not want any part of [his] contribution this year restricted to spending on a headquarters building, fees for election contests and other legal proceedings, and presidential nominating conventions." *Id.* Rufer does "not believe that the LNC has much use for those spending purposes this year, and any money spent for those purposes may not communicate the same messages that the LNC would otherwise communicate with [his] donation." *Id.*
- 146.Rufer "would donate funds to the [LNC] in excess of the annual contribution limits for general, non-segregated purposes and the party's spending for segregated account purposes, this year and . . . in future years, but refrain[s] from

doing so owing to the contribution limits and restrictions imposed by the government." *Id.* ¶ 6. Rufer understands that he "face[s] a real threat of prosecution if [he] were to violate the federal laws restricting [his] ability to donate money to the [LNC], and [he is] not willing to risk prosecution." *Id.* 

147. "If it is determined that the [LNC] is not subject to the limitation for general, non-segregated purposes, currently \$33,900 per year, such that donations exceeding that amount per year need not be dedicated to the segregated purpose accounts, [Rufer] would expect to donate to the Libertarian National Committee in excess of that amount, this year and in future years." *Id.* ¶ 7.

### b. Michael Chastain

- 148.Michael Chastain is a Libertarian who "desire[s] to maximize the ideals of the Libertarian Party and see them implemented through political action." Chastain Decl. ¶ 1.
- 149. Chastain believes that the "Libertarian Party is the only organization that seeks to directly participate in and control the government, with the aim of steering its functions according to libertarian principles." *Id.* ¶ 1. Therefore, Chastain "regularly donate[s] money to the [LNC] and to Libertarian candidates." *Id.*
- 150.Chastain "trust[s] the LNC to effectively spend funds advancing its mission, which [he] support[s]." *Id.* ¶ 2. He "wish[es] to maximize LNC's unrestrained ability to advocate its message, and further [his] participation in the LNC's mission, by donating as much as [he is] comfortably able to the LNC to be spent freely in the LNC's judgment." *Id.* "The government's contribution limitations

are below the amount [Chastain] would freely give the LNC this year, and in future years, to be spent as the LNC sees fit." *Id.* 

- 151.Chastain "wish[es] to donate money to the [LNC] to advance its mission, not to obtain access to or the gratitude of any candidates or officeholders." *Id.* ¶ 3.
  Chastain has "no expectation of receiving any special access to candidates or officeholders if [he] were to donate over \$33,900 to the [LNC] in any given year, to be spent for a particular purpose or without restriction." *Id.*
- 152. "Thus far in 2017, [Chastain has] donated a total of \$60,310.01 to the [LNC]." *Id.* ¶ 4. Chastain has "donated the maximum \$33,900 in unrestricted funds, and an additional \$26,410.01 to the building fund." *Id.*
- 153.Chastain "understand[s] that the government now allows him to donate up to \$339,000 to the LNC per year, but not if the money would be spent as the LNC wishes." *Id.* ¶ 5. "Any additional money [Chastain] would donate this year beyond the \$33,900 he has already donated for unrestricted purposes would come with government-imposed strings." *Id.* Accordingly, Chastain is "not giving the LNC any additional money for the year." *Id.*
- 154.Chastain does "not want any additional part of his contribution this year restricted to spending on a headquarters building, fees for election contests and other legal proceedings, and presidential nominating conventions." *Id.* Chastain does "not believe that the LNC has much use for those spending purposes this year, and any money spent for those purposes may not communicate the same messages that the LNC would otherwise communicate with [his] donation." *Id.*

- 155.Chastain "would donate funds to the [LNC] in excess of the annual contribution limits for general, non-segregated purposes and the party's spending for segregated account purposes, this year and in future years, but refrain[s] from doing so owing to the contribution limits and restrictions imposed by the government." *Id.* ¶ 6. Chastain "understand[s] that he face[s] a real threat of prosecution if [he] were to violate the federal laws restricting [his] ability to donate money to the [LNC], and [he is] not willing to risk prosecution." *Id.*
- 156. "If it is determined that the [LNC] is not subject to the limitation for general, nonsegregated purposes, currently \$33,900 per year, such that donations exceeding that amount per year need not be dedicated to the segregated purpose accounts, [Chastain] would donate to the [LNC] in excess of that amount, this year and in future years. *Id.* ¶ 7.
- 157.Chastain is "in the process of revising [his] estate plan," and "plan[s] to make the LNC a contingent beneficiary in the amount of \$500,000-\$1,000,000." *Id.* ¶ 8.
- 158. Chastain "would not want the government to impose any strings on how the LNC would spend [his] bequest." *Id.* Chastain "would not want any part of his bequest to LNC restricted to spending on a headquarters building, fees for election contests and other legal proceedings, and presidential nominating conventions." *Id.* Chastain "would want the LNC to have [his] bequest entirely without restriction." *Id.*
- 159.Chastain "would not bequeath money to LNC in an attempt to remain affiliated with the party after [he is] dead." *Id.* ¶ 9. "The party does not have deceased members." *Id.*

- 160.Chastain has "no idea who would be running as a Libertarian Party candidate for any office at the time [his] estate would disburse his assets to the Libertarian Party." *Id.* ¶ 10. Chastain "cannot predict who will run for office under the Libertarian banner in the future, and [he] hope[s] and expects to live beyond the time through which the party's candidates, and the likely issues they would espouse, may be currently foreseen." *Id.*
- 161. Chastain has "not received any sort of benefit whatsoever for promising to remember the Libertarian Party in [his] will should the contribution limits change." *Id.* ¶ 11. "The Party does not offer any benefits in exchange for being remembered in an individual's will, apart from perhaps a simple expression of gratitude." *Id.*

### c. William Redpath

- 162. William Redpath is "currently an at-large member of the [LNC]." Redpath Decl.
  ¶ 1. He has "served as the Treasurer of the Libertarian Party three times, and served as the National Chair of the Libertarian Party from July, 2006 through May, 2010." *Id.* He has also repeatedly "run for public office as a Libertarian." *Id.*
- 163.Redpath is a Libertarian who "desire[s] to maximize the ideals of the Libertarian Party and see them implemented through political action." *Id.* ¶ 2. Redpath believes that "the Libertarian Party is the only organization that seeks to directly participate in and control the government, with the aim of steering its functions according to libertarian principles." *Id.* "Therefore, [Redpath] regularly

donate[s] money to the [LNC] and to Libertarian candidates." *Id.* "Apart from [his] time, over the years, [he has] contributed over \$100,000 to the LNC." *Id.* 164.Redpath's "last will and testament provides that upon [his] death, 40% of his estate—a portion of his anticipated estate that is currently valued at over \$1.1 million—would fund a trust charged with furthering ballot access and electoral reform to benefit the Libertarian Party." *Id.* ¶ 3.

- 165.Redpath "would prefer, however, to leave this seven-figure amount to the LNC as an unrestricted bequest." *Id.* ¶ 4. Redpath "would want [his] death to give expression to the LNC cause that [he has] so steadfastly endorsed and advocated throughout [his] life, and to assist in the LNC's expression of its ideals and political program." *Id.* Redpath "trust[s] the LNC to effectively use [his] bequest for these expressive purposes, and want[s] to maximize the LNC's expression by seeing that [his] bequest is given to the LNC without restriction." *Id.*
- 166. "But for the current contribution limits, which limit the purposes for which the LNC could spend [Redpath's] bequest, [Redpath] would immediately alter [his] last will and testament to replace the current ballot access and electoral reform trust with an unrestricted donation of that same 40% of [his] estate to the LNC." *Id.* ¶ 5. Redpath "do[es] not want any part of his bequest restricted to spending on a headquarters building, fees for election contests and other legal proceedings, and presidential nominating conventions, and [he] will not leave a sizable gift to the LNC so long as these strings are attached to the LNC's ability to access [his] gift." *Id.* Redpath "do[es] not believe that the LNC has much use for those spending purposes in any given year, and any money spent for those purposes

may not communicate the same messages that the LNC might otherwise communicate with [his] donation." *Id.* 

- 167.Redpath "would not bequeath money to LNC in an attempt to remain affiliated with the party after he is dead." *Id.* ¶ 6. "The party does not have deceased members." *Id.*
- 168.Redpath has "no idea who would be running as a Libertarian Party candidate for any office at the time his estate would disburse assets to the Libertarian Party." *Id.* ¶ 7. Redpath "cannot predict who will run for office under the Libertarian banner in the future, and [he] hope[s] and expect[s] to live beyond the time through which the party's candidates, and the likely issues they would espouse, may be currently foreseen." *Id.*
- 169.Redpath has "not received any sort of benefit whatsoever for promising to remember the Libertarian Party in [his] will should the contribution limits change." *Id.* ¶ 8. "The Party does not offer any benefits in exchange for being remembered in an individual's will, apart from perhaps a simple expression of gratitude." *Id.*

### d. Frank Welch Clinard, Jr.

- 170. "LNC has been left a testamentary bequest by one Frank Welch Clinard, Jr. The bequest does not specify any use restriction. Sarwark Decl. ¶ 45; *see also* Pet.'s Mot. Cert., Ex. L, Last Will and Testament of Frank Welch Clinard, Jr. at 3–4, ECF No. 24-14.
- 171.Between 1988 and 2008, Clinard had sporadically donated to the LNC, in small amounts that totaled \$1,625.30 throughout the time period. *See* Pet.'s Mot. Cert.,

Ex. M, Donor Clinard Gift History, ECF No. 24-15. Only three times did his donations meet or exceed \$100, with the highest donation amounting to \$159. *See id.*<sup>26</sup>

- 172."To LNC's knowledge, neither Clinard nor anyone related to him or acting on his behalf has had any relationship with the LNC, its officers, board members, or candidates, apart from Clinard's contribution history." Sarwark Decl. ¶ 47.
- 173.Clinard's bequest to LNC totals \$111,863.52. Pet.'s Mot. Cert., Ex. N, Estate of Frank W. Clinard, Jr. at 12, ECF No. 24-16.
- 174. "LNC would accept and spend the entire amount of the Clinard bequest for its general expressive purposes, including expression in aid of its federal election efforts." Sarwark Decl. ¶ 48.
- 175. "LNC is in the process of establishing an escrow account so that it may receive the entirety of Clinard's bequest for general expressive purposes, without restriction." *Id.* ¶ 49.
- 176. "Aside from pursuing its ideological and political mission, LNC has provided nothing of value to Frank Clinard, or to anyone else, in exchange for his bequest to the LNC." *Id.* ¶ 50.
- 177. "Frank Clinard's death prevents him from engaging in political expression, association, or support." *Id.* ¶ 51.
- 178."The LNC has removed Frank Clinard from its membership rolls on account of his death." *Id.* ¶ 52.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup> The Sarwark Declaration asserts that Clinard donated \$1,625.30 to the petitioner between 1996 (rather than 1988) and 2008. Sarwark Decl. ¶ 46. This appears to be a typographical error, which the parties inadvertently repeat, *see* Def.'s Resps. Pet.'s Proposed Facts at 49, as Exhibit M to the petitioner's memorandum shows that Clinard donated \$1,625.30 to the petitioner between 1988 and 2008. *See* Donor Clinard Gift History.

# IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

LIBERTARIAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE, INC.,	)	Case No.
1444 Duke Street	)	
Alexandria, VA 22314	)	COMPLAINT
	)	
Plaintiff,	)	
	)	
V.	)	
	)	
FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION,	)	
999 E Street, N.W.	)	
Washington, DC 20463	)	
	)	

#### COMPLAINT

Plaintiff Libertarian National Committee, Inc., by and through undersigned counsel, complains of Defendant as follows:

#### INTRODUCTION

"You can't take it with you."

Accordingly, many people leave instructions for the disbursement of their worldly possessions and money upon their passing—instructions that our legal system aims to honor. Those instructions, often called a "last will and *testament*," are inherently expressive, conveying the decedent's desires to advance particular charitable and ideological goals. Often times, those instructions direct the funding of political parties.

Consistent with this longstanding American tradition, Joseph Shaber bequeathed \$235,575.20, without restrictions, to the Libertarian National Committee. But the LNC cannot access this money, at least not for the purposes that would best help it communicate with voters, elect its candidates, and achieve its political objectives.

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Defendant Federal Election Commission applies the federal annual contribution limits to political party committees, 52 U.S.C. §§ 30116, 30125 ("the Party Limit"), against decedents' bequests, infringing upon the speech rights of both donors and donees. And while the Party Limit is currently \$33,400, that limit only applies where a particular contribution might be used for general communication and party-building. Conversely, the Government would allow the Party to accept as much as \$100,200 per year from Shaber's bequest provided it was used for each of three Government-approved purposes: a national convention, attorneys, or a headquarters building. *See* 52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(1)(B) and (a)(9). In other words, the Government imposes a content-based restriction on a national party's speech: a party can only spend \$33,400 of a donor's money on general political speech, but nearly ten times that amount on Government-favored purposes.

Applying any contribution limits to Joseph Shaber's bequest is unconstitutional.

And the content-based restrictions on how the Libertarian Party may use its funds are also unconstitutional, on their face, and as applied against Shaber's bequest.

#### THE PARTIES

1. Plaintiff Libertarian National Committee, Inc. ("LNC") is the national committee of the Libertarian Party of the United States. The LNC is a not-for-profit organization incorporated under the laws of the District of Columbia, which maintains its headquarters in Alexandria, Virginia. The LNC has 12,235 current dues paying members, in all 50 states and the District of Columbia. Approximately 399,302 registered voters identify with the Libertarian Party in the 27 states in which voters can register as Libertarians. Throughout the Nation, 141 officeholders (including holders of non-partisan offices), are affiliated with the Libertarian Party. The LNC's purpose is to field national Presidential tickets, to support its state party affiliates in running

candidates for public office, and to conduct other political activities in furtherance of a libertarian public policy agenda in the United States.

2. Defendant Federal Election Commission ("FEC") is the federal government agency charged with administrating and enforcing the federal campaign finance laws, including the laws challenged in this action.

# JURISDICTION AND VENUE

3. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over the matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 2201, and 52 U.S.C. § 30110, pursuant to which the matter should be immediately certified to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit for consideration en banc.

4. Venue lies in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e).

# STATEMENT OF FACTS

#### Legislative and Regulatory Background

5. Title 52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(1) provides, in pertinent part, that "no person shall make contributions– (B) to the political committees established and maintained by a national political party, which are not the authorized political committees of any candidate, in any calendar year which, in the aggregate, exceed \$ 25,000, or, in the case of contributions made to any of the accounts described in paragraph (9), exceed 300 percent of the amount otherwise applicable under this subparagraph with respect to such calendar year."

6. Title 52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(9) describes three "separate, segregated account[s]" referenced in 52 U.S.C. § 30116(a), to which individuals may, pursuant to that section, contribute "300 percent of the amount otherwise applicable" under that section. These accounts are:

- (A) an account "which is used solely to defray expenses incurred with respect to a presidential nominating convention (including the payment of deposits) or to repay loans the proceeds of which were used to defray such expenses, or otherwise to restore funds used to defray such expenses, except that the aggregate amount of expenditures the national committee of a political party may make from such account may not exceed \$ 20,000,000 with respect to any single convention;"
- (B) an account "which is used solely to defray expenses incurred with respect to the construction, purchase, renovation, operation, and furnishing of one or more headquarters buildings of the party or to repay loans the proceeds of which were used to defray such expenses, or otherwise to restore funds used to defray such expenses (including expenses for obligations incurred during the 2-year period which ends on the date of the enactment of this paragraph);" and
- (C) an account "which is used to defray expenses incurred with respect to the preparation for and the conduct of election recounts and contests and other legal proceedings."

7. Pursuant to 52 U.S.C. § 30125, enacted as part of the "Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002," no political committee can "solicit, receive or direct to another person a contribution, donation, or transfer of funds or any other thing of value, or spend any funds, that are not subject to the limitations, prohibitions, and reporting requirements" of 52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(1). The Libertarian Party is not one of the two parties referenced in the "Bipartisan" Act's title.

