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AGENDA ITEM

For Meeting of: 7-15-99



FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION

Washington, DC 20463

July 8, 1999

MEMORANDUM

TO:

The Commission

THROUGH:

James A. Pehrkon

Staff Director

FROM:

Lawrence M. Noble

General Counsel

N. Bradley Litchfield

Associate General Court

Jonathan Levin

Senior Attorney

SUBJECT:

Draft AO 1999-14 - Alternative Drafts

Attached are two proposed drafts of the subject advisory opinion. We request that both drafts be placed on the agenda for July 15, 1999.

These drafts address a proposal by a political committee to ask its major supporters to include a provision in their wills bequeathing \$100,000 to the committee. The committee would place any amounts exceeding \$5,000 into a separate escrow account and would only draw \$5,000 per year from that account. Draft A relies on three previous advisory opinions permitting such bequests and would permit the proposal to solicit such bequests provided that certain conditions are met. Draft B would supersede those three opinions to the extent they permit the proposed escrow arrangement, but would permit a plan whereby the solicitee establishes a testamentary trust from which the committee could draw \$5,000 per year. The draft also outlines conditions for such an arrangement.

This office is mindful of the previous advisory opinions permitting the type of bequests proposed by the requester but also notes the concerns related to such bequests. In view of these considerations, we present drafts containing the appropriate legal analyses but do not make a recommendation as to which draft should be approved.

Attachments

ADVISORY OPINION 1999-14

Elizabeth Kingsley

4 Harmon, Curran, Spielberg & Eisenberg

5 1726 M Street, N.W.

6 Suite 600

Washington, D.C. 20036

Dear Ms. Kingsley:

This responds to your letter dated May 25, 1999, on behalf of the Council for a Livable World ("the Council"), requesting an advisory opinion concerning the application of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, as amended ("the Act"), and Commission regulations to the solicitation of supporters for testamentary bequests.

The Council, which was originally organized as an unincorporated association in 1962, has been registered as a political committee since 1972 and is a non-connected multicandidate committee. In order to provide for long-term financial stability, the Council's Board of Directors has decided to set up a planned giving program soliciting supporters for testamentary bequests. The Council will request that its supporters include in their wills a provision bequeathing an amount up to \$100,000 to the committee.

The Council will deposit all funds received from any bequests that exceed \$5,000 into an interest-bearing savings or other investment account to be held in escrow. A separate segregated escrow account will be created for each bequest. You state that the Council will not pledge, assign, or otherwise obligate the escrow account balances in any manner to augment other Council funds. The Council will annually withdraw no more than \$5,000 from each escrow account, and these funds will be deposited into its general account to be used for political purposes. If the contribution limit at 2 U.S.C. §441a(a)(1)(C) is raised or lowered in the future, the Council will adjust the transfer amount to conform with the new limit. The Council asks whether its proposal would constitute the solicitation and acceptance of excessive contributions.

Leo Szilard originally funded the Council by asking the directors and key supporters to pledge two percent of their incomes. This method has given way to periodic appeals for

You state that the solicitation language will be similar to the following:



1 The Act sets a limit of \$5,000 in a calendar year on contributions by any "person" 2 to a political committee other than an authorized candidate committee or a political 3 committee established and maintained by a national political party. 2 U.S.C. §441a(a)(1)(C). The Act also provides that no political committee shall knowingly accept a contribution in violation of the Act's provisions. 2 U.S.C. §441a(f). The Act 5 defines "person" to include "an individual" but makes no specific reference to an 6 individual's testamentary estate. See 2 U.S.C. §431(11). Because the Act includes no 7 express or implied prohibitions on contributions from a decedent's estate, the 8 Commission has concluded, in previous opinions, that a testamentary estate is the 9 successor legal entity to the testator and qualifies as a person under the Act that would be 10 subject to the same limitations and prohibitions applicable to the decedent in the 11 decedent's lifetime. Advisory Opinions 1988-8, 1986-24, and 1983-13. 12 13 In those opinions, the Commission addressed a lump sum bequest in excess of \$5,000 to a political committee from the estate of a decedent individual, either by direct 14 gift from the estate or through a testamentary trust. In each opinion, the Commission 15 concluded that the distribution of the funds would not constitute an excessive 16 contribution provided that the committee placed the funds in a separate escrow account 17 from which it withdrew no more than \$5,000 in any calendar year until the escrow 18 account balance was reduced to zero. The account would have to be administered and 19 20 drawn upon only in a manner whereby the committee would not realize any augmentation 21 of, or benefit to, its other funds by reason of any funds on deposit in the escrow account. For example, the committee could not pledge, assign, or otherwise obligate the escrow 22 funds to provide anything of value to the committee, its connected organization, or any 23

