

# **FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION** Washington, DC 20463

August 14, 2023

## **VIA ELECTRONIC MAIL**

Charlie Spies
Katie Reynolds
Dickinson Wright PLLC
1825 Eye Street, NW, Suite 900
Washington, DC 20006
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RE: MUR

Dear Mr. Spies and Ms. Reynolds:

On January 25, 2023, the Federal Election Commission notified Dickinson Wright PLLC of a complaint alleging violations of certain sections of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, as amended. A copy of the complaint was forwarded to you at that time.

On August 10, 2023, based upon the information contained in the complaint and information provided by you, the Commission voted to find no reason to believe that Dickinson Wright PLLC violated 52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(1) and 11 C.F.R. § 110.1(b)(1) by making an excessive contribution and closed the file in this matter. A copy of the Factual and Legal Analysis, which more fully explains the basis for the Commission's decision, is enclosed.

Documents related to the case will be placed on the public record within 30 days. *See* Disclosure of Certain Documents in Enforcement and Other Matters, 81 Fed. Reg. 50,702 (Aug. 2, 2016). If you have any questions, please contact me at (202) 694-1476 or arabinowitz@fec.gov.

Sincerely,

Aaron Rabinowitz

**Assistant General Counsel** 

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Enclosure:

Factual and Legal Analysis

1 2	FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION FACTUAL AND LEGAL ANALYSIS		
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5 6 7 8 9 10	RESPONDENTS:	Kim Klacik for Congress and Bradley T. Crate in his official capacity as treasurer Kimberly Klacik Dickinson Wright PLLC	MUR 7990
11 12	I. INTRODUCTIO	ON	
13	This matter was g	enerated by a complaint filed with the	Federal Election Commission
14	(the "Commission"), which alleges that Kimberly Klacik and her authorized committee, Kim		
15	Klacik for Congress and Bradley T. Crate in his official capacity as treasurer (the "Committee"),		
16	converted campaign funds to personal use in violation of the Federal Election Campaign Act of		
17	1971, as amended (the "Act"), by paying for legal expenses in connection with a defamation suit		
18	brought by Klacik personally. The Response and supplemental Response on behalf of the		
19	Committee and Klacik contend that the payments at issue were a valid use of campaign funds		
20	because the defamation suit would not exist but for Klacik's Congressional campaign.		
21	Because the defamation suit is based on a video that primarily makes allegations based or		
22	campaign spending activity and reporting by the Committee, it appears that the lawsuit would		
23	not exist irrespective of Klacik's campaign activity. Therefore, under longstanding Commission		
24	precedent, the use of campaign funds to pay for legal expenses in connection with this lawsuit is		
25	permissible, and the Commission finds no reason to believe that Kimberly Klacik and the		
26	Committee violated 52 U.S.C. § 30114(b) by converting campaign funds to personal use.		
27	A second supplemental Complaint also alleges that the Committee has improperly		
28	received a loan from Dickinson Wright PLLC, the law firm that provided the legal services at		
29	issue. However, the campaign simply reported debts owed to the law firm on Schedule D of its		

MUR 7990 (Kim Klacik for Congress, *et al.*) Factual and Legal Analysis Page 2 of 11

- 1 reports, which specifically excludes loans. The Commission therefore finds no reason to believe
- 2 that the Committee received impermissible contributions in the form of a loan from Dickinson
- Wright in violation of 52 U.S.C. § 30116(f) and 11 C.F.R. § 110.9 and finds no reason to believe
- 4 that Dickinson Wright made an excessive contribution in violation of 52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(1)
- 5 and 11 C.F.R. § 110.1(b)(1).

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### II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

- 7 Kim Klacik for Congress was the authorized committee for Kimberly Klacik's 2020
- 8 Congressional campaign; its treasurer is Bradley T. Crate.<sup>1</sup>
- 9 The Complaint in this matter alleges that the Committee violated the personal use 0 prohibition by making a disbursement of \$51,526.50 to Dickinson Wright PLLC for legal
- prohibition by making a disbursement of \$51,526.50 to Dickinson Wright PLLC for legal
- services that the Complaint alleges were "irrespective of her long-since-concluded congressional
- campaign."<sup>2</sup> The Complaint alleges that Dickinson Wright represents Klacik in a defamation
- suit she has brought against Candace Owens, which seeks damages "to be paid to Ms. Klacik
- personally," and it attaches the complaint in that lawsuit.<sup>3</sup> The Complaint asserts that this
- payment violated the prohibition on the conversion of campaign funds to personal use.<sup>4</sup> A
- supplement to the Complaint further alleges that the Committee reported another disbursement to