8. The FEC has previously taken the litigating position in this Court, which this Court has accepted, that the limitation on the amounts that political committees may "solicit" is not violated if the funds are subject to the Party Limit when they are actually received; *e.g.*, a political

party may solicit bequests in any amount, provided that it does not, in any year, accept funds from said bequests in excess of the Party Limit.

Pursuant to 52 U.S.C. § 30116(c), the contribution limits set forth in 52 U.S.C. §
 30116(a)(1) are indexed for inflation. The current annual limit on contributions to political parties is
 \$33,400.00.

10. Although the term "person," as used in 52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(1), is not specifically defined to include an individual's testamentary estate, Defendant FEC has determined that the definition should be so extended. *See*, *e.g.* FEC Advisory Opinions 2015-05, 2004-02, 1999-14.

11. Accordingly, the national committees of political parties may not receive bequests exceeding the federal contribution limits applicable to living individuals. In the event such bequests are made, defendant FEC does not permit national party committees to receive such bequests into escrow funds over which they exercise control, including control over the direction of the funds' investment strategies or choice as to the amount of any withdrawals made in any particular year.

#### The Libertarian National Committee

12. The Libertarian Party may be the largest "third" party in the United States, but it is generally unable to effectively recruit and advocate for its candidates. Founded in 1971, the party has yet to elect a federal office holder. Unlike its two major competitors, the Libertarian Party's national committee is forced to spend the bulk of its resources securing access to the ballot, leaving comparatively little for actual campaigning—an expensive activity in and of itself. The situation is self-perpetuating, as a party's ability to solicit donations depends in part on having adequate financial resources on hand. Donors, voters, and prospective political candidates who might be attracted to the party's ideology are nonetheless dissuaded from supporting the party by its lack of resources.

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13. Accordingly, the LNC has comparatively less use for funds intended to support national conventions, a headquarters building, or attorney fees. The LNC's needs in these areas is not commensurate with the needs of the two major political parties whose elected officials were exclusively responsible for enacting the segregated account structure of 52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(9). The LNC needs, and would prefer, to spend its funds in order to directly speak to the electorate about its ideology and political mission, to support its candidates, and to build its institutional capability, including its ability to regularly qualify for the ballot in various states.

14. But for the Party Limits, the LNC would accept sums in excess of the annual contribution limit, from living donors as well as from testamentary bequests, and spend those funds for its general expressive purposes, including expression in aid of its federal election efforts. LNC would accept and spend such sums in amounts that are otherwise within the limits it could accept and spend for the segregated account purposes of 52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(9).

### The Shaber Bequest

15. Between 1988 and 2011, Joseph Shaber sporadically made small donations to the LNC, in amounts as low as \$10 and rarely exceeding \$50. The most that Mr. Shaber donated to LNC at any time during this period was \$300 in March, 1997. Between June, 2011 and November, 2012, Shaber donated \$100 per month to the LNC, an amount he twice supplemented by \$100 during this period.

16. Unbeknown to the LNC, it was made a beneficiary of the Joseph Shaber Revocable Living Trust U/T/D February 11, 2010 ("the trust").

17. On August 23, 2014, Joseph Shaber passed away, rendering the trust irrevocable.LNC's share of the trust's estate is \$235,575.20.

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# Add. 74

18. LNC would accept and spend the entire amount of the Shaber bequest for its general expressive purposes, including expression in aid of its federal election efforts.

19. Owing to Defendant FEC's application of federal contribution limits, Plaintiff LNC could not accept this entire bequest at once, as it would use at least some if not all of the money on federal election efforts and for its other desired expressive purposes. Rather, the LNC accepted a single payment of \$33,400 in 2015, and agreed that the remaining \$202,175.20 would be placed in an escrow.

20. The escrow account is established pursuant to an agreement among Alexina Shaber, a trustee of the trust, the LNC, and the escrow agent, First International Bank & Trust of Phoenix, Arizona, attached hereto as Exhibit A. The agreement provides, inter alia, that the escrow agent is to invest the funds in bank accounts or certificates of deposit, and to annually disburse the funds to LNC at the maximum amount permitted by the FEC. The agreement explicitly provides, however, that the LNC may challenge the legal validity of the contribution limit, and demand payment of the full amount remaining in the account should its challenge succeed. LNC has received its 2016 disbursement.

#### COUNT I

#### VIOLATION OF U.S. CONST. AMEND. I – RIGHT OF FREE SPEECH APPLICATION OF CONTRIBUTION LIMITS AGAINST THE SHABER BEQUEST

21. Paragraphs 1 through 20 are incorporated as though fully re-stated herein.

22. A unilateral, revocable promise to donate money to a political party at some indeterminate future time upon one's death does not readily create the appearance or possibility of *quid pro quo* corruption justifying restrictions upon the size of bequests to political parties. Such bequests, by their nature, cannot effectively circumvent contribution limits to political candidates because the donor often has no idea which candidates might benefit from the contribution, no

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candidate can predictably rely on receiving the money from a bequest, and neither candidates nor political parties risk offending the donors of bequests once the money is received.

23. Although the Libertarian Party is the nation's third-largest political party in terms of elected officeholders, ballot access, and participation in federal, state, and local elections, the Libertarian Party has never seen one of its candidates elected to federal office. No current federal office holder is affiliated with the Libertarian Party. The Libertarian Party is thus not in any position to deliver political favors in exchange for promises of future bequests.

24. The Supreme Court has previously upheld the Party Limit against a facial challenge, applying a relaxed standard of review on the theory that individuals contributing to political parties are typically engaged in associational, rather than expressive conduct. However, individuals acting in a testamentary capacity are not exercising their associational rights, but their right of free speech in desiring to leave a political legacy, a circumstance that the Supreme Court has not previously considered. Laws restricting the solicitation and acceptance of testamentary contributions must therefore be strictly scrutinized under the First Amendment.

25. Even if the testamentary donation could be viewed as an associational rather than primarily expressive act, the Party Limit's application to testamentary bequests does not "leav[e] persons free to engage in independent political expression, to associate actively through volunteering their services, and to assist to a limited but nonetheless substantial extent in supporting candidates and committees with financial resources." *Buckley* v. *Valeo*, 424 U.S. 1, 28 (1976) (per curiam).

26. In the absence of the Party Limit's application to the Shaber bequest, the LNC would substantially improve its ability to advocate and achieve electoral success by taking immediate control over the balance of the Shaber funds.

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27. Considering the unenforceable nature of promises to make testamentary bequests; the lack of coordination, let alone a quid-pro-quo relationship, between Joseph Shaber or anyone related to him and the Libertarian Party; the Libertarian Party's critical need for funds given its distant third-party status; and the Libertarian Party's inability, owing to its lack of elected federal officeholders, to engage in a quid pro quo donor relationship even if it were inclined to make such arrangements, application of 52 U.S.C. §§ 30116(a)(1)(B) and 30125 to Joseph Shaber's bequest to the LNC violates the First Amendment speech and associational rights of the LNC and its supporters. Such application significantly hampers the LNC in its ability to attract and advocate for its candidates and does not serve any valid governmental interest.

#### COUNT TWO VIOLATION OF U.S. CONST. AMEND. I – RIGHT OF FREE SPEECH CONTENT-BASED RESTRICTIONS OF 52 U.S.C. §§ 30116, 30125

28. Paragraphs 1 through 27 are incorporated as though fully re-stated herein.

29. The Party Limit discriminates against LNC based on the content of LNC's speech. LNC is allowed to accept only \$33,400 per year from individuals if it would use that money for general expressive purposes, but it can accept individual donations in the amount \$100,200 to speak through a convention, to promote itself via the establishment of a headquarters building, and to pay attorneys to speak on its behalf. The LNC could even accept any combination of these \$100,200 donations, in addition to the \$33,400 limit for general expressive purposes.

30. Content-based restrictions on speech are subject to strict scrutiny. Yet there is not even a rational basis to imagine that a \$33,401 donation for general expressive purposes might corrupt the political process, but a \$100,200 donation for a political party's lawyers, a \$100,200 donation for a political party's headquarters building, a \$300,600 donation to a political party for all three purposes—or even a \$334,000

donation to a political party for general purposes and the maximum amount for each of the favored purposes—would not be corrupting.

31. Because they favor, on their face, the acceptance of funds based on the content of a political party's speech, 52 U.S.C. §§ 30116(a)(1)(B) and 30125 violate the First Amendment speech and associational rights of the LNC and its supporters.

#### COUNT THREE VIOLATION OF U.S. CONST. AMEND. I – RIGHT OF FREE SPEECH CONTENT-BASED RESTRICTIONS OF 52 U.S.C. §§ 30116, 30125 AS APPLIED TO THE SHABER BEQUEST

32. Paragraphs 1 through 31 are incorporated as though fully re-stated herein.

33. Plaintiff LNC could accept the entire balance of the Shaber bequest immediately if it agreed to spend the bulk of the money on attorney fees, a convention, or a building. Because LNC prefers to spend that money to express itself generally, it can access only a small portion of the Shaber bequest every year.

34. Accordingly, 52 U.S.C. §§ 30116(a)(1)(B) and 30125 violate the First Amendment speech and associational rights of the LNC and its supporters.

#### PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Libertarian National Committee, Inc. requests that judgment be entered in its favor and against Defendant as follows:

1. An order permanently enjoining Defendant, its officers, agents, servants, employees, and all persons in active concert or participation with it who receives actual notice of the injunction, from enforcing 52 U.S.C. §§ 30116 and 30125, either generally or in relation to the Shaber Bequest;

2. Declaratory relief consistent with the injunction;

- 3. Costs and attorneys' fees pursuant to any applicable statute or authority; and
- 4. Any other further relief as the Court deems just and appropriate.

Dated: January 25, 2016

Respectfully submitted,

Alan Gura (D.C. Bar No. 453449) Gura & Possessky, PLLC 916 Prince Street, Suite 107 Alexandria, VA 22314 703.835.9085/Fax 703.997.7665

By: <u>/s/ Alan Gura</u> Alan Gura

Attorney for Plaintiff

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION -----x LIBERTARIAN NATIONAL : COMMITTEE, INC., : : Plaintiff, : : v. : FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, : Defendant. -----x Washington, D.C.

Tuesday, July 25, 2017

Deposition of

### NICHOLAS J. SARWARK

a Plaintiff, called for examination by counsel for Defendant, pursuant to notice and agreement of counsel, beginning at approximately at 10:00 a.m., at the offices of Federal Election Commission, Office of General Counsel, 999 E Street, NW, Washington, D.C., before Sean Young of Anderson Court Reporting, notary public in and for the District of Columbia, when were present on behalf of the parties:

1 **APPEARANCES:** 2 On behalf of Plaintiff: ALAN GURA, ESQUIRE 3 Gura & Possessky, PLLC 916 Prince Street, Suite 107 4 Alexandria, Virginia 22314 5 (703) 835-9085 On behalf of Defendants: 6 7 JACOB S. SILER, ESQUIRE HARRY J. SUMMERS, ESQUIRE Federal Election Commission 8 999 E Street, NW. Washington, D.C. 20463 9 (202) 694-1623 10 11 12 13 14 \* \* \* \* \* 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22

Libes GA GA BB = 187522 Comm D06 = Ment #1749653Filed: 09/10/2018 Page 116 paid 50 45 1 subscribers. Additionally, it is archived in a 2 way that people can read it. 3 And are there any restrictions on who 0 4 can post to the list? Yes, the people that I listed, those 5 Α recipients are the only ones who are able to post 6 7 to the list. The LNC members, staff members and 8 our counsel. 9 Okay. So, this email appears to be from Q 10 Tim Hagan. Who is that? 11 Α That's our treasurer. 12 Q In his role as treasurer, he has access to LNC's finances? 13 14 Α Yes. 15 So, he has knowledge of how much -- his Q access to knowledge and how much LNC has raised in 16 response to a particular fundraising request. 17 18 Α Yes. 19 At the beginning of the email it says, 0 20 for 2015 we budgeted \$67,300 for building fund 21 revenues. And then it says, we raised on 22 \$22,435.63. Did I read that right? Anderson Court Reporting -- 703-519-7180 Add. 82 -- www.andersonreporting.net

Case 1:16-cv-00121-BAH Document 26-10 Filed 10/05/17 Page 46 of 109

1	A Yes.
2	Q So, when this document says building
3	fund, is that referring to the building fund you
4	mentioned earlier in your deposition?
5	A Please clarify that question, it is a
6	little vague.
7	Q What do you understand building fund in
8	this email to mean?
9	A In this email, I understand building
10	fund to mean the line on our chart of accounts for
11	spending on the building which is potentially
12	unrelated to whether it monies in the separated
13	segregated accounts established by the agency.
14	Q So, this document reflects that the LNC
15	had a budget in 2015 of \$67,300 for the building
16	fund is that right?
17	A Yes. We had in the proposed budget that
18	was adopted which would have been in the fall of
19	the year before, we had targeted that we would
20	have \$67,300 that we would raise and be applied to
21	the building fund.
22	Q So, this reflects a pretty serious

Libes GA GA BB = 187522 Comm D06 = Ment #1749653Filed: 09/10/2018 Page 118 pade 0 47 shortfall from that budget is that fair to say? 1 2 Sadly, yes. Α Are there -- are you aware of other 3 0 4 years in which the LNC failed to raise it budgeted 5 total for building fund expenses? 6 Α Maybe although we haven't had the 7 building that long. We just bought it in, we 8 closed on it in early '14. Prior to early '14 when you bought the 9 Q building, did LNC have a building fund? 10 11 No. Well, I take that back, strike that. Α 12 We had been raising money to get to the point 13 where we could buy a building. 14 Would that have been referred to as a 0 15 building fund? 16 I believe it was referred to as a Α building fund. 17 18 Did LNC project similar projections, at 0 19 that time prior to buying the building, about how 20 much it intended to raise towards the building fund? 21 22 I don't recall specifically, I'd have to Α

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#### Case 1:16-cv-00121-BAH Document 26-10 Filed 10/05/17 Page 109 of 109 USCA Case #18-5227 Document #1749853 Filed: 09/10/2018 Page 119 of 150

From:	Alan Gura
To:	info@andersonreporting.net; Jacob S. Siler
Subject:	Sarwark Deposition errata sheet
Date:	Monday, August 28, 2017 8:21:03 AM

With respect to the deposition of Nicholas Sarwark on July 25, 2017, we did not receive an errata sheet or signature page for this deposition.