funds. In order to continue Leo Szilard's vision for the Council and to endow the organization as a permanent institution, we respectfully call upon all members of Council for a Livable World's Board of Directors -- and all friends of the Council -- to place in their wills a provision to bequeath \$100,000 to the Council. Should your estate not be sufficient to sustain this level, please choose an alternative amount. Your estate contribution will be placed in a special escrow account from which the Council can withdraw \$5,000 annually under present law.

affiliated entities. Moreover, although interest may be earned on the escrow funds, that

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interest would become part of the principal for purposes of the \$5,000 annual limit on withdrawals by the committee's general account.

The Commission also delineated the recipient committee's reporting requirements with respect to such an arrangement. The bank where the escrow account is maintained would have to be disclosed as a committee depository on the committee's amended statement of organization. 2 U.S.C. §433(b)(6); 11 CFR 102.2(a)(1)(vi). The amounts in the escrow account would be treated as analogous to an obligation owed to the committee for reporting purposes, and thus the balance (including interest) would be included on line 9 of FEC Form 3X for each reporting period during which funds remained in the account, with a supporting Schedule D identifying the account and briefly describing the nature of the escrow account "debt." 11 CFR 104.3(d) and 104.11(a). As escrow withdrawals and deposits were made into the general account, the amount withdrawn would be reported as a contribution from the estate on line 11(a) of Form 3X and Schedule A, with corresponding reductions on line 9 and Schedule D.

The Commission concludes that the Council may implement its proposal, subject to the conditions set out in the above-described opinions and subject to other conditions, discussed below, that did not arise in the previous opinions. The fact that this proposal, unlike previous proposals, entails the solicitation of a number of bequests in advance of the death of the solicitees does not negate the permissibility of the arrangement. There is no specific prohibition in the Act on the solicitation of individuals who can lawfully contribute, other than the prohibitions at 2 U.S.C. §441b(b)(4) which do not apply here. Moreover, the inclusion by the living solicitee of such a bequest in his or her will is merely a promise that is revocable at any time before death. A promise to make a contribution does not constitute a "contribution" under the Act. See 2 U.S.C. §431(8)(A); 11 CFR 100.7(b)(1).²

Prior to January 8, 1980, the Act defined "contribution" to include "a written contract, promise, or agreement, whether or not legally enforceable, to make a contribution for [the purpose of influencing a Federal election]." However, the Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-187, repealed that portion of the contribution definition while retaining similar definitional language for the definition of "expenditure." See 2 U.S.C. §431(9)(A)(ii).

jurisdiction.



1. In order to ensure that nothing of value is provided to the Council prior to the 2 death of the individual, the Commission further conditions its approval on the assumption that the Council will not use such bequest promises to augment or otherwise add to the 3 funds in the committee's general or other accounts, e.g., through pledging, assigning or 4 otherwise obligating such prospective funds. The approval is also conditioned upon your 5 representation that a separate account will be established for each bequest. A 6 7 combination or commingling of the proceeds from multiple bequests in the same account will compromise the concept of using the funds from a bequest only until the escrow 8 balance from that bequest is zero (particularly when interest is also included). Moreover, 9 the combination of bequests in one account may result in benefits to the account, because 10 11 of the enhanced balance, that would not occur if the proceeds from each bequest were in separate accounts. See, by analogy, Advisory Opinions 1985-19, 1981-20, and 1981-19 12 (where the Commission addressed joint investments of funds from "hard" dollar and 13 "soft" dollar accounts and a joint purchase of equipment by a political committee and a 14 corporation and based its determinations on whether the Federal political committee had 15 sufficient funds to make the investment or purchase on its own and whether it would 16 17 receive any additional preference or benefit that it could not receive without the funds of the other entity). 19 The Commission cautions that this opinion relates only to testamentary bequests and should not be viewed as expressing any opinion on other estate planning procedures 20 such as inter vivos trusts, guardianships, or powers of appointment or attorney, or any 21 other methods by which a person may make gifts to a political committee. Advisory 22 23 Opinions 1988-8, 1986-24, and 1983-13. The Commission also expresses no opinion 24 regarding any tax ramifications of the proposal since such issues are outside its