Committee, Amended Statement of Organization (May 7, 2021).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Compl. at 1-3 (Apr. 26, 2022).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> *Id.*; see also id., Attach 2 (Compl., Klacik v. Owens, No. 21C1607 (Tenn. Cir. Ct., Davidson Cty. filed Sept. 17, 2021) ("Defamation Suit Complaint")).

<sup>4</sup> *Id.* at 2-3.

MUR 7990 (Kim Klacik for Congress, *et al.*) Factual and Legal Analysis Page 3 of 11

- Dickinson Wright of \$126,806.72 that the supplement alleges was for the same purpose.<sup>5</sup> The
- 2 Committee's reports confirm that it made payments to Dickinson Wright PLLC on December 15,
- 3 2021, for \$51,526.50 and on May 13, 2022 for \$126,806.72, both for the purpose of "legal
- 4 consulting."<sup>6</sup> In their Response, the Committee and Klacik argue that "the Commission has
- 5 consistently allowed campaigns to pay for legal expenses, so long as the litigation involves
- 6 allegations directly relating to the candidate's campaign."<sup>7</sup>
- 7 The civil complaint that is attached to the Complaint in this matter was filed by Klacik in
- 8 Tennessee state court and alleges that Owens defamed Klacik by accusing her on Twitter of
- 9 various crimes, some of which involved the misuse of campaign funds and others which were
- unrelated to her prior candidacy. 8 The civil complaint claims that Owens made these and other
- allegedly defamatory statements in an approximately 44-minute video posted by Owens on
- 12 Instagram and Facebook on June 20, 2021. The civil complaint asserts that the video resulted

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Supp. Compl. at 1-2 (Aug. 24, 2022).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Committee, 2021 Year-End Report at 7 (Jan. 31, 2022); Committee, July 15 Quarterly Report at 9 (July 15, 2022).

Committee & Klacik Resp. at 1 (June 21, 2022); *see also* Committee & Klacik First Supp. Resp. at 1 (Sept. 16, 2022) ("Our original response to this Complaint remains unchanged.").

Defamation Suit Complaint ¶¶ 2-3 (listing as defamatory statements, among others, claims that Klacik "used campaign funds to purchase cocaine and scammed people" and engaged in "tax fraud, campaign fraud, money laundering, illegal drug use, and act[ed] as a 'madame'"). To be clear, nothing in this document should be read as expressing a view on the validity or lack thereof of the underlying claims in the defamation suit.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> *Id.* ¶ 18-29 (citing Candace Owens (@realcandaceowens), INSTAGRAM (June 22, 2021), https://www.instagram.com/p/CQcQ-oEpM-V/ ("Owens Instagram Video").

MUR 7990 (Kim Klacik for Congress, *et al.*) Factual and Legal Analysis Page 4 of 11

- from a "'petty Twitter feud'" and describes various social media posts by Klacik and Owens
- 2 leading up to the video. 10
- 3 The video itself includes the accusations described above and discusses various aspects of
- 4 the Committee's disbursement reporting and information regarding the entities that have been the
- 5 recipients of those disbursements, primarily regarding disbursements by the Committee to "Pearl
- 6 Events" and "Fox and Lion Communications LLC." A substantial majority of the video relates
- 7 to analyzing campaign activity and reporting or explaining the background circumstances that
- 8 led to the video.
- 9 In the Committee's July and October 2022 Reports to the Commission, it disclosed debts
- 10 to Dickinson Wright totaling \$55,802.10.12 A later-filed supplement to the Complaint alleges
- that this evidences an impermissible loan from Dickinson Wright to Klacik and the Committee. 13
- 12 A Response from the Committee points out that these debts were reported on Schedule D, which
- 13 specifically excludes loans. 14

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> *Id*.