Please note there are a few non-substantive typographical errors:

Page 23, line 20: "there" should be "their"

Page 28, line 1: insert "you" after "would"

Page 39, line 14: insert "about" after "email"

Page 40, line 21: "Allen" should be "Alan"

Page 56, line 5: "request" should be "bequest"

Page 58, line 7: "Prolini" should be "Frollini"

Page 68, line 2: "Fellini" should be "Frollini"

Page 69, line 17: "Tyler" should be "Robert"

Page 84, line 11: "Paul" should be "Hall"

Page 88, line 7: "descanting" should be "dissenting"

Page 88, line 12: "descant" should be "dissent"

Page 92, line 3: "Karen Ann Haloes" should be "Caryn Ann Harlos"

Page 97, line 7: insert "52" after "Title"

Page 100, lines 5 and 6: "Krouse" should be "Kraus"

Page 101, line 1: "Krouse" should be "Kraus"

Thanks, Alan

	Libertarian	orion N	ational Comm	ittee Inc.	2			3
					_	-		
	00004	ر The second se	Account QuickReport					
	As of D	ecemp	As of December 31, 2015					
4			Type	Date	Num	Name	Memo	Amount
5	16 - Pr	<ul> <li>Prepaid Expenses</li> </ul>	thenses					
9	160	0 - Office	160 · Office Acquisition Deposits/Exp	Exp				
2	Tot	tal 160 · C	Total 160 · Office Acauisition Deposits/Exp	its/Exp				
	167	7 - Prepai	167 · Prepaid Convention	<b>+</b>				
6		167-10 .	167-10 • Prepaid Convention General Exp	eneral Exp				
10			Bill	12/17/2015	LP0017	Luckey, Denise	Nationbuilder LP Conv Setup	340.50
1			Credit Card Charge	12/17/2015		Nationbuilder, Inc.	Split Conv Exp and IT	00.0
12		Total 167	Total 167-10 · Prenaid Convention General Exp	on General Exp				340.50
1.0		167-20 .	167-20 · Prepaid Convention Travel/Other	ravel/Other				
14		Total 167	Total 167-20 · Prepaid Convention Travel/Other	on Travel/Other				
15	Tot	tal 167 · F	Total 167 · Prepaid Convention					340.50
16	Total 1	16 - Prepa	Total 16 · Prepaid Expenses					340.50
17	17 · Fi)	Fixed Assets	its					
18	176	8 - Ofc Im	178 Ofc Imprmnt Acq & Capt Expense	Jense				
19			Bill	08/03/2015	283173	Fire & Life Safety America, Inc.	Sprinkler Flow Alarm System	2,220.00
20	Tot	tal 178 · C	Total 178 · Ofc Imprmnt Acq & Capt Expense	Expense				2,220.00
21	Total 1	Total 17 · Fixed Assets	Assets					2,220.00
22	24 · Ac	24 · Accrued Expenses	xpenses					
23	245	5 - Accru	245 · Accrued Real Estate Tax					
24			Bill	06/01/2015	REDACTED	City of Alexandria Virginia	2015 Property Tax	4,421.01
25			Bill	11/04/2015	REDACTED	City of Alexandria Virginia	2015 Real Property Tax	3,684.15
26	Tot	tal 245 -	Total 245 · Accrued Real Estate Tax					8,105.16
27	Total 2	24 · Accru	Total 24 · Accrued Expenses					8,105.16
28	29 · Lo	oans & M	· Loans & Mortgages (Principal)					
29			Bill	01/25/2015	CTE	BB&T Loan Processing Center	Mortgage Principle	829.67
30			Bill	02/25/2015		BB&T Loan Processing Center	Mortgage Principle	829.67
31			Bill	03/25/2015	<b>EDACTE</b>	BB&T Loan Processing Center	Mortgage Principle	1,036.32
32			Bill	04/07/2015		BB&T Loan Processing Center	Mortgage Principle	7,500.00
33			Bill	04/25/2015		BB&T Loan Processing Center	Mortgage Principle	844.43
34			Bill	05/14/2015		BB&T Loan Processing Center	Mortgage Principle	10,000.00
35			Bill	05/25/2015	EDACIE	BB&T Loan Processing Center	Mortgage Principle	952.20
36			Bill	06/25/2015	EDACTE	BB&T Loan Processing Center	Mortgage Principle	918.83
37			Bill	07/16/2015	REDACTED	BB&T Loan Processing Center	Mortgage Principle	5,000.00
38			Bill	07/25/2015	EDACTE	BB&T Loan Processing Center	Mortgage Principle	989.07
39			Bill	08/25/2015		BB&T Loan Processing Center	Mortgage Principle	949.03
40			Bill	09/25/2015		BB&T Loan Processing Center	Mortgage Principle	954.33
41			Bill	10/25/2015	REUACIEU	BB&T Loan Processing Center	Mortgage Principle	1,020.97
42			Bill	11/25/2015	KEUAGIEU	BB&T Loan Processing Center	Mortgage Principle	962.59
43			Bill	12/25/2015		BB&T Loan Processing Center	Mortgage Principle	1,028.98
		,				-		

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		Type	Date	Num	Name	Memo	Amount
	31 · General Operating						
	Total 31 · General Operating	bu					
47 7	7000 · General Fundraising Expense	ig Expense					
48	7085 - Building Fund Fundraising Exp	<sup>-</sup> undraising E	dx				
49	Credit Ca	Credit Card Charge	01/22/2015		Gallery Leather Company, Inc.	PNC BF Donor Recognition Book -003	47.95
50	Credit Ca	Credit Card Charge	01/25/2015		PlaqueMaker.com	BF Donor Recognition Plaques	33.46
	Credit Ca	Credit Card Charge	08/01/2015		Marriott Hotels	Donor Recognition Benefits	0.00
52	Total 7085 · Building Fu	Building Fund Fundraising Exp	g Exp				81.41
	Total 7000 · General Fundraising Expense	aising Expense	0				81.41
2	7100 · Project-Related Expenses	penses					
	7111 · Legal Offense Fund						
	Bill		06/10/2015	LNCVFEC	Gura, PLLC	LNCvFEC Legal Expense	5,000.00
	Bill		07/27/2015	KRC Engagement	Chris Wiest AAL PLLC	Legal Expense	100.00
	Total 7111 · Legal Offense Fund	nse Fund					5,100.00
Т	Total 7100 · Project-Related Expenses	d Expenses					5,100.00
~	7300 · Program-Related Expenses	:xpenses					
	7380 · Ballot Access - Other Related	Other Related	-				
	7380-30 · Ballot Access Legal	cess Legal					
	Bill		12/14/2015	LPME-Lagal	Branson Law Office, P.A.	LPME v. ME SOS Legal Retainer	4,000.00
	Total 7380-30 · Ballot Access Legal	ot Access Leg	الا				4,000.00
	Total 7380 · Ballot Access - Other Related	ess - Other Rel	ated				4,000.00
Т	Total 7300 · Program-Related Expenses	ted Expenses					4,000.00
8	8100 - Admin & Overhead Expense	Expense					
	8170 · Occupancy Expenses	senses					
	8170-10 · Mortgage Interest Expense	e Interest Expe	ense				
	Bill		01/25/2015	REDACTED	BB&T Loan Processing Center	Mortgage Interest	2,070.54
	Bill		02/25/2015	REDACTED	BB&T Loan Processing Center	Mortgage Interest	2,070.54
	Bill		03/25/2015	ſ	BB&T Loan Processing Center	Mortgage Interest	1,863.89
	Bill		04/07/2015	J [] -  -	BB&T Loan Processing Center	Mortgage Interest	0.00
	Bill		04/25/2015	ローンドつ	BB&T Loan Processing Center	Mortgage Interest	2,055.78
	Bill		05/14/2015			Mortgage Interest	0.00
	Bill		05/25/2015	DACTE	BB&T Loan Processing Center	Mortgage Interest	1,948.01
	Bill		06/25/2015	<b>JACTF</b>	BB&T Loan Processing Center	Mortgage Interest	1,981.38
	Bill		07/16/2015		BB&T Loan Processing Center	Mortgage Interest	0.00
	Bill		07/25/2015		BB&T Loan Processing Center	Mortgage Interest	1,911.14
	Bill		08/25/2015	n	BB&T Loan Processing Center	Mortgage Interest	1,951.18
	Bill		09/25/2015	REDACTED	BB&T Loan Processing Center	Mortgage Interest	1,945.88
	Bill		10/25/2015	REDACTED	BB&T Loan Processing Center	Mortgage Interest	1,879.24
	Bill		11/25/2015	REDACTED	BB&T Loan Processing Center	Mortgage Interest	1,937.62
	Bill		12/25/2015		BB&T Loan Processing Center	Mortgage Interest	1,871.23
85	Total 8170-10 · Mortgage Interest Expense	tgage Interest I	Expense				23,486.43
	8170-20 · Utilities Expense	Expense					
	Bill		01/10/2015	REDACTED	Dominion Virginia Power	Electric	387.04

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4		Type	Date	Num	Name	Memo	Amount
89		Bill	01/22/2015	REDACTED	Virginia American Water	Water Bill	15.70
06		Bill	02/09/2015		Virginia American Water	Water Bill	15.70
91		Bill	02/11/2015	ÌС IЦ	Dominion Virginia Power	Electric	562.81
92		Bill	02/11/2015	ЦГ	Alexandria Renew Ent.	REDACTED	33.04
93		Bill	03/06/2015		Virginia American Water	Water Bill	15.70
94		Bill	03/09/2015	REDACTED	Dominion Virginia Power	Electric	553.70
5		Bill	03/12/2015	REDACTED	Alexandria Renew Ent.	REDACTED	33.04
96		Bill	04/09/2015	REDACTED	Alexandria Renew Ent.	REDACTED	33.04
97		Bill	04/09/2015	) Г П	Virginia American Water	Water Bill	15.70
98		Bill	04/09/2015		Dominion Virginia Power	REDACTED	303.34
66		Bill	05/07/2015	П О	Virginia American Water	Water Bill	15.70
100		Bill	05/09/2015	Ц П	Dominion Virginia Power	REDACTED	205.65
101		Bill	05/13/2015	REDACTED	Alexandria Renew Ent.	DACTE	33.04
102		Bill	06/03/2015	REDACTED	Dominion Virginia Power	REDACTED	312.72
103		Bill	06/10/2015	ÌС	Alexandria Renew Ent.		33.04
104		Bill	06/10/2015		Virginia American Water	Water Bill	15.74
105		Bill	07/03/2015	ם ער	Dominion Virginia Power	REDACTED	329.53
106		Bill	07/13/2015	Ц Ц	Alexandria Renew Ent.		33.04
107		Bill	07/13/2015	Д	Virginia American Water	Water Bill	15.74
108		Bill	08/03/2015	REDACTED	Dominion Virginia Power	REDACTED	416.97
6		Bill	08/12/2015	REDACTED	Virginia American Water	Water Bill	17.59
110		Bill	08/17/2015	) ( 1 П	Alexandria Renew Ent.	DACT	40.93
111		Bill	09/03/2015	ЦП	Dominion Virginia Power	REDACTED	415.77
112		Bill	09/14/2015	ЦÚ	Alexandria Renew Ent.		33.04
113		Bill	09/14/2015	REDACTED	Virginia American Water	Water Bill	15.74
114		Bill	10/03/2015	REDACTED	Dominion Virginia Power	REDACTED	365.98
115		Bill	10/07/2015	REDACTED	Virginia American Water	Č	15.74
116		Bill	10/07/2015	ÌС IЦ	Alexandria Renew Ent.	REDACIED	36.35
117		Bill	10/20/2015	ה ה	Alexandria Renew Ent.	REDACTED	36.35
118		Bill	11/03/2015	П Ц	Dominion Virginia Power		213.14
119		Bill	11/12/2015	REDACTED	Virginia American Water	Water Bill	15.74
120		Bill	12/03/2015	REDACTED	Dominion Virginia Power	REDACTED	249.43
121		Bill	12/11/2015	REDACTED	Alexandria Renew Ent.		29.99
122		Bill	12/11/2015		Virginia American Water	Water Bill	15.74
123	Total 817	Total 8170-20 · Utilities Expense	0				4,914.55
124	8170-30 -	8170-30 · Property Taxes, Fees	s & Permits				
5		Bill	11/04/2015	REDACTED	City of Alexandria Virginia	Property Tax Map ID 073.02.08.17	736.85
126	Total 817	Total 8170-30 · Property Taxes, Fees & Permits	Fees & Permits				736.85
127	8170-40 -	8170-40 · Maintenance, Cleaning & Repairs	ng & Repairs				
128		Bill	01/07/2015	IN-0270563	Miller's Office Products, Inc.	Cleaning & Maint. Supplies	0.00
6		Bill	01/07/2015	IN-0270339	Miller's Office Products, Inc.	Cleaning & Maint. Supplies	40.60
130		Bill	01/08/2015	01/05-08-12-15	A & D Cleaning Service, LLC	Cleaning	250.00
131		Bill	01/22/2015	IN-0279359	Miller's Office Products, Inc.	Cleaning & Maint. Supplies	29.42

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	Type	Date	Num	Name	Memo	Amount
	Bill	01/26/2015	15 IN-0280053	Miller's Office Products, Inc.	Cleaning & Maint. Supplies	00.00
	Bill	01/26/2015	15 IN-02802807	Miller's Office Products, Inc.	Cleaning & Maint. Supplies	29.99
	Bill	01/29/2015	15 01/19-22-26-29	A & D Cleaning Service, LLC	Cleaning	250.00
	Bill	02/09/2015	15 286309	Better Termite & Pest Control, Inc.	Bi Monthly Pest Control Services	75.00
	Bill	02/11/2015	15 IN-0287439	Miller's Office Products, Inc.	Cleaning & Maint. Supplies	24.80
	Bill	02/11/2015	15 In-0288007	Miller's Office Products, Inc.	Cleaning & Maint. Supplies	58.29
	Bill	02/12/2015	15 Cleaning-2/2-5-9-12	A & D Cleaning Service, LLC	Cleaning	250.00
	Bill	02/19/2015	IN-0290451	Miller's Office Products, Inc.	Cleaning & Maint. Supplies	233.87
	Bill	02/20/2015	15 97031	PROLEC	HVAC Repair and Maint.	464.80
	Bill	02/25/2015	15 02/16-19-23-25	A & D Cleaning Service, LLC	Cleaning	250.00
l I	Bill	03/04/2015	15 IN-0297812	Miller's Office Products, Inc.	Cleaning & Maint. Supplies	95.54
1	Bill	03/12/2015	15 Clean-03/02-05-09-12	A & D Cleaning Service, LLC	Cleaning	250.00
1	Credit Card Charge	03/12/2015	15	Amazon.com	Maint Supplies	0.00
	Credit Card Charge	03/13/2015	15	ADT Security Systems	BBT Security System Monthly Fee	52.21
	Credit Card Charge	03/15/2015	15	ComplianceSigns.com	BB&T Maintenance Supplies	17.95
	Bill	03/20/2015	15 IN-0303901	Miller's Office Products, Inc.	Cleaning & Maint. Supplies	41.78
	Bill	03/20/2015	15 IN-0302708	Miller's Office Products, Inc.	Cleaning & Maint. Supplies	0.00
	Bill	03/24/2015	15 IN-0305212	Miller's Office Products, Inc.	Cleaning & Maint. Supplies	0.00
	Bill	03/26/2015	15 03/16-19-23-26	A & D Cleaning Service, LLC	Cleaning	250.00
	Bill	03/26/2015	15 IN-0282326	Miller's Office Products, Inc.	Cleaning & Maint. Supplies	0.00
	Bill	03/26/2015	15 272828	Fire & Life Safety America, Inc.	Sprinkler Inspection & Maintenance	55.00
	Bill	03/26/2015		Fire & Life Safety America, Inc.	Sprinkler Inspection & Maintenance	675.00
	Bill	04/09/2015		A & D Cleaning Service, LLC	Cleaning	250.00
	Bill	04/09/2015	15 IN-0313112	Miller's Office Products, Inc.	Cleaning & Maint. Supplies	0.00
	Bill	04/15/2015	15 286310	Better Termite & Pest Control, Inc.	Bi Monthly Pest Control Services	75.00
	Credit Card Charge	04/16/2015	15	ADT Security Systems	BB&T Security System Monthly Fee	52.21
	Bill	04/21/2015	15 IN-0316233	Miller's Office Products, Inc.	Cleaning & Maint. Supplies	0.00
	Bill	04/21/2015	15 IN-0317282	Miller's Office Products, Inc.	Cleaning & Maint. Supplies	86.66
	Bill	04/23/2015	15 04/13-16-20-23	A & D Cleaning Service, LLC	Cleaning	250.00
	Bill	05/07/2015	15 4/27-30 & 5/4-7	A & D Cleaning Service, LLC	Cleaning	250.00
	Bill	05/13/2015	15 IN-0327102	Miller's Office Products, Inc.	Cleaning & Maint. Supplies	0.00
	Credit Card Charge	05/17/2015	15	ADT Security Systems	BB&T Security System Monthly Fee	52.21
	Bill	05/21/2015	15 05/11-14-18-21	A & D Cleaning Service, LLC	Cleaning	250.00
	Bill	05/27/2015	15 IN-0332357	Miller's Office Products, Inc.	Cleaning & Maint. Supplies	100.43
	Credit Card Charge	06/01/2015	15	Executive Lock & Key	BB&T Door Locks & Repairs	457.04
	Bill	06/04/2015		A & D Cleaning Service, LLC	Cleaning	250.00
	Bill	06/10/2015	15 974411 HVAC	PROLEC	HVAC Repair and Maint.	1,706.19
	Bill	06/10/2015	15 286311	Better Termite & Pest Control, Inc.	Bi Monthly Pest Control Services	75.00
	Credit Card Charge	06/16/2015	15	ADT Security Systems	BB&T Security System Monthly Fee	52.21
	Bill	06/18/2015	15 06/08-11-15-18	A & D Cleaning Service, LLC	Cleaning	250.00
	Bill	06/23/2015	15 IN-0344385	Miller's Office Products, Inc.	Cleaning & Maint. Supplies	0.00
	Bill	06/23/2015		Miller's Office Products, Inc.	Cleaning & Maint. Supplies	0.00
	Bill	06/29/2015	06/29/2015 IN-0345066	Miller's Office Products, Inc.	Cleaning & Maint. Supplies	0.00
í.						