1	This response constitutes an advisory opinion concerning application of the Act
2	and Commission regulations to the specific transaction or activity set forth in your
3	request. 2 U.S.C. §437f.
4	Sincerely,
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6	Scott E. Thomas
7	Chairman
8	
9 10	Enclosures (AOs 1988-8, 1986-24, 1985-19, 1983-13, 1981-20, and 1981-19)

ADVISORY OPINION 1999-14

- 3 Elizabeth Kingsley
- 4 Harmon, Curran, Spielberg & Eisenberg
- 5 1726 M Street, N.W.
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- 7 Washington, D.C. 20036

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The Council, which was originally organized as an unincorporated association in 1962, has been registered as a political committee since 1972 and is a non-connected multicandidate committee. In order to provide for long-term financial stability, the Council's Board of Directors has decided to set up a planned giving program soliciting supporters for testamentary bequests. The Council will request that its supporters include in their wills a provision bequeathing an amount up to \$100,000 to the committee.

The Council will deposit all funds received from any bequests that exceed \$5,000 into an interest-bearing savings or other investment account to be held in escrow. A separate segregated escrow account will be created for each bequest. You state that the Council will not pledge, assign, or otherwise obligate the escrow account balances in any manner to augment other Council funds. The Council will annually withdraw no more than \$5,000 from each escrow account, and these funds will be deposited into its general account to be used for political purposes. If the contribution limit at 2 U.S.C. §441a(a)(1)(C) is raised or lowered in the future, the Council will adjust the transfer amount to conform with the new limit. The Council asks whether its proposal would constitute the solicitation and acceptance of excessive contributions.

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You state that the solicitation language will be similar to the following:

The Act sets a limit of \$5,000 in a calendar year on contributions by any "person" 1 2 to a political committee other than an authorized candidate committee or a political committee established and maintained by a national political party. 2 U.S.C. 3. §441a(a)(1)(C). The Act also provides that no political committee shall knowingly 4 accept a contribution in violation of the Act's provisions. 2 U.S.C. §441a(f). The Act 5 6 defines "person" to include "an individual" but makes no specific reference to an 7 individual's testamentary estate. See 2 U.S.C. §431(11). Because the Act includes no express or implied prohibitions on contributions from a decedent's estate, the 8 Commission has concluded, in previous opinions, that a testamentary estate is the 9 successor legal entity to the testator and qualifies as a person under the Act that would be 10 subject to the same limitations and prohibitions applicable to the decedent in the 11 decedent's lifetime. Advisory Opinions 1988-8, 1986-24, and 1983-13. 12 In those opinions, the Commission addressed a lump sum bequest in excess of 13 \$5,000 to a political committee from the estate of a decedent individual, either by direct 14 gift from the estate or through a testamentary trust. In each opinion, the Commission 15 16

concluded that the distribution of the funds would not constitute an excessive contribution provided that the committee placed the funds in a separate escrow account 17 from which it withdrew no more than \$5,000 in any calendar year until the escrow 18 account balance was reduced to zero. The opinions also provided that the account would 19 have to be administered and drawn upon only in a manner whereby the committee would 20 21 not realize any augmentation of, or benefit to, its other funds by reason of any funds on deposit in the escrow account. For example, the committee could not pledge, assign, or 22 otherwise obligate the escrow funds to provide anything of value to the committee, its 23 connected organization, or any affiliated entities. Moreover, although interest could be 24

organization as a permanent institution, we respectfully call upon all members of Council for a Livable World's Board of Directors — and all friends of the Council — to place in their wills a provision to bequeath \$100,000 to the Council. Should your estate not be sufficient to sustain this level, please choose an alternative amount. Your estate contribution will be placed in a special escrow account from which the Council can withdraw \$5,000 annually under present law.

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earned on the escrow funds, that interest would become part of the principal for purposes of the \$5,000 annual limit on withdrawals by the committee's