Owens Instagram Video; see also FEC Disbursements: Filtered Results, FEC.GOV, <a href="https://www.fec.gov/data/disbursements/?data\_type=processed&committee\_id=C00726117">https://www.fec.gov/data/disbursements/?data\_type=processed&committee\_id=C00726117</a> (last visited June 22, 2023) (showing all disbursements by the Committee). The allegations in the video formed the basis for allegations in two other matters, which resulted in a finding of no reason to believe that a violation of the personal use prohibition, reporting requirements, or acceptance of excessive contribution occurred. Certification ¶¶ 1-3 (Feb. 28, 2023) MURs 7944, 7945 (Kim Klacik for Congress).

Committee, 2022 July Quarterly Report at 15 (July 15, 2022); Committee, 2022 October Quarterly Report at 15 (October 15, 2022).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> Second Suppl. Compl. at 2 (Nov. 1, 2022).

Committee & Klacik Second Suppl. Resp. at 1 (Nov. 28, 2022). Dickinson Wright filed a response that makes the same argument. Dickinson Wright Resp. at 1 (Feb. 22, 2023).

MUR 7990 (Kim Klacik for Congress, *et al.*) Factual and Legal Analysis Page 5 of 11

#### III. LEGAL ANALYSIS

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A. The Commission Finds No Reason to Believe that Kim Klacik for Congress and Kim Klacik Converted Campaign Funds to Personal Use

Candidates and their authorized committees are permitted to use campaign funds for a variety of specific purposes, including otherwise authorized expenditures in connection with the candidate's campaign for federal office, ordinary and necessary expenses incurred in connection with the duties of a federal officeholder, and "any other lawful purpose," but the Act prohibits any person from converting campaign funds to "personal use." Conversion to personal use occurs when campaign funds are used to fulfill any commitment, obligation, or expense of any person "that would exist irrespective of the candidate's election campaign or individual's duties as a holder of Federal office." The Act and Commission regulations provide a non-exhaustive list of uses of campaign funds that are *per se* personal use, including rent, home mortgage, household food items, and tuition. For other uses of campaign funds, including payments for legal expenses, the Commission determines on a "case-by-case basis" whether the use is a prohibited personal use, that is, whether the expenses would exist irrespective of the candidate's campaign or federal officeholder duties. 18

<sup>52</sup> U.S.C. § 30114(a)-(b); 11 C.F.R. §§ 113.1(g), 113.2; *see also* Expenditures; Reports by Political Committees; Personal Use of Campaign Funds, 60 Fed. Reg. 7862, 7867 (Feb. 9, 1995) ("Personal Use E&J") (explaining that "candidates have wide discretion over the use of campaign funds").

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> 52 U.S.C. § 30114(b)(2); see 11 C.F.R. § 113.1(g).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> 52 U.S.C. § 30114(b)(2)(A)-(I); 11 C.F.R. § 113.1(g)(1)(i)(A)-(J).

<sup>11</sup> C.F.R. § 113.1(g)(1)(ii)(A); Advisory Opinion 2018-09 at 2-3 (Clements) ("AO 2018-09").

MUR 7990 (Kim Klacik for Congress, *et al.*) Factual and Legal Analysis Page 6 of 11

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The Commission has explained that "'campaign funds may be used to pay for legal expenses incurred in proceedings that directly relate to the candidate's campaign activities or officeholder duties.'" Legal fees and expenses, however, "will not be treated as though they are campaign or officeholder[-]related merely because the underlying proceedings have some impact on the campaign or the officeholder's status." In a number of advisory opinions, the Commission has addressed legal fees incurred in criminal and congressional investigations and concluded that the use of campaign funds for such legal fees and expenses does not constitute personal use when the legal proceedings involve allegations directly relating to the candidate's campaign activities or duties as a Federal officeholder. The facts underlying the defamation suit principally relate to Klacik's campaign. The video that forms the basis of the civil complaint makes a variety of claims regarding whether the Committee properly reported various disbursements and whether the Committee and Klacik converted campaign funds to personal use. Because these allegations are based on campaign

activity, the defamation suit would not exist but for Klacik's campaign such that it is not a

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> AO 2018-09 at 3 (quoting Advisory Opinion 2013-11 at 3 (Citizens for Joe Miller) ("AO 2013-11")).

Personal Use E&J, 60 Fed. Reg. at 7868; see also FEC v. Craig for U.S. Senate, 816 F.3d 829, 839 (D.C. Cir. 2016) ("[The] allegations did not concern the Senator's campaign activities or official duties, the legal fees he expended trying to withdraw his plea constituted 'personal use.'").