177	Bill	07/13/2015	IN-0352242	Miller's Office Products, Inc.	Cleaning & Maint. Supplies	0.00
178	Bill	07/13/2015	IN-0352034	Miller's Office Products, Inc.	Cleaning & Maint. Supplies	102.23
179	Bill	07/16/2015	07/06-09-13-16	A & D Cleaning Service, LLC	Cleaning	250.00
180	Credit Card Charge	07/16/2015		ADT Security Systems	BB&T Security System Monthly Fee	52.21
181	Bill	07/24/2015	IN-0354902	Miller's Office Products, Inc.	Cleaning & Maint. Supplies	111.88
182	Bill	07/24/2015	IN-0353526	Miller's Office Products, Inc.	Cleaning & Maint. Supplies	00.0
183	Bill	07/24/2015	IN-0353316	Miller's Office Products, Inc.	Cleaning & Maint. Supplies	0.00
184	Bill	08/03/2015	07-20-23-27-30	A & D Cleaning Service, LLC	Cleaning	250.00
185	Bill	08/03/2015	283173	Fire & Life Safety America, Inc.	Fire Extinguishers	225.00
186	Bill	08/12/2015	IN-0365178	Miller's Office Products, Inc.	Cleaning & Maint. Supplies	00.0
187	Bill	08/12/2015	292814	Better Termite & Pest Control, Inc.	Bi Monthly Pest Control Services	75.00
188	Bill	08/12/2015	IN-0363621	Miller's Office Products, Inc.	Cleaning & Maint. Supplies	24.83
189	Bill	08/13/2015	08/03-06-10-13	A & D Cleaning Service, LLC	Cleaning	250.00
190	Credit Card Charge	08/16/2015		ADT Security Systems	BB&T Security System Monthly Fee	52.21
191	Bill	08/17/2015	98140	PROLEC	Water Heater Repair	120.00
192	Bill	08/27/2015	08-17-20-24-27	A & D Cleaning Service, LLC	Cleaning	250.00
193	Bill	09/03/2015	IN-0374349	Miller's Office Products, Inc.	Cleaning & Maint. Supplies	00.0
194	Bill	09/10/2015	08/31-09/04-07-10	A & D Cleaning Service, LLC	Cleaning	250.00
195	Bill	09/14/2015	IN-0376040	Miller's Office Products, Inc.	Cleaning & Maint. Supplies	00.0
196	Bill	09/15/2015	IN-0378033	Miller's Office Products, Inc.	Cleaning & Maint. Supplies	213.67
197	Credit Card Charge	09/16/2015		ADT Security Systems	BB&T Security System Monthly Fee	52.21
198	Bill	10/07/2015	IN-0384361	Miller's Office Products, Inc.	Cleaning & Maint. Supplies	00.0
199	Bill	10/07/2015	IN-0384273	Miller's Office Products, Inc.	Cleaning & Maint. Supplies	36.52
200	Bill	10/07/2015	09/14-10/08 (4 Wks)	A & D Cleaning Service, LLC	Cleaning	500.00
201	Credit Card Charge	10/16/2015		ADT Security Systems	BB&T Security System Monthly Fee	52.21
202	Bill	10/20/2015	IN-0391111	Miller's Office Products, Inc.	Cleaning & Maint. Supplies	00.0
203	Bill	10/22/2015	10/12-15-19-22	A & D Cleaning Service, LLC	Cleaning	250.00
204	Bill	10/22/2015	292815	Better Termite & Pest Control, Inc.	Bi Monthly Pest Control Services	75.00
205	Bill	10/30/2015	IN-0393563	Miller's Office Products, Inc.	Cleaning & Maint. Supplies	00.0
206	Bill	11/04/2015	IN-0394008	Miller's Office Products, Inc.	Cleaning & Maint. Supplies	0.00
207	Bill	11/05/2015	Cleaning- 10/26-29+1	A & D Cleaning Service, LLC	Cleaning	250.00
208	Bill	11/12/2015	IN-0400926	Miller's Office Products, Inc.	Cleaning & Maint. Supplies	19.00
209	Credit Card Charge	11/16/2015		ADT Security Systems	BB&T Security System Monthly Fee	52.21
210	Bill	11/19/2015	11/9-12-16-19	A & D Cleaning Service, LLC	Cleaning	250.00
211	Credit Card Charge	11/19/2015		Atlantic Sun Control, Inc.	BB&T Window Cleaning and Film	1,750.00
212	Bill	11/24/2015	in-0404702	Miller's Office Products, Inc.	Cleaning & Maint. Supplies	33.99
213	Bill	12/03/2015	11/23-11/30-02/03	A & D Cleaning Service, LLC	Cleaning	187.50
214	Bill	12/10/2015	IN-001555	Miller's Office Products, Inc.	Cleaning & Maint. Supplies	0.00
215	Bill	12/11/2015	IN-014465	Miller's Office Products, Inc.	Cleaning & Maint. Supplies	64.03
216	Bill	12/11/2015	C106-AnnualMaint	PROLEC	Annual Maint Agreement HVAC/Electrical	765.00
217	Bill	12/11/2015	IN-0411920	Miller's Office Products, Inc.	Cleaning & Maint. Supplies	41.82
218	Bill	12/11/2015	304590	Better Termite & Pest Control, Inc.	Bi Monthly Pest Control Services	75.00
219	Credit Card Charge	12/16/2015		ADT Security Systems	BB&T Security System Monthly Fee	52.21
220	Bill	12/21/2015	12/7-10-14-17	A & D Cleaning Service, LLC	Cleaning	250.00

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	Type	Date	Num	Name	Memo	Amount
	Bill	12/29/2015	99005	PROLEC	HVAC/Electrical Repairs/Maint.	170.00
	Bill	12/29/2015	IN-0416973	Miller's Office Products, Inc.	Cleaning & Maint. Supplies	00:0
	Bill	12/31/2015	12/21-24-28-31	A & D Cleaning Service, LLC	Cleaning	250.00
	Total 8170-40 · Maintenance, Cleaning & Repairs 8170-50 · Proberty / GL Insurance	leaning & Repairs				15,204.93
	Bill	04/21/2015	DACTE	CNA Insurance	3002817127 Liability Insurance	2,437.00
	Bill	04/21/2015	DACTEI	CNA Insurance	3002817127 Liability Insurance	0.00
	Bill	05/22/2015	REDACTED	CNA Insurance	3002817127 Liability Insurance	00:0
	Bill	09/03/2015	REDACTED	CNA Insurance	3002817127 Liability Insurance	0.00
	Total 8170-50 · Property / GL Insurance	Isurance				2,437.00
	8170-60 · Assc Fees, Rent & Storage	storage				
	Bill	01/01/2015	RHS-0115	Round House Sq UOA	Association Fee LNC-01	200.00
	Bill	02/01/2015	RHS-0215	Kound House Sq UOA	Association Fee LNC-01	380.00
+	Bill	03/01/2015	RHS-0315	Kound House Sq UOA	Association Fee LNC-01	290.00
	Bill	04/01/2015	RHS-0415	Round House Sq UOA	Association Fee LNC-01	290.00
	Bill	05/04/2015	RHS-0215-1215	Round House Sq UOA	Association Fee LNC-01	290.00
-	Bill	06/01/2015	RHS-0615	Round House Sq UOA	Association Fee LNC-01	290.00
_	Bill	06/23/2015	LNC-01 / 142	Round House Sq UOA	Association Spec Assessment Snow Removal	500.00
+	Bill	07/01/2015	RHS-0215-1215	Round House Sq UOA	Association Fee LNC-01	290.00
_	Credit Card Charge	07/05/2015		Public Storage, Inc.	BB&T Storage Rent	579.70
+	Bill	08/01/2015	RHS-0815	Round House Sq UOA	Association Fee LNC-01	290.00
-	Credit Card Charge	08/04/2015		Public Storage, Inc.	BB&T Storage Rent	429.00
	Bill	09/01/2015	RHS-0215-1215	Round House Sq UOA	Association Fee LNC-01	290.00
	Credit Card Charge	09/04/2015		Public Storage, Inc.	BB&T Storage Rent	429.00
	Bill	10/01/2015	RHS-1015	Round House Sq UOA	Association Fee LNC-01	290.00
	Credit Card Charge	10/04/2015		Public Storage, Inc.	BB&T Storage Rent	429.00
	Bill	11/01/2015	RHS-1115	Round House Sq UOA	Association Fee LNC-01	290.00
	Credit Card Charge	11/04/2015		Public Storage, Inc.	BB&T Storage Rent	429.00
	Bill	12/01/2015	RHS-1215	Round House Sq UOA	Association Fee LNC-01	290.00
	Credit Card Charge	12/04/2015		Public Storage, Inc.	BB&T Storage Rent	429.00
	Total 8170-60 · Assc Fees, Rent & Storage	it & Storage				6,704.70
	8170-70 · Office Move Related Expenses	l Expenses				
	Credit Card Charge	06/21/2015		U-Haul International - AMERCO, Inc.	BB&T Storage Moving Expense	400.95
	Credit Card Charge	07/01/2015		Colonial Parking, Inc.	Storage Move Related Exp	12.00
	Credit Card Charge	07/01/2015		DC Dept. of Transportation	Storage Move Related Exp	4.00
	Credit Card Charge	07/01/2015		ExxonMobil	Storage Move Related Exp	16.87
	Credit Card Charge	07/01/2015		U-Haul International - AMERCO, Inc.	BB&T Storage Moving Expense	79.83
	Total 8170-70 · Office Move Related Expenses	lated Expenses				513.65
Tot	Total 8170 · Occupancy Expenses					53,998.11
Total 8	Total 8100 · Admin & Overhead Expense	se				53,998.11
3200 -	8200 - Professional Services					
821	8210 · Legal					
	8210-10 · Legal - General					
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			Type		Date	Num	Name	W	Memo		Amount
265			Bill		02/19/2015	1938541	Warner, Norcross & Judd	Trademark related legal services	al services		20.50
266			Bill		02/19/2015	1938542	Warner, Norcross & Judd	Trademark related legal services	al services		20.50
267			Bill		04/09/2015	SCC ID #F195931-3	Virginia State Corp. Commission	Annual Reg Fee			25.00
268			Bill		11/02/2015	LP Legal 10/15	Hall, Oliver	Legal Retainer			3,000.00
269			Bill		11/12/2015	81103621541	CSC - Corp. Services Co.	Acct 146357A - DC Clean Hands Cert	san Hands Cert		113.00
270			Bill		12/01/2015	LP-Legal-1215	Hall, Oliver	Legal Retainer			3,000.00
			Bill		12/29/2015	78511989	CSC - Corp. Services Co.	Annual Rep DC/VA			688.00
272			Bill		12/31/2015	LP Legal 1215	Hall, Oliver	Legal Retainer			3,000.00
273		Total 8210	Total 8210-10 · Legal - General								10,201.00
274	Tota	Total 8210 · Legal	egal								10,201.00
275 Tc	otal 82	200 · Profe	Total 8200 · Professional Services								10,201.00
276 TOTAL	٦L										117,862.27

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-	-ibertariar	Libertarian National Committee, Inc.	nittee, Inc.				
2	Account	Account QuickReport					
3	As of Decem	As of December 31, 2016					
4		Type	Date	Num	Name	Memo	Amount
5	16 - Prepaid Expenses	Expenses					
9	160 - Offi	160 · Office Acquisition Deposits/Exp	/Exp				
7	Total 160	Total 160 · Office Acquisition Deposits/Exp	sits/Exp				
ω	167 · Pre	167 - Prepaid Convention					
ი	167-10	167-10 Prepaid Convention General Exp	Seneral Exp				
10		Bill	01/05/2016	LP0018	Luckey, Denise	Nationbuilder LP Conv Setup	664.07
11		Credit Card Charge	01/17/2016		Nationbuilder, Inc.	Split Conv Exp and IT (forgot to split in DecJan ch	0.00
12		Bill	01/20/2016	LP0019	Luckey, Denise	Nationbuilder LP Conv Setup	500.00
13		Bill	02/01/2016	101	Daugherty, Lauren	NB Conv 1/2 Conv 1/2 IT	125.38
14		Bill	02/01/2016	2387	Brown, David	Conv Insert	25.00
15		Bill	02/10/2016	LP0020	Luckey, Denise	Nationbuilder LP Conv Setup	813.75
16		Bill	02/17/2016	103	Daugherty, Lauren	NB Conv 1/2 Conv 1/2 IT	60.00
17		Bill	02/17/2016	LP0021	Luckey, Denise	Nationbuilder LP Conv Setup	314.10
18		Credit Card Charge	02/17/2016		Nationbuilder, Inc.	Split Conv Exp and IT (charge all to Conv)	29.00
19		Bill	03/02/2016	104	Daugherty, Lauren	NB Conv 1/2 Conv 1/2 IT	60.00
20		Bill	03/02/2016	LP0022	Luckey, Denise	Nationbuilder LP Conv Setup	250.00
21		Bill	03/17/2016	105	Daugherty, Lauren	Convention related	117.33
22		Bill	03/17/2016	LP0023	Luckey, Denise	Convention related work	609.17
23		Credit Card Charge	03/18/2016		Nationbuilder, Inc.	Conv Website	29.00
24		Bill	03/31/2016	106	Daugherty, Lauren	Convention related	100.00
25		Bill	04/04/2016	LP0024	Luckey, Denise	Convention related work	609.17
26		Credit Card Charge	04/06/2016		Clear Imprint, LLC	R bbons	986.13
27		Bill	04/11/2016	2402	Brown, David	Conv Insert	0.00
28		Bill	04/12/2016	LP Convention	David Keith Photography	Convention Photography Deposit	700.00
29		Credit Card Charge	04/17/2016		Nationbuilder, Inc.	Conv Website	29.00
30		Bill	04/19/2016	LP0025	Luckey, Denise	Convention related work	532.72
31		Bill	04/19/2016	108	Daugherty, Lauren	Convention related	100.00
32		Bill	06/27/2016	2415	Brown, David	Conv Insert	0.00
33		Bill	09/19/2016	2433	Brown, David	Conv Insert	0.00
34	Total 1	Total 167-10 · Prepaid Convention General Exp	ion General Exp	0			6,653.82
35	167-2(	167-20 · Prepaid Convention Travel/Other	<b>Travel/Other</b>				
36		Credit Card Charge	04/01/2016		American Airlines	Conv Staff Travel	400.20
37		Credit Card Charge	04/01/2016		American Airlines	Conv VIP Travel	954.40
38		Credit Card Charge	04/01/2016		Corporate & Leisure	Conv VIP Travel - Air	150.00
39		Credit Card Charge	04/01/2016		Delta Airlines	Conv Staff Travel - Air	336.20
40		Credit Card Charge	04/01/2016		Southwest Airlines	Conv VIP Travel - Air	396.97
41		Credit Card Charge	04/15/2016		JetBlue	Conv Staff Travel - Air	369.20
42		Bill	08/03/2016	LNC062018	Hyatt Regency New Orleans	2018 Convention Deposit	1,500.00

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4			Date	Mum	e	Memo	Amount
43	Tota	Total 167-20 · Prepaid Convention Travel/Other	ition Travel/Othe				4,106.97
44	Total 16	Total 167 · Prepaid Convention					10,760.79
45	Total 16 · F	Total 16 - Prepaid Expenses					10,760.79
46	17 - Fixed Assets	Assets					
47	178 - 0	178 · Ofc Imprmnt Acq & Capt Expense	xpense				
48		Bill	08/17/2016	FR8854	Freedom Restoration, LLC	Brick Entry Stair Restoration Project	6,754.00
49	Total 17	Total 178 · Ofc Imprmnt Acq & Capt Expense	pt Expense				6,754.00
50	Total 17 · F	Total 17 · Fixed Assets					6,754.00
51	24 · Accru	24 · Accrued Expenses					
52	244 • 0	244 · Other Accrued Expenses					
53		Bill	12/30/2016	201509-LNC01	Brierly, Elizabeth	2015 Exp billed 12/16	2,208.34
54	Total 2 <sup>4</sup>	Total 244 · Other Accrued Expenses	es				2,208.34
55	245 - Ac	Accrued Real Estate Tax					
56		Bill	06/06/2016	REDACTED	City of Alexandria Virginia	2016 Real Property Tax	4,441.29
57		Bill	10/25/2016		City of Alexandria Virginia	2016 Real Property Tax	4,441.29
58	Total 24	245 · Accrued Real Estate Tax	ax				8,882.58
59	Total 24 · A	Accrued Expenses					11,090.92
60	29 · Loans	· Loans & Mortgages (Principal)					
61		Bill	01/25/2016	Mort-0116	BB&T Loan Processing Center	Mortgage Principle	970.91
62		Bill	02/25/2016	Morgt 02/16	BB&T Loan Processing Center	Mortgage Principle	974.96
63		Bill	03/25/2016	REDACTED	BB&T Loan Processing Center	Mortgage Principle	1,102.98
64		Bill	03/31/2016		BB&T Loan Processing Center	Mortgage Principle	7,000.00
65		Bill	04/25/2016	BBT-Loan-0416	BB&T Loan Processing Center	Mortgage Principle	983.63
66		Check	05/25/2016	REDACIED	BB&T Loan Processing Center	Mortg Principle	1,090.94
67		Check	06/25/2016		BB&T Loan Processing Center	Mortg Principle	1,021.54
68		Check	07/25/2016	1607-01	BB&T Loan Processing Center	Mortg Principle	1,086.26
69		Bill	08/23/2016	REDACTED	BB&T Loan Processing Center	Mortgage Principle	15,000.00
70		Check	08/25/2016		BB&T Loan Processing Center	Mortg Principle	1,030.35
7		Check	09/25/2016	) (	BB&T Loan Processing Center	Mortg Principle	1,095.26
72		Check	10/25/2016	REDAUED	BB&T Loan Processing Center	Mortg Principle	1,159.88
73		Check	11/25/2016		BB&T Loan Processing Center	Mortg Principle	1,106.71
74		Bill	12/12/2016	REDACTED	BB&T Loan Processing Center	Mortgage Principle	100,000.00
75		Check	12/25/2016		BB&T Loan Processing Center	Mortg Principle	1,169.03
76	Total 29 · L	Total 29 · Loans & Mortgages (Principal)	aal)				134,792.45
77	31 - Gener	31 · General Operating					
78	Total 31 · C	Total 31 · General Operating					
79	7000 - Gen	7000 · General Fundraising Expense	e				
80	7085 - 1	7085 · Building Fund Fundraising Exp	ig Exp				
81		Credit Card Charge	11/20/2016		PlaqueMaker.com	Donor Recognition Plaques	1,175.00
82	Total 70	Total 7085 · Building Fund Fundraising Exp	lising Exp				1,175.00
83	Total 7000	Total 7000 · General Fundraising Expense	ense				1,175.00

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85 85		Type	Date	Num	Name	Memo	Amount
85	7200 Events a	7200 - Events and Conventions Exp					
ç	7200-10 · Ct	7200-10 · Convention Expenses -	- General				
86		Credit Card Charge	05/01/2016		First American Media Group	Podium and State Signs	1,352.00
87		Credit Card Charge	05/01/2016		NorthStar Flags	Podium Banners	1,035.86
88		Bill	05/02/2016	110	Daugherty, Lauren	Convention related	440.00
89		Credit Card Charge	05/03/2016		Sign11.com	Photo Op Banner	347.09
06		Bill	05/04/2016	Ip0026	Luckey, Denise	Convention related work	1,462.00
91		Credit Card Charge	05/08/2016		Trophies Plus, Inc.	Awards	579.96
92		Bill	05/11/2016	2697	The A V Guys, Inc.	a/v	15,100.00
93		Credit Card Charge	05/12/2016		PC Nametag, Inc.	Convention Name Tag Supplies	151.28
94		Credit Card Charge	05/13/2016		Northern Nye Printing	Badges and Order Forms	259.80
95		Credit Card Charge	05/15/2016		DC Banners and Signs	State Signs	987.24
96		Credit Card Charge	05/15/2016		Global Rose	Conv Flowers	294.78
97		Credit Card Charge	05/15/2016		Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.	Convention Decor	160.28
98		Credit Card Charge	05/15/2016		The Digital Print Store	Conv Book Printing	3,100.00
66		Bill	05/16/2016	111-1	Daugherty, Lauren	Convention related	880.00
100		Bill	05/16/2016	111-2	Daugherty, Lauren	Convention related	00:0
101		Bill	05/19/2016	LP0027	Luckey, Denise	Convention related work	1,462.00
102		Bill	05/30/2016	Conv-Comedian	McLellan, Jeremy	Convention Entertainment	500.00
103		Bill	05/31/2016	Parlm-4-Conv	Brown, Richard	Parliamentarian	1,955.50
104		Bill	06/01/2016	LP0028	Luckey, Denise	Convention related work	1,462.00
105		Bill	06/01/2016	112	Daugherty, Lauren	Convention related	1,776.00
106		Bill	06/01/2016	2016-Conv	Tatiana Moroz Music, LLC	Convention Music	400.00
107		Credit Card Charge	06/01/2016		Northern Nye Printing	Printing	323.66
108		Credit Card Charge	06/01/2016		First American Media Group	Various Other Signage	1,029.10
109		Credit Card Charge	06/01/2016		Barbizon Capitol, Inc.	Decor - GoBo's	212.01
110		Credit Card Charge	06/01/2016		Nationbuilder, Inc.	Conv Website	29.00
111		Credit Card Charge	06/01/2016		OffliceDepot.com	Name Badge Supples	422.91
112		Credit Card Charge	06/01/2016		OfficeDepot.com	Conv Supplies	353.24
113		Credit Card Charge	06/01/2016		PC Nametag, Inc.	Convention Name Tag Supplies	185.36
114		Credit Card Charge	06/01/2016		Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.	Name Badge Supplies	182.57
115		Credit Card Charge	06/01/2016		Staples, Inc	Conv General Supplies	465.05
116		Credit Card Charge	06/01/2016		The Digital Print Store	Conv Book Printing	3,163.00
117		Credit Card Charge	06/01/2016		Walgreens, Inc.	Conv Office Supplies	32.64
118		Bill	06/02/2016	5311601	Moen, Tim	Speaking Fees - Convention -007	430.00
119		Credit Card Charge	06/02/2016		FedEx Kinko's	Conv Shipping	213.99
120		Bill	06/06/2016	2697	The A V Guys, Inc.	a/v	25,200.00
121		Bill	06/12/2016	1/11-6/9/16	Dixon, Eric D.	Conv Video Production	427.50
122		Bill	06/12/2016	1	Woods, Thomas	Speaker Fee	4,000.00
123		Credit Card Charge	06/12/2016		UStream.TV	Fee for Conv Streaming	985.07
124		Credit Card Charge	06/16/2016		Nationbuilder, Inc.	Web Site Hosting	29.00
125		Bill	06/20/2016	114	Daugherty, Lauren	Convention related	00.0

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	Type	Date	Num	Name	Memo	Amount
	Bill	06/22/2016	CONV-2016	Ryan, Bette	R bbons	140.22
	Bill	06/22/2016	CONV-2016	Ryan, Bette	Supplies	46.40
	Credit Card Charge	06/22/2016		Trophies Plus, Inc.	Awards	86.39
	Bill	06/23/2016	LP0029	Luckey, Denise	Convention related work	0.00
	Bill	06/27/2016	Postage-062716	Daugherty, Lauren	Convention related	0.00
	Bill	07/07/2016	LP0030	Luckey, Denise	Convention related work	0.00
	Bill	07/11/2016	Marco-R bbons	Ryan, Bette	R bbons	382.90
	Bill	07/11/2016	Marco-R bbons	Ryan, Bette	Supplies	0.00
	Bill	07/11/2016	201605-LNC01	Brierly, Elizabeth	Convention Media Support	2,173.33
	Bill	07/22/2016	1258	David Keith Photography	Photograghy	2,298.00
	Bill	07/22/2016	LP0031	Luckey, Denise	Convention related work	0.00
	Bill	08/12/2016	201606-LNC01	Brierly, Elizabeth	Convention Media Support	0.00
	Bill	08/12/2016	LP0032	Luckey, Denise	Convention related work	0.00
	Bill	08/20/2016	LP0033	Luckey, Denise	Convention related work	0.00
	Bill	08/23/2016	201607-LNC01	Brierly, Elizabeth	Convention Media Support	0.00
	Bill	09/15/2016	LP0034	Luckey, Denise	Convention related work	0.00
	Bill	09/19/2016	LP0035	Luckey, Denise	Convention related work	0.00
	Bill	10/11/2016	06-10-10-07	Dixon, Eric D.	Conv Video Production	0.00
	Bill	10/19/2016	201609-LNC01	Brierly, Elizabeth	Convention Media Support	0.00
	Bill	10/19/2016	LP0036-37	Luckey, Denise	Convention related work	0.00
	Bill	10/20/2016	201609-LNC01-2	Brierly, Elizabeth	Convention Media Support	0.00
	Bill	11/30/2016	201608-LNC01	Brierly, Elizabeth	Convention Media Support	0.00
	Bill	12/13/2016	201610-LNC01	Brierly, Elizabeth	Convention Media Support	0.00
	Bill	12/13/2016	201611-LNC01	Brierly, Elizabeth	Convention Media Support	0.00
Total 720	Total 7200-10 · Convention Expenses - General	ses - General				76,517.13
7200-20	7200-20 · Convention Expense - Travel/F&B	<b>Fravel/F&amp;B</b>				
	Bill	05/16/2016	SW-Air-Reimbursement	Johnston, Robert	Conv Travel - Staff	315.97
	Bill	05/17/2016	64847	Rosen Centre Hotel	Deposit on F&B, Rooms, Etc.	63,408.92
	Bill	05/30/2016	64847-Deposit	Rosen Centre Hotel	Deposit on F&B, Rooms, Etc.	6,691.00
	Credit Card Charge	06/01/2016		Best Western International, Inc.	Conv Staff Travel - Hotel	198.80
	Credit Card Charge	06/01/2016		Cracker Barrel Inc.	Conv Staff Food	29.81
	Credit Card Charge	06/01/2016		ExxonMobil	Conv Staff Travel Gas	47.44
	Credit Card Charge	06/01/2016		EZ Shop, Inc.	Conv Srtaff Travel Gas	53.48
	Credit Card Charge	06/01/2016		Ruby Tuesday's, Inc.	Conv Staff Travel - Food	44.43
	Credit Card Charge	06/01/2016		Waffle House, Inc.	Conv Staff Travel - Food	23.23
	Credit Card Charge	06/02/2016		Alamo Rent A Car	Staff Car Rental	1,905.12
	Credit Card Charge	06/02/2016		L berty Petroleum, LLC	Conv Staff Travel - Gas	65.12
	Credit Card Charge	06/02/2016		Bojangles, Inc.	Conv Staff Meals	14.98
	Credit Card Charge	06/02/2016		Citgo	Conv Staff Gas	50.00
	Credit Card Charge	06/02/2016		Rosen Centre Hotel	Conv Staff Food	234.71
	Credit Card Charge	06/03/2016		Hilton Hotels Inc.	Conv Staff Travel Hotel	217.92