See, e.g., Advisory Opinion 2009-20 (Visclosky for Congress) ("AO 2009-20"); Advisory Opinion 2009-12 (Coleman); Advisory Opinion 2009-10 (Visclosky I); Advisory Opinion 2008-07 (Vitter); Advisory Opinion 2006-35 (Kolbe); Advisory Opinion 2005-11 (Cunningham); Advisory Opinion 2003-17 (Treffinger) ("AO 2003-17"); Advisory Opinion 1997-12 (Costello); cf. Advisory Opinion 2000-40 at 4 (McDermott).

Supra note 11 and accompanying text. And, as noted above, these same allegations formed the basis of a complaint filed against the Committee. *Id*.

MUR 7990 (Kim Klacik for Congress, *et al.*) Factual and Legal Analysis Page 7 of 11

violation of the prohibition on the personal use of campaign funds to pay for legal expenses

2 related to the suit.<sup>23</sup>

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The Complaint discusses several facts in support of its contention that the payment of these legal expenses was prohibited, but they do not materially change the analysis. First, the Complaint notes that the lawsuit has been brought in Klacik's personal capacity, rather than by the Committee. He are Commission has in many prior circumstances permitted campaign funds to be used to pay for legal expenses where the candidate, rather than the committee, was the party in the proceeding. Second, the Complaint points out that Klacik's 2020 campaign concluded well before the payments at issue occurred. But the Commission has recognized that legal proceedings involving political campaigns "are often litigated after the election, and . . . has never barred the use of campaign funds . . . on this temporal ground." And the commission has recognized that legal proceedings involving political campaigns are often litigated after the election,

Third, the Complaint raises the fact that the defamation suit seeks to obtain compensatory

damages to be paid to Klacik herself, rather than seeking to recover funds that would be paid to

See, e.g., Advisory Opinion 2011-07 at 4 (Fleischmann for Congress) (permitting campaign to pay for legal expenses of campaign consulted who was sued for tortious interference with a contract for activity conducted on behalf of the campaign).

Compl. at 2.

E.g., AO 2009-20 at 4 (approving the use of campaign funds to pay legal expenses of candidate and campaign staff); AO 2003-17 at 7 (approving the use of campaign funds to pay legal expenses of candidate); Factual & Legal Analysis at 7-8, MUR 7390 (Make America Great Again PAC, et al.) (finding that campaign committee payments for legal expenses of the candidate and campaign staff in connection with Department of Justice investigation into Russian interference with the 2016 election were not personal use).

Compl. at 2.

AO 2013-11at 4.

MUR 7990 (Kim Klacik for Congress, *et al.*) Factual and Legal Analysis Page 8 of 11

an award of \$5,000 to him personally.<sup>29</sup>

the Committee. However, a lawsuit seeking to recover for losses that a candidate personally suffered as a result of campaign activity would not exist irrespective of the candidate's campaign. It is therefore not a conversion to personal use to pay for legal expenses in connection with a lawsuit seeking damages that are alleged to have resulted from campaign activity. In other words, if a candidate suffers losses as a result of campaign activity, a suit to recover for those loses would not exist irrespective of the candidate's campaign. Indeed, the Commission has previously permitted the use of campaign funds to pay for litigation seeking damages to be paid directly to a candidate where the events underlying the claim arose from campaign activity. In Advisory Opinion 2013-11 (Miller), the Commission determined that it would not be personal use to pay the costs of litigation that would not have existed irrespective of a candidate's campaign although the suit included cross claims by the candidate individually, which resulted in

As explained above, the Committee may pay for legal expenses in connection with the defamation suit. However, when a legal proceeding arises *in part* due to campaign activity or officeholder duties and *in part* for other reasons, the campaign must limit its payments for legal expenses to a percentage of the cost of the proceeding associated with the campaign activity or officeholder duties, as that portion of the litigation would not exist "irrespective of" the campaign. Here, some of the allegations described in the civil complaint as a basis for the

Compl. at 2.

AO 2013-11 at 2, 4.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>30</sup> 11 C.F.R. § 113.1(g)(1)(ii)(A); see AO 2009-20 at 7 (determining that nine out of twenty counts in a federal candidate's indictment "relate directly to the Federal campaign"... [and thus the candidate] may pay up to 45% (9/20) of the legal expenses incurred in his defense of this indictment using campaign funds").