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Matrix			נייי	- <sup>2</sup>				
Image: Instant in the second sequence is the	t (			Date	LINN	Name	Mello	Amount
Image:	168		Bill	06/12/2016	05/27-06-09-90-hrs	Johnston, Robert	Mears Shuttle Conv Staff Travel - Parking/Shuttle	81.00
I noil         001420101         20644647         Roand Curren Holai         Deposition Field.         10           I noil         20012000.         Exercised.         100402010         2001         2001           I noil         2000.         Exercised.         100402010         100402010         1000         2001           I noil         2000.         Exercised.         10050010         KET Funding         2000         2000           1 noil         2000.         Exercised.         10050010         KET Funding         2000         2000           1 noil         2000.         Exercised.         10050010         Exercised.         2000         2000           1 noil         2000.         Exercised.         1000         Exercised.         2000         2000           1 noil         2000.         Exercised.         1000         Exercised.         2000	169		Bill	06/14/2016	Delta-Air-Reimb	Laurence A. Elder & Assc., Inc.	Convention Travel - Air -002	933.44
Total 7300         Total 7	170		Bill	06/14/2016	206-64847	Rosen Centre Hotel	Deposit on F&B, Rooms, Etc.	55,674.56
Total 72:00 - Eventence ED         Total 72:00 - Eventence ED         Total 72:00 - Eventence ED         2017           700 - Program-Related Expenses         17:00 - Rogram-Related Expenses         1000 - Relative Access Legal         00552016         KET Funding         2017           700 - Program-Related Expenses         1005 2010         KET Funding         Crine Weet AL PLLC         KET Legal Expenses         6           1 Total 73:00 - Subir Access Legal         100552016         KET Funding         2017         2017           1 Total 73:00 - Subir Access Legal         100552016         KET Funding         2017         2017           1 Total 73:00 - Subir Access Legal         100552016         KET Funding         2017         2017           1 Total 73:00 - Subir Access Legal         100         Ket Funding         2017         2017         2017           1 Total 73:00 - Subir Access Legal         Mort 11:6         EBA Loan Processing Center         Mort 11:6         10           1 Total 73:00 - Subir Access Legal         Mort 11:6         EBA Loan Processing Center         Mort 11:6         1         1           1 Total 73:00 - Subir Access Ligal         Mort 11:6         EBA Loan Processing Center         Mort 11:6         1         1           1 Total 70 - Subir Access Ligal         Mort 11:6         EBA Loan Processin	171	Total 7200	-20 · Convention Expens	e - Travel/F&B				130,963.33
T300.         T300.         Forgram. Foldened Expenses         Er         Funding         Ex         Forgram. Foldened Expenses         Ex         Forgram.	172	Total 7200 · E	ivents and Conventions E	dx				207,480.46
7280 - Billor Access - Other Related     File Access - Other Related     Exit Funding     Exit Funding </th <th>173</th> <th>7300 - Progra</th> <th>Im-Related Expenses</th> <th></th> <th></th> <th></th> <th></th> <th></th>	173	7300 - Progra	Im-Related Expenses					
T200.0.1         T200.0.2         Bill of Access Legal         Chris Wiest AL, PLLC         KET Legal Expense         6           Trail 730-50.         Bill Access Legal         1075/2016         KET Legal Expense         6           Trail 730-50.         Bill Access Legal         1075/2016         KET Legal Expense         6           Trail 730-50.         Bill Access Legal         Hord Access Legal         10         10           Trail 730-50.         Bill Access Legal         More Access Legal         More Access Legal         6           Froil 730-50.         Bill Access Legal         More Access Legal         More Access Legal         10           Froil 740-50.         Bill Access Legal         More Access Legal         More Access Legal         10           Froil 740-50.         Bill Access Legal         More Access Process         More Access Legal         11           Froil 740-50.         Bill Access Process Process More Access Process Process More Access Process Process More Access Process Process More Access Process Process More Access Process Process More Access Process More Access Process Process More Access Process Process Process Process Process Process Process Process Process Proces Process Process Process Process Process Process Pro	174	7380 - Ball	lot Access - Other Relat	ed				
Image:	175	7380-30	0 · Ballot Access Legal					
Tool 7380-30. Ballot Accest Legal         Tool 7380-30. Ballot Accest Legal         Cold Tool 7390-30. Ballot Accest Legal         Cold Tool 730-30.           11241 720 - Tool 7300-300 Contract Related for the tool 7300-300 contrelated for the tool 7300-300 contract Related for the tool 7300	176		Bill	10/25/2016	KET Funding	Chris Wiest AAL PLLC	KET Legal Expense	6,400.00
Total 730. Pagera Maint Sorrival Status         Internal Status         Maint Sorrival Status<	177	Total 73	380-30 · Ballot Access Le	egal				6,400.00
Total 7300 - Program Related Expenses         India         Montgage Interest Expenses         India         India         Montgage Interest Expenses         India         Montgage Interest Expenses         India         Montgage Interest Expenses         India         India         Montgage Interest Expenses         India         Indin         India         India	178	Total 7380	· Ballot Access - Other F	Related				6,400.00
8100 - Admint & Overhand Expenses         1         2400 - Admint & Overhand Expenses         1 <th1< th="">         1         <th1< <="" td=""><td>179</td><td>Total 7300 · P</td><td>rogram-Related Expense</td><td>S</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td>6,400.00</td></th1<></th1<>	179	Total 7300 · P	rogram-Related Expense	S				6,400.00
8170 - Occupancy Expenses     8170 - Occupancy Expenses     8170 - Occupancy Expenses       1     19770 - Worgage Interest Expenses     Morgage Interest Expenses       1     19770 - Worgage Interest Expenses     Morgage Interest Expenses       1     191     0225/2016     REDACTED     BB&T Loan Processing Center     Morgage Interest       1     1     1     1     1     Morgage Interest Expenses     1       1     1     1     1     1     1     1       1     1     1     1     1     1     1       1     1     1     1     1     1     1     1       1     1     1     1     1     1     1     1       1     1     1     1     1     1     1     1       1     1     1     1     1     1     1     1       1     1     1     1     1     1     1     1       1     1     1     1     1     1     1     1       1     1     1     1     1     1     1     1       1     1     1     1     1     1     1     1     1       1     1	180	8100 · Admin	& Overhead Expense					
Interval       Interval <t< th=""><th>181</th><th>8170 - Occ</th><th>cupancy Expenses</th><th></th><th></th><th></th><th></th><th></th></t<>	181	8170 - Occ	cupancy Expenses					
Image: Image indext         Image indext <thimage indext<="" th="">         Image indext         Image i</thimage>	182	8170-10	0 · Mortgage Interest Ex	pense				
$ \begin{array}{ c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c$	183		Bill	01/25/2016	Mort-0116	BB&T Loan Processing Center	Mortgage Interest	1,929.30
$ \begin{array}{ c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c$	184		Bill	02/25/2016	Morgt 02/16	BB&T Loan Processing Center	Mortgage Interest	1,925.25
	185		Bill	03/25/2016	REDACTED	BB&T Loan Processing Center	Mortgage Interest	1,797.23
Image         Image <th< td=""><td>186</td><td></td><td>Bill</td><td>03/31/2016</td><td>REDACTED</td><td>BB&amp;T Loan Processing Center</td><td>Mortgage Interest</td><td>00.00</td></th<>	186		Bill	03/31/2016	REDACTED	BB&T Loan Processing Center	Mortgage Interest	00.00
$ \begin{array}{ c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c$	187		Bill	04/25/2016		BB&T Loan Processing Center	Mortgage Interest	1,916.58
	188		Check	05/25/2016		BB&T Loan Processing Center	Morgt Interest	1,809.27
	189		Check	06/25/2016	E U	BB&T Loan Processing Center	Morgt Interest	1,878.67
Image: index	190		Check	07/25/2016	БD	BB&T Loan Processing Center	Morgt Interest	1,813.95
	191		Bill	08/23/2016	ШШ	BB&T Loan Processing Center	Mortgage Interest	0.00
Image: Ima: Image: Image: Image: Image: Image: Image: I	192		Check	08/25/2016	) Г Ц	BB&T Loan Processing Center	Morgt Interest	1,869.86
<th< td=""><td>193</td><td></td><td>Check</td><td>09/25/2016</td><td>ז ב</td><td>BB&amp;T Loan Processing Center</td><td>Morgt Interest</td><td>1,804.95</td></th<>	193		Check	09/25/2016	ז ב	BB&T Loan Processing Center	Morgt Interest	1,804.95
<td>194</td> <td></td> <td>Check</td> <td>10/25/2016</td> <td>EU,</td> <td>BB&amp;T Loan Processing Center</td> <td>Morgt Interest</td> <td>1,740.33</td>	194		Check	10/25/2016	EU,	BB&T Loan Processing Center	Morgt Interest	1,740.33
1112/12/2016REDACTEDB&R Loan Processing CenterMortgage Interest11Check12/25/2016REDACTEDB&R Loan Processing CenterMortgage Interest11Total 8170-10 · Mortgage Interest Expense12/25/2016B&R Loan Processing CenterMortgage Interest1112/12/2016Mortgage Interest12/12/2016Percessing CenterMortgalia Power2211Bill01/03/2016REDACTEDDominion Virginia PowerREDACTED2211Bill01/12/2016REDACTEDMater Bill2211Bill01/12/2016REDACTEDMater Bill2211Bill01/12/2016REDACTEDMater Bill2211Bill01/12/2016REDACTEDMater Bill2211Bill01/12/2016REDACTEDMater Bill2211Bill02/03/2016REDACTEDMater Bill2211Bill02/03/2016REDACTEDMater Bill2211Bill02/03/2016REDACTED222211Bill02/03/2016REDACTED222211Bill02/03/2016REDACTED222211Bill02/03/2016REDACTED222211Bill02/03/2016REDACTED23/14/201623/14/201623/14/2016111	195		Check	11/25/2016	ЕD	BB&T Loan Processing Center	Morgt Interest	1,793.50
Image: Indecode the control of the	196		Bill	12/12/2016	Ш	BB&T Loan Processing Center	Mortgage Interest	00.00
	197		Check	12/25/2016	]	BB&T Loan Processing Center	Morgt Interest	1,731.18
8170-20 · Utilities Expense </td <td>198</td> <td>Total 8</td> <td>170-10 · Mortgage Intere</td> <td>st Expense</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td>22,010.07</td>	198	Total 8	170-10 · Mortgage Intere	st Expense				22,010.07
IBilO1/03/2016REDACTEDDominon Virginia PowerREDACTEDIIIBil01/12/2016REDACTEDAlexandria Renew Ent.Mater BilIIIDil01/12/2016REDACTEDAlexandria Renew Ent.Mater BilIIIDil01/12/2016REDACTEDAlexandria Renew Ent.Mater BilIIIDil01/12/2016REDACTEDVirginia American WaterMater BilIIIDilDil02/03/2016REDACTEDVirginia American WaterMater BilIIIBilDilDilDilNiginia American WaterNater BilIIIIBilDilDilDilAlexandria Renew Ent.Nater BilIIIIBilDilDilDilAlexandria Renew Ent.Nater BilIIIIBilDilDilDilDinion Virginia PowerNater BilIIIIBilDilDilDilDilIIIIIIBilDilDilDilDilDilIIIIIBilDilDilDilDilIIIIIIBilDilDilDilDilIIIIIIIBilDilDilDilDilIII <td>199</td> <td>8170-2</td> <td>0 - Utilities Expense</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td>	199	8170-2	0 - Utilities Expense					
Image: light bit bitDescriptionD	200		Bill	01/03/2016	REDACTED	Dominion Virginia Power	REDACTED	255.19
Image: light stateDescriptionDescriptionVirginia American WaterWater BillImage: light state02/03/2016REDACTEDDominion Virginia PowerNater BillNater BillImage: light state02/03/2016REDACTEDDominion Virginia PowerNater BillNater BillNater BillImage: light state02/18/2016REDACTEDAlexandria Renew Ent.Nater BillREDACTEDNater BillImage: light state02/18/2016REDACTEDAlexandria Renew Ent.REDACTEDNater BillImage: light state03/03/2016REDACTEDDominion Virginia PowerNater BillNater BillImage: light state03/14/2016REDACTEDDominion Virginia PowerNater BillNater BillImage: light state03/14/2016REDACTEDVirginia American WaterNater BillNater BillImage: light state03/14/2016REDACTEDVirginia American WaterNater BillNater BillImage: light state03/14/2016REDACTEDNater BillNater BillNater BillImage: light state03/14/2016REDACTEDAlexandria Renew Ent.Nater BillImage: light state BillImage: light state03/14/2016REDACTEDAlexandria Renew Ent.Mater BillImage: light state BillImage: light state BillImage: light state03/14/2016REDACTEDREDACTEDImage: light state BillImage: light state BillImage: light state BillImage: light state BillImage: light stateImage: light state Bill <td>201</td> <td></td> <td>Bill</td> <td>01/12/2016</td> <td>REDACTED</td> <td>Alexandria Renew Ent.</td> <td></td> <td>33.17</td>	201		Bill	01/12/2016	REDACTED	Alexandria Renew Ent.		33.17
Image: Market indext	202		Bill	01/12/2016		Virginia American Water	Water Bill	15.74
Image: Net DACTED     Nitron Mater     Nater Bill     REDACTED       Image: Net DACTED     02/18/2016     REDACTED     Nitron Mater     Nater Bill       Image: Net DACTED     02/18/2016     REDACTED     Alexandria Renew Ent.     REDACTED       Image: Net DACTED     03/03/2016     REDACTED     Alexandria Renew Ent.     REDACTED       Image: Net DACTED     03/14/2016     REDACTED     Dominion Virginia Power     Nater Bill       Image: Net DACTED     03/14/2016     REDACTED     Nater Bill     Nater Bill       Image: Net DACTED     03/14/2016     REDACTED     Nater Bill	203		Bill	02/03/2016		Dominion Virginia Power	KEDAUIED	412.25
Image: New Term     Description	204		Bill	02/08/2016	ΕU	Virginia American Water	Water Bill REDACTED	15.60
Image: Normal limits         Distribution         Distr	205		Bill	02/18/2016	ΕD	Alexandria Renew Ent.	REDACIED	33.17
Bill         03/14/2016         REDACTED         Virginia American Water         Water Bill           Bill         03/14/2016         REDACTED         Alexandria Renew Ent.         REDACTED         Alexandria Renew Ent.         REDACTED	206		Bill	03/03/2016	Ш	Dominion Virginia Power		520.16
Bill 03/14/2016 ACLACIED Alexandria Renew Ent.	207		Bill	03/14/2016		Virginia American Water	Water Bill	15.60
	208	  	Bill	03/14/2016	NEUAUIED	Alexandria Renew Ent.	REDACTED	33.17

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	Type	Date		Name	Memo	Amount
Bill		04/03/2016	REDACTED	Dominion Virginia Power	REDACTED	328.15
Bill		04/28/2016	REDACTED	Alexandria Renew Ent.		33.17
Bill		04/28/2016	<u>З</u> С ЦЦ	Virginia American Water	REDACTED	15.73
Check		05/10/2016		Dominion Virginia Power		328.15
Bill		05/13/2016	ED,	Alexandria Renew Ent.		74.36
Bill		05/13/2016	REDACTED	Virginia American Water		37.11
Bill		06/06/2016	DEDACTED	Virginia American Water	<b>KEUAUEU</b>	9.91
Bill		06/12/2016	) נ ו נ	Alexandria Renew Ent.		16.04
Bill		07/08/2016	EU,	Virginia American Water		25.64
Check		07/10/2016	REDACTED	Dominion Virginia Power		46.92
Bill		07/11/2016	REDACTED	Alexandria Renew Ent.		49.23
Check		08/10/2016	й С I П	Dominion Virginia Power		329.00
Bill		08/17/2016	ו נו	Virginia American Water		19.74
Bill		08/17/2016	REDACIED	Alexandria Renew Ent.		33.32
Bill		09/08/2016	REDACTED	Virginia American Water		21.48
Check		09/10/2016	REDACTED	Dominion Virginia Power	<b>REUACIEU</b>	329.00
Bill		09/14/2016	) ( ] L	Alexandria Renew Ent.		41.49
Check		10/10/2016	Ц Ц	Dominion Virginia Power		329.00
Bill		10/11/2016	REDACTED	Virginia American Water	REDACTED	19.74
Check		11/10/2016	REDACTED	Dominion Virginia Power		329.00
Bill		11/18/2016	REDACTED	Virginia American Water		19.74
Bill		12/06/2016	) ( ] L	Virginia American Water		19.74
Check		12/10/2016	REUAUEU	Dominion Virginia Power		329.00
al 8170-20 · L	Total 8170-20 · Utilities Expense					4,118.71
70-30 - Prope	8170-30 · Property Taxes, Fees	& Permits				
Credit	Credit Card Charge	03/10/2016		City of Alexandria VA	BB&T Annual Bus Lic Fee	55.00
Bill	)	06/06/2016	REDACTED	City of Alexandria Virginia	Property Tax Map ID 073.02.08.17	00.00
Bill		10/25/2016	REDACTED	City of Alexandria Virginia	Property Tax Map ID 073.02.08.17	0.00
al 8170-30 · F	Total 8170-30 · Property Taxes, Fees & Permits	Fees & Permit				55.00
70-40 · Mainte	8170-40 · Maintenance, Cleaning & Repairs	ng & Repairs				
Bill		01/13/2016	REDACIED	Miller's Office Products, Inc.	Cleaning & Maint. Supplies	54.99
Bill		01/13/2016	REDACTED	Miller's Office Products, Inc.	Cleaning & Maint. Supplies	00.00
Bill		01/14/2016	REDACTED	A & D Cleaning Service, LLC	Cleaning	250.00
Credit	Card Charge	01/17/2016	ז ב ד ר	ADT Security Systems	BB&T Security System Monthly Fee	52.21
Bill		02/01/2016	E U	A & D Cleaning Service, LLC	Cleaning	250.00
Bill		02/08/2016	REDACTED	Miller's Office Products, Inc.	Cleaning & Maint. Supplies	00.00
Bill		02/08/2016		Better Termite & Pest Control, Inc.	Bi Monthly Pest Control Services	75.00
Bill		02/08/2016	IN-0434591	Miller's Office Products, Inc.	Cleaning & Maint. Supplies	40.75
Bill		02/08/2016	IN-0431272	Miller's Office Products, Inc.	Cleaning & Maint. Supplies	32.99
Bill		02/08/2016	IN-0427251	Miller's Office Products, Inc.	Cleaning & Maint. Supplies	0.00
Bill		02/11/2016	02/01-04-08-11	A & D Cleaning Service, LLC	Cleaning	250.00
		02/18/2018	11317-11334			

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		Type	Date	Num	Name	Memo	Amount
		Credit Card Charge	02/16/2016		ADT Security Systems	BB&T Security System Monthly Fee	52.21
		Bill	02/18/2016	IN-0440241	Miller's Office Products, Inc.	Cleaning & Maint. Supplies	15.93
		Bill	02/25/2016	02/15-18-22-25	A & D Cleaning Service, LLC	Cleaning	250.00
		Bill	03/14/2016	IN-0421855	Miller's Office Products, Inc.	Cleaning & Maint. Supplies	17.23
		Bill	03/14/2016	IN-0421859	Miller's Office Products, Inc.	Cleaning & Maint. Supplies	14.18
		Bill	03/14/2016	IN-0431272	Miller's Office Products, Inc.	Cleaning & Maint. Supplies	1.98
		Credit Card Charge	03/16/2016		ADT Security Systems	BB&T Security System Monthly Fee	52.21
		Bill	03/17/2016	02/29-3/3-7-10-14-17	A & D Cleaning Service, LLC	Cleaning	375.00
		Bill	03/18/2016	IN-0453108	Miller's Office Products, Inc.	Cleaning & Maint. Supplies	35.94
		Bill	03/18/2016	IN-0452340	Miller's Office Products, Inc.	Cleaning & Maint. Supplies	75.49
		Bill	03/31/2016	IN-0441419	Miller's Office Products, Inc.	Cleaning & Maint. Supplies	0.00
		Bill	03/31/2016	IN-0460239	Miller's Office Products, Inc.	Cleaning & Maint. Supplies	0.00
		Bill	03/31/2016	3/21-24-28-31	A & D Cleaning Service, LLC	Cleaning	250.00
		Credit Card Charge	04/05/2016		ADT Security Systems	BB&T Security System Monthly Fee	55.07
		Bill	04/28/2016	IN-0470654	Miller's Office Products, Inc.	Cleaning & Maint. Supplies	38.29
		Bill	04/28/2016	IN-0473693	Miller's Office Products, Inc.	Cleaning & Maint. Supplies	00.00
		Bill	04/28/2016	Cleaning-04/07-04/28	A & D Cleaning Service, LLC	Cleaning	500.00
		Bill	04/28/2016	IN-0460999	Miller's Office Products, Inc.	Cleaning & Maint. Supplies	94.57
		Bill	04/28/2016	IN-0460998	Miller's Office Products, Inc.	Cleaning & Maint. Supplies	0.00
		Bill	04/28/2016	304592	Better Termite & Pest Control, Inc.	Bi Monthly Pest Control Services	75.00
		Bill	05/02/2016	IN-0467503	Miller's Office Products, Inc.	Cleaning & Maint. Supplies	0.00
		Bill	05/05/2016	IN-0476864	Miller's Office Products, Inc.	Cleaning & Maint. Supplies	32.99
		Credit Card Charge	05/05/2016		ADT Security Systems	BB&T Security System Monthly Fee	55.07
		Bill	05/13/2016	IN-0480615	Miller's Office Products, Inc.	Cleaning & Maint. Supplies	41.82
		Bill	05/19/2016	05/02-05-09-12-16-19	A & D Cleaning Service, LLC	Cleaning	375.00
		Bill	05/20/2016	IN-0481158	Miller's Office Products, Inc.	Cleaning & Maint. Supplies	0.00
		Bill	05/20/2016	IN-0483046	Miller's Office Products, Inc.	Cleaning & Maint. Supplies	62.34
		Bill	05/20/2016	IN-0483045	Miller's Office Products, Inc.	Cleaning & Maint. Supplies	00.0
		Credit Card Charge	05/21/2016		Amazon.com	Maint Supplies	0.00
		Bill	06/02/2016	05/23-26-30-06/02	A & D Cleaning Service, LLC	Cleaning	250.00
		Bill	06/06/2016	IN-0462887	Miller's Office Products, Inc.	Cleaning & Maint. Supplies	0.00
		Bill	06/06/2016	333970	Fire & Life Safety America, Inc.	Annual Inspection	675.00
		Bill	06/06/2016	99593	PROLEC	HVAC/Electrical Repairs/Maint.	240.43
		Bill	06/14/2016	304593	Better Termite & Pest Control, Inc.	Bi Monthly Pest Control Services	75.00
		Bill	06/22/2016	IN-0496269	Miller's Office Products, Inc.	Cleaning & Maint. Supplies	21.61
		Bill	06/22/2016	IN-0493858	Miller's Office Products, Inc.	Cleaning & Maint. Supplies	118.00
		Bill	06/22/2016	IN-0493857	Miller's Office Products, Inc.	Cleaning & Maint. Supplies	0.00
		Bill	07/01/2016	Clean-06/02-06/30	A & D Cleaning Service, LLC	Cleaning	500.00
		Credit Card Charge	07/01/2016		Amazon.com	Maint Supplies	0.00
		Bill	07/08/2016	IN-0502777	Miller's Office Products, Inc.	Cleaning & Maint. Supplies	29.45
		Bill	07/08/2016	IN-0502776	Miller's Office Products, Inc.	Cleaning & Maint. Supplies	0.00

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	Type		Date	Num	Name	Memo	Amount
	Bill		07/08/2016	IN-0497618	Miller's Office Products, Inc.	Cleaning & Maint. Supplies	00.0
	Bill		07/08/2016	REDACTED	ADT Security Systems	REDACTED	110.14
	Bill		07/21/2016	07/05-07/21	A & D Cleaning Service, LLC	Cleaning	375.00
	Bill		08/03/2016	IN-0513222	Miller's Office Products, Inc.	Cleaning & Maint. Supplies	38.29
	Bill		08/03/2016	IN-0511256	Miller's Office Products, Inc.	Cleaning & Maint. Supplies	0.00
	Bill		08/03/2016	IN-0510196	Miller's Office Products, Inc.	Cleaning & Maint. Supplies	00.00
	Bill		08/03/2016	IN-0510195	Miller's Office Products, Inc.	Cleaning & Maint. Supplies	00.0
	Bill		08/03/2016	REDACTED	ADT Security Systems	REDACTED	55.07
	Bill		08/03/2016	IN-0505190	Miller's Office Products, Inc.	Cleaning & Maint. Supplies	00.0
	Bill		08/03/2016	IN-0505169	Miller's Office Products, Inc.	Cleaning & Maint. Supplies	00.0
	Bill		08/03/2016	IN-0505188	Miller's Office Products, Inc.	Cleaning & Maint. Supplies	00.0
	Bill		08/04/2016	7/25-28 & 8/1-4	A & D Cleaning Service, LLC	Cleaning	250.00
	Bill		08/17/2016	323978	Better Termite & Pest Control, Inc.	Bi Monthly Pest Control Services	75.00
	Bill		08/18/2016	08-11-15-18	A & D Cleaning Service, LLC	Cleaning	250.00
	Bill		08/25/2016	IN-0506443	Miller's Office Products, Inc.	Cleaning & Maint. Supplies	00.0
	Bill		08/25/2016	m	Miller's Office Products, Inc.	Cleaning & Maint. Supplies	00.0
	Bill		08/25/2016	REDACTED	ADT Security Systems	REDACTED	55.07
	Bill		08/25/2016	IN-0522459	Miller's Office Products, Inc.	Cleaning & Maint. Supplies	107.20
	Bill		09/08/2016	IN-0530468	Miller's Office Products, Inc.	Cleaning & Maint. Supplies	111.56
	Bill		09/08/2016	08/22-25-31 9/1-5-8	A & D Cleaning Service, LLC	Cleaning	375.00
	Bill	-	09/22/2016	09/12-09/22	A & D Cleaning Service, LLC	Cleaning	250.00
	Bill		09/28/2016	IN-0540230	Miller's Office Products, Inc.	Cleaning & Maint. Supplies	0.00
	Bill	_	09/28/2016	REDACTED	ADT Security Systems	KEDACIED	55.07
	Bill		09/28/2016	IN-0536556	Miller's Office Products, Inc.	Cleaning & Maint. Supplies	167.39
	Bill		10/04/2016	IN-0543081	Miller's Office Products, Inc.	Cleaning & Maint. Supplies	0.00
	Bill		10/04/2016	IN-0543081	Miller's Office Products, Inc.	Cleaning & Maint. Supplies	57.43
	Bill		10/06/2016	9/23-26 10/3-6	A & D Cleaning Service, LLC	Cleaning	250.00
	Bill		10/11/2016	IN-0545213	Miller's Office Products, Inc.	Cleaning & Maint. Supplies	68.62
	Bill		10/19/2016	IN-0511894	Miller's Office Products, Inc.	Cleaning & Maint. Supplies	0.00
	Bill		10/19/2016	IN-0517538	Miller's Office Products, Inc.	Cleaning & Maint. Supplies	0.00
	Bill		10/19/2016	~	Miller's Office Products, Inc.	Cleaning & Maint. Supplies	0.00
	Bill		10/19/2016	REDACTED	ADT Security Systems	REDACTED	55.07
	Bill		10/25/2016	IN-0516911	Miller's Office Products, Inc.	Cleaning & Maint. Supplies	0.00
	Bill		10/25/2016	IN-0551346	Miller's Office Products, Inc.	Cleaning & Maint. Supplies	0.00
	Bill		10/27/2016	10/10-10/27	A & D Cleaning Service, LLC	Cleaning	375.00
	Bill		10/31/2016	330238	Better Termite & Pest Control, Inc.	Bi Monthly Pest Control Services	75.00
	Bill		10/31/2016	IN-0553703	Miller's Office Products, Inc.	Cleaning & Maint. Supplies	0.00
	Bill		11/17/2016	10/31-11/17	A & D Cleaning Service, LLC	Cleaning	375.00
	Bill		11/18/2016	IN-0563922	Miller's Office Products, Inc.	Cleaning & Maint. Supplies	152.17
	Bill		11/28/2016	REDACTED	ADT Security Systems	REDACTED	55.07
	Bill		12/06/2016	IN-0568459	Miller's Office Products, Inc.	Cleaning & Maint. Supplies	0.00
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Page 28 of 34

4 335 336 337 338		Tvno	ſ			,	<i>s</i>
335 336 338 338		- ypc	Date	Num	Name	Memo	Amount
336 337 338		Bill	12/08/2016	Clean-11/21-12/08	A & D Cleaning Service, LLC	Cleaning	375.00
337 338		Bill	12/15/2016	IN-0572016	Miller's Office Products, Inc.	Cleaning & Maint. Supplies	0.00
338		Bill	12/15/2016	IN-0572006	Miller's Office Products, Inc.	Cleaning & Maint. Supplies	0.00
		Bill	12/15/2016	IN-0574139	Miller's Office Products, Inc.	Cleaning & Maint. Supplies	0.00
339		Bill	12/22/2016	12/12-12/22-16	A & D Cleaning Service, LLC	Cleaning	250.00
340		Bill	12/30/2016	IN-0578279	Miller's Office Products, Inc.	Cleaning & Maint. Supplies	0.00
341		Bill	12/30/2016	REDACTED	ADT Security Systems	REDACTED	55.07
342	Total 817	Total 8170-40 · Maintenance, Cleaning & Repairs	leaning & Repai	LS			9,855.02
343	8170-50	8170-50 - Property / GL Insurance	ince				
344		Bill	04/28/2016	0015265202	CNA Insurance	REDACTED Liability Insurance	1,858.00
345		Bill	05/20/2016	0015408646	CNA Insurance	REDACTED Liability Insurance	0.00
346	Total 817	Total 8170-50 · Property / GL Insurance	surance				1,858.00
347	8170-60	8170-60 · Assc Fees, Rent & S	Storage				
348		Bill	01/01/2016	RHS-0116	Round House Sq UOA	Association Fee LNC-01	295.00
349		Credit Card Charge	01/04/2016		Public Storage, Inc.	BB&T Storage Rent	429.00
350		Credit Card Charge	02/01/2016		U-Haul International - AMERCO, Inc.	BB&T Storage Moving Expense	307.00
351		Bill	02/01/2016	RHS-0216	Round House Sq UOA	Association Fee LNC-01	295.00
352		Credit Card Charge	02/04/2016		Public Storage, Inc.	BB&T Storage Rent	31.66
353		Credit Card Charge	02/04/2016		U-Haul International - AMERCO, Inc.	BB&T Storage Moving Expense	65.03
354		Bill	03/01/2016	RHS-0316	Round House Sq UOA	Association Fee LNC-01	295.00
355		Bill	04/01/2016	RHS-0416	Round House Sq UOA	Association Fee LNC-01	295.00
356		Bill	05/01/2016	RHS-0516	Round House Sq UOA	Association Fee LNC-01	295.00
357		Check	06/01/2016	16060101	Round House Sq UOA	Association Fee	295.00
358		Check	07/01/2016	0716-01	Round House Sq UOA	Association Fee	295.00
359		Check	08/01/2016	160801001	Round House Sq UOA	Association Fee	295.00
360		Check	09/01/2016	RHS-0916	Round House Sq UOA	Association Fee	295.00
361		Check	10/01/2016	161001001	Round House Sq UOA	Association Fee	295.00
362		Check	11/01/2016	16110101	Round House Sq UOA	Association Fee	295.00
363		Check	12/01/2016	ACH1201161	Round House Sq UOA	Association Fee	295.00
364	Total 817	Total 8170-60 · Assc Fees, Rent & Storage	it & Storage				4,372.69
365	Total 8170 ·	Total 8170 · Occupancy Expenses					42,269.49
366	Total 8100 · Adı	Total 8100 · Admin & Overhead Expense	lse				42,269.49
367	8200 - Professional Services	onal Services					
368	8210 - Legal						
369	8210-10 · Legal	- Legal - General					
370		Bill	02/01/2016	LP Legal 01/16	Hall, Oliver	Legal Retainer	3,000.00
371		Bill	03/01/2016	LP-Legal-0216	Hall, Oliver	Legal Retainer	3,000.00
372		Bill	03/31/2016	81104185149	CSC - Corp. Services Co.	Annual Report Filing	160.00
373		Bill	03/31/2016	81104183078	CSC - Corp. Services Co.	Annual Report Filing	215.00
374		Bill	03/31/2016	LP Legal 03/16	Hall, Oliver	Legal Retainer	3,000.00
375		Bill	04/29/2016	LP-Legal 04/16	Hall, Oliver	Legal Retainer	3,000.00

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0	Memo	Legal Retainer	Annual Reg Rep Fee	Legal Retainer			Legal LNC v FEC										
Z																	
M	Name	Hall, Oliver	CSC - Corp. Services Co.	Hall, Oliver			Gura, PLLC										
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К	Num	LP-Legal-0516	LP Legal 0616	LP-Legal-0716	LP Legal 0816	LP Legal 0916	LP Legal 10/16	LP Legal 1116	77160412	LP Legal 1216			LNCVFEC				
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_	Date	05/31/2016	06/30/2016	07/31/2016	08/31/2016	09/30/2016	10/31/2016	11/30/2016	12/22/2016	12/30/2016			02/18/2016				
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ŋ	Type	Bill	Bill	Total 8210-10 · Legal - General	8210-20 · Legal - Proactive	Bill	Total 8210-20 · Legal - Proactive	Total 8210 · Legal	Total 8200 · Professional Services								
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2016 Budget

	* Annual Budget 2016
Support and Revenue	
20-Membership Dues	415,000
21-Donations	318,800
22-Recurring Gifts	329,300
23-Board/ED Solicitation MajorGifts	60,000
24-Convention Revenue	240,000
25-Project Program Revenue	10,000
26-Brand Dev / Political Materials Rev	316,269
27-Ballot Access & Related Donations	213,700
28-Membership Communication	4,800
29-Other Revenue	0
Total Support and Revenue	1,907,869
Cost of Support and Revenue	
32-Fundraising Costs	201,364
33-Membership Fundraising Costs	127,200
35-Convention	200,000
36-Ballot Access Fundraising Exp	16,800
37-Building Fundraising Exp	0
Total Cost of Support and Revenue	545,364
Net Support Available for Programs	1,362,505
Program Expense	
40-Adminstrative Costs	310,050
45-Compensation	448,800
50-Affiliate Support	55,000
55-Brand Dev / Political Materials	366,269
58-Campus Outreach	1,000
60-Candidate, Campaign & Initiatives	49,000
70-Ballot Access VR & Related Exp	390,000
75-Litigation	20,000
80-Media	10,000
85-Member Communication	62,500
88-Outreach	5,200
90-Project Program Other	0
Total Program Expense	1,717,819
Total Net Operating Surplus (or Deficit)	(355,314)
Unrestricted Net Operating Surplus (or De	f (19,814)

Note: \$3,464.00 budgeted capital expenses plus release to pay off mortgage



IOHN C. LINCOLN LAW OFFICES

JOHN C. LINCOLN Certified Specialist in Estate and Trust Law, State Bar of Arizona MICHELLE M. LAUER Associate Attorney ERAKA I. ELLISON Legal Assistant 3514 E. Indian School Road Phoenix, AZ 85018 602.955.9555 Fax 602.955.9790 www.johnclincolnlaw.com john@johnclincolnlaw.com michelle@johnclincolnlaw.com <u>eraka@johnclincolnlaw.com</u>

June 3, 2015

# VIA E- MAIL whall@wnj.com & FIRST-CLASS MAIL

William W. Hall, Esq. Warner Norcross & Judd, LLP 900 Fifth Third Center 111 Lyon Street NW Grand Rapids, MI 49503-2487

Re: The Joseph Shaber Revocable Trust

Dear Bill:

General Counsel for the FEC called me after reviewing our request for the advisory opinion to discuss the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act ("CFCAA"), which amended contribution limits to national party committees effective January 1, 2015. Specifically, national party committees are permitted to set up three segregated accounts under which a national party committee can accept up to \$100,200 per year as of 2015 into each account from an individual donor. *See* 52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(1)(B) and (a)(9). The limits of each segregated account, like other contribution limits, is indexed for inflation. We also understand from public filings that the Libertarian National Committee, Inc. ("LNC") has accepted contributions into its segregated headquarters buildings fund account.

Because the full residual share to the LNC from the Trust will be approximately \$191,600, we understand our client, the Trustee, will have to make distributions to two of the LNC's segregated accounts to comply with the CFCAA. Therefore, please let us know how our client should make the two checks payable and in what amounts.

Shaber June 4, 2015 Page 2

We are happy to learn that the CFCAA offers this other option for our client to distribute the LNC's share and avoid the time, process, and expense of pursuing the FEC advisory opinion. We look forward to hearing from you soon.

Sincerely,

Michelle M. Foren

MICHELLE M. LAUER For the Firm

cc: Alexina Shaber, Trustee

Re: [Lnc-business] Added Mortgage Payment

Case 1:16-cv-00121-BAH Document 26-21 Filed 10/05/17 Page 2 of 28 USCA Case #18-5227 Document #1749853

Filed: 09/10/2018 Page 140 of 150

Subject: Re: [Lnc-business] Added Mortgage Payment From: Caryn Ann Harlos <carynannharlos@gmail.com> Date: 11/29/2016 5:32 PM To: "Inc-business@hq.lp.org" <Inc-business@hq.lp.org>

Okay that's what I thought. Yet I think the argument can still be made that we should have the right to put where we wish - but yes, a strategic legal question.

Not one I am sure is worth blowing a ton of interest on if this is the only way to get principle paid down.

On Tuesday, November 29, 2016, Nicholas Sarwark <chair@lp.org> wrote: We are suing the Federal government over the limitations on how much we can take from a bequest in a particular year. One of their arguments is that we could take more if we put it into their special segregated accounts (building, convention, and legal); we have argued that we want it for operating funds to do political work, not to put it in a special bucket.

-Nick

On Tue, Nov 29, 2016 at 12:45 PM, Caryn Ann Harlos <carynannharlos@gmail.com> wrote:

> Details? I know tangentially what you mean but not fully.

> >

> On Tuesday, November 29, 2016, Nicholas Sarwark <chair@lp.org> wrote: >>

>> Drawing money from the current bequest into any account other than the >> operating account may have a negative impact on pending Federal

>> litigation.

>>

>> -Nick

>>

>> On Tue, Nov 29, 2016 at 12:00 PM, Caryn Ann Harlos

>> <carynannharlos@gmail.com> wrote:

>> > My suggestion though would require paying the 105K (approx) during one

>> > vear

>>> (this one most likely) and then having the re-set for what we can draw

>> > from

>> > the bequest next year.

>> >

>> > Basically I am suggesting taking full advantage of what we can get from

>> > the

>> > bequest to put towards this.

>>>

>> > This would seem to satisfy a lot of issues.

>> >

>> > Again, not saying I support but it is an alternative I thought about. It

>> > seems (?) everyone is in agreement on the make-up we need to do from the



IOHN C. LINCOLN AW OFFICES

ERAKA I. ELLISON

JOHN C. LINCOLN Certified Specialist in Estate and Trust Law, State Bar of Arizona MICHELLE M. LAUER Associate Attorney Legal Assistant

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June 15, 2015

#### VIA CERTIFIED MAIL, RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED

Federal Election Commission Office of General Counsel 999 E Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20463 Attn: Amy Rothstein and Esther Gyory Assistant General Counsel

#### Re: Amended Request for Advisory Opinion

Dear Counsel:

As you know, we represent Alexina Shaber in her capacity as trustee of the Joseph Shaber Revocable Living Trust U/T/D February 11, 2010 (the Trust). The Trust directs our client to make specific and residuary distributions to the National Libertarian Party, also known as the Libertarian National Committee, Inc. (LNC), in excess of the annual contribution limit pursuant to 52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(1)(B). After some discussions, you asked us to explain why our client cannot distribute the LNC's share of the Trust to the segregated accounts it may have established under the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act (CFCAA). The reason is simple and supported for centuries by the laws of equity: A trustee cannot dictate how a beneficiary receives his/her share unless directed by the settlor in the trust instrument to do so. See Restatement (Second) of Trusts §§ 164-169 (1959).

The primary duty of a trustee is to follow in good faith the terms and purposes of the trust. See Uniform Trust Code § 801 cmt. (Nat'l Conf. Comm. on Uniform State Laws 2010). Specifically, a trustee's job is to carry out the settlor's last wishes and distribute or manage

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FEC June 15, 2015 Page 2

the trust property according to the terms of the trust. In administering the trust, the trustee must comply with the obligation <u>not</u> to place the interests of others above those of the beneficiaries. *Id.* 

Perhaps the most fundamental duty charged to the trustee is the duty of loyalty to administer the trust solely in the interests of the beneficiaries. See Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 170(1) (1959). A trustee's duty of loyalty to the beneficiaries is a principle sometimes expressed as the obligation of the trustee not to place the trustee's own interests over those of the beneficiaries. See Uniform Trust Code § 802 cmt. (Nat'l Conf. Comm. on Uniform State Laws 2010).

The LNC declined to accept our client's proposal to distribute its share to the segregated accounts authorized by the CFCAA. The Trustee has no power to require that the beneficiary accept the beneficiary's share in a way not required by the Settlor. The Settlor directed that the distribution be made to the LNC outright. It is therefore entirely up to the LNC how it wishes to apply the distribution.

Therefore, on behalf of our client, we request an advisory opinion on whether our client as trustee would comply with federal election law if she were to engage an independent third party escrow agent, not controlled by the LNC, to receive the LNC's distributions under specific restrictive instructions to distribute annually to the LNC only the annual contribution limit permitted under said federal election law.

#### The Facts:

Joseph Shaber, as settlor and original trustce, established the Trust by executing a trust declaration on February 11, 2010. Pursuant to Article 5.1(e) of the Trust, the trustee is to distribute a specific monetary gift in the amount of \$50,000 to the LNC upon the settlor's death. In addition, pursuant to Articles 5.4(a) and (b), the trustee is also to distribute fifty percent of the residue of the trust estate to the LNC upon the settlor's death. Enclosed is a copy of the relevant Articles of the Trust as <u>Exhibit A</u>.

The settlor passed away on August 23, 2014, and therefore the Trust became irrevocable. Our client, Ms. Shaber, became the successor trustee pursuant to Article 7.2 of the Trust. On or about February 23, 2015, our client distributed to the LNC a portion of the specific monetary gift, the sum of \$33,400, in compliance with the federal election law contribution limit. The LNC is entitled to the balance of \$16,600 from the \$50,000 specific gift.

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FEC June 15, 2015 Page 3

In addition, our client has the duty to distribute fifty percent of the residue of the trust estate to the LNC. The LNC's said share is approximately \$175,000. Our client will have to keep the trust administration open for an estimated period of six years in order to distribute the LNC's full share of approximately \$191,600 given the contribution limit. This will require the Trust to incur ongoing fees, costs and expenses of administration, including annual tax filings, for six years and adversely impact the LNC's ultimate share amount. Our client would like to avoid extending the trust administration and its related expenses by taking the following action if doing so will not violate federal election law. Specifically, our client proposes to make a final distribution of the LNC's full share under the Trust to an independent third party escrow agent, not controlled by the LNC. The escrow agent would maintain the funds until exhausted and distribute annually to the LNC only the allowed contribution limit.

#### Existing Authority:

The existing authority seems to support the action our client wishes to take in distributing the LNC's share to an independent third party escrow agent. Namely, Advisory Opinion 1999-14 reversed earlier advisory opinions that permitted a political committee to set up a separate bank account under the political party's control to take testamentary bequests exceeding contribution limitations, with the promise it would not disburse to itself more than the annual limit, or otherwise benefit (e.g., via a pledge) from the funds held in the segregated account. This Advisory Opinion focused on 11 CFR 110.1, the regulation that discusses contribution limits, and concluded that federal election law was violated because the entire contribution had heen delivered to the political committee in such a segregated account under the political committee.

Advisory Opinion 2004-02 is instructive in that it authorizes testamentary trusts (trust created in a Will) to distribute a bequest in installments equal to the annual contribution limit over a period of years. The Advisory Opinion makes the point that a bequest can be spread out over a period of years, so long as control is not turned over to the political committee.

#### Analysis:

The facts in our case are distinguishable from those in Advisory Opinions 1999-14 and 2004-02. Our client proposes to deliver the LNC's full share to an independent third

party escrow agent with no control available to the LNC to compel disbursements to itself. Our client intends to instruct the escrow agent not to make distributions over the contribution

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FEC June 15, 2015 Page 4

limits permitted. This appears to comply with the authority of Advisory Opinion 1999-14.

Also, the independent third party escrow agent would spread the LNC's share of the Trust over a period of years and only distribute the annual contribution limit until the funda are exhausted. The LNC will have no control over the escrow agent or the funds maintained by the escrow agent. Neither our client or the escrow agent will be an officer, director, employee, member, agent, or affiliated organization of the LNC. Enclosed as <u>Exhibit B</u> is the proposed Escrow Agreement for your review. Our client's proposed action appears to comply with the authority in Advisory Opinion 2004-02.

Nevertheless, we defer to the FEC's analysis and look forward to your advisory opinion. Please let us know if we can provide further information to assist you.

Sincerely,

UL M. Joine

JOHN C. LINCOLN MICHELLE M. LAUER

cc: Alexina Shaber, Trustee

## **Libertarian Party**

2600 Virginia Avenue NW, Suite 200 Washington, DC 20037 (202) 333-0008 • LP.org

April 26, 2014

Dear [name],

Thank you for supporting our David F. Nolan Memorial Headquarters Office Fund.

I'm happy to report that the Libertarian National Committee has just closed on a new office in Alexandria, Virginia.

We did it! We're moving!

We have several upcoming expenditures we need your additional help with.

According to our records, you have donated [amount] to the fund, which gives you the donor level of **[level]**!

These are the donor levels:

- \$25,000 or more Nolan Liberty Room
- \$10,000 or more Nolan Founder
- \$5,000 or more Nolan Hero of Liberty
- \$1,000 or more Nolan Benefactor of Liberty
- \$500 or more Nolan Defender of Liberty
- \$250 or more Nolan Friend of Liberty
- \$100 or more Nolan Advocate of Liberty

If you donate an additional [higheramount], then you'll rise to the level of [higherlevel].

As long as your total donation reaches \$100 or more, your name will appear as follows: [fullname]

#### Add. 111

#### Case 1:16-cv-00121-BAH Document 26-34 Filed 10/05/17 Page 3 of 5 USCA Case #18-5227 Document #1749853 Filed: 09/10/2018 Page 146 of 150

Our new office is a modern, recently renovated, all-brick end unit of a town house style building, and it's only three blocks away from a major Metro subway stop. The purchase price is \$825,000. And the address is 1444 Duke Street in Alexandria, Virginia.

I hope to have better photos for you soon, but here's a view of the main entrance.



1444 Duke Street

I am very happy about our choice. Our current estimate is that we'll save over \$6,200 per month after the move.

We hope to have the move completed within the next month or so.

Right before closing, we had (\$333,500) in our Nolan Memorial Office Fund, plus (\$61,255) in pledges to the fund. (But those are pledges, not money in the bank.)

Our mortgage down payment was \$325,000.

Estimates of other related expenditures:

- \$7,500 in closing costs
- \$30,000 for renovations, modifications, and permits
- \$15,000 for furniture
- \$20,000 for moving expenses

### Add. 112

That's about \$397,500 in total cash we need to have raised by the end of May. So we're still (\$64,000) short.

If all of the pledges come in, we'll have (\$394,755), still (\$2,745) short. But we can't count on all of the pledges coming in. (And several thousand dollars of the pledges are for future years.)

We need to bring in (\$64,000) by the end of May.

One of our pledges is for \$32,400 from a reliable major donor, so we're counting on that coming in.

Please help me collect the other (\$31,600) ASAP. Please send the best donation you can in the enclosed envelope.

All funds raised go into a separate account and are dedicated to the Nolan Memorial Headquarters Office, and will be restricted for use toward the associated purchase, furnishing, renovation, and moving expenses.

If we raise extra money, that's even better. It will be restricted to the office fund, and we can use it to pay down the mortgage.

Our National Chair, Geoff Neale, just signed the final closing documents yesterday. It's a big commitment, and as soon as possible, I'd like to be able to tell our chairman we have all the money in the bank we need.

By the way, <u>Geoff and Nancy Neale donated \$10,000</u> to the Office Fund this past March.

Thanks again for your past support. If you can make another donation today, I sure would appreciate it.

Once again, if you donate an additional [higheramount], then you'll rise to the level of [higherlevel]

But any amount is helpful.

You can donate using the enclosed form and envelope, or call 1-800-ELECT-US, or donate online at LP.org/office-fund.

Sincerely,

Wes Benedict

Wes Benedict, Executive Director Libertarian Party

P.S. <u>Please help us finish the move.</u> Please send your best donation in the enclosed envelope. You can also donate online at LP.org/office-fund, or call 1-800-ELECT-US.

Paid for by the Libertarian National Committee, Inc., 2600 Virginia Avenue NW, Suite 200, Washington, DC 20037. Not authorized by any candidate or candidate committee.

#### IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

LIBERTARIAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE, INC.,	)	Case No. 1:16-CV-0121-BAH
Plaintiff,	)))	
v.	)	
FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION,	) )	
Defendant.	)	
	)	

#### DECLARATION OF ROBERT KRAUS

I, Robert Kraus, declare the following based on my personal knowledge:

- 1. I am the Operations Director of the Libertarian National Committee, Inc. ("LNC"), a position I have held for the past eleven years.
  - 2. On October 14, 2014, the LNC received a letter dated October 9, 2014, notifying it

for the first time that it would receive a bequest from Joseph Shaber's trust. The amount due the LNC from the Shaber bequest was not finally determined until September, 2015.

3. The LNC did not voluntarily forego any payment in 2014.

4. The first payment received by LNC from the Shaber bequest was a payment of

\$33,400, received on February 25, 2015.

5. In 2015, the LNC did not hold a presidential nominating convention. The LNC spent no money on a presidential nominating convention in 2015.

6. In 2015, the LNC spent \$7,260.61 with respect to the preparation for and the conduct of legal proceedings.

7. In 2015, the LNC spent a total of \$72,827.11 on its headquarters, including mortgage payments, utilities, property taxes, maintenance, cleaning, insurance, and association fees.

### Add. 115

Executed this the 2nd day of May, 2016.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Robert Oraus Robert Kraus