MUR 7990 (Kim Klacik for Congress, *et al.*) Factual and Legal Analysis Page 9 of 11

- defamation claims would appear to be unrelated to campaign activity, such as statements by
- 2 Owens that Klacik acted as a "madame" during a period of time prior to the start of her
- 3 campaign.<sup>31</sup> The Committee would be limited to paying for only the portion of the defamation
- 4 suit that relates to statements connected to campaign activity.
- 5 This limitation on the total amount the Committee could spend on litigation costs here is
- 6 not, by itself, a basis to conduct an investigation, however. The gravamen of the video
- 7 underlying the suit regards allegations of impropriety related to the Committee's filings and
- 8 Klacik's use of campaign funds such that it would appear appropriate for the Committee to pay
- 9 for a substantial portion of the legal proceeding expenses.<sup>32</sup> There is no information in the
- 10 record indicating whether or not the Committee has paid all of the costs of the defamation suit or
- a portion thereof. And there is no information in the record to indicate that the portion of the
- 12 costs of the litigation paid for by the Committee would exceed the proportion of the suit that
- would reasonably be viewed as related to campaign activity.
- Accordingly, the Commission finds no reason to believe that the Committee and
- 15 Kimberly Klacik violated 52 U.S.C. § 30114(b) by converting campaign funds to personal use.

Supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.

Moreover, arguably the lawsuit would not have existed at all but for Klacik's campaign, as Owens indicates that the reasons she "look[ed] into" Klacik related to her Congressional campaign. *Supra* note 9; Owens Instagram Video; *see also* AO 2013-11 at 3 (civil litigation brought by media companies to obtain candidate's state employment records would not have existed irrespective of candidate's campaign because the media companies only sought the records due to the candidacy).

MUR 7990 (Kim Klacik for Congress, *et al.*) Factual and Legal Analysis Page 10 of 11

B. The Commission Finds No Reason to Believe that Dickinson Wright PLLC Made an Excessive Contribution to Kim Klacik for Congress in the Form of a Loan

The Act defines a contribution as "any gift, subscription, loan, advance or deposit of money" made for the purpose of influencing a federal election. Under Commission regulations, partnerships may make contributions, which are subject to the limitations set forth in the Act. Under Commission regulations, partnerships may make contributions, which are subject to the limitations set forth in the Act. Under Commission must be attributed to both the partnership and either each partner in direct proportion to each partner's share of the partnership's profits or to individual partners by agreement of the partners. The Act also provides that no person, including partnerships, shall make contributions to any federal candidate and his or her authorized political committee, which in the aggregate, exceed a \$2,900 contribution to a federal candidate per election during the 2022 cycle. The Commission has furthermore provided that a "loan (except for a loan made in accordance with 11 C[.]F[.]R[. §§] 100.82 and 100.83), . . . made by any person for the purpose of influencing any election for Federal office is a contribution."

With respect to the allegation that Dickinson Wright made an impermissible campaign contribution in the form of a loan to the Committee, there is no information in the record indicating that such a violation occurred. Klacik for Congress simply disclosed debts owed to Dickinson Wright on its reports filed with the Commission, which does not indicate that the law

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>33</sup> 52 U.S.C. § 30101(8)(A).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>34</sup> 11 C.F.R.§ 110.1(e).

*Id.* § 110.1(e)(1), (2).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>36</sup> 52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(1); see 11 C.F.R. §§ 110.1(b)(1)(i), 110.17(b), 110.17(e).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>37</sup> 11 C.F.R. § 100.52(a).

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MUR 7990 (Kim Klacik for Congress, *et al.*) Factual and Legal Analysis Page 11 of 11

- 1 firm provided a loan to the Committee. Indeed, the debtwas reported on Schedule D of the
- 2 Committee's reports, which specifically excludes loans.<sup>38</sup>
- 3 The Commission therefore finds no reason to believe that the Committee accepted
- 4 excessive contributions in violation of 52 U.S.C. § 30116(f) and 11 C.F.R. § 110.9. And the
- 5 Commission finds no reason to believe that Dickinson Wright made an excessive contribution in
- 6 violation of 52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(1) and 11 C.F.R. § 110.1(b)(1).

Supra note 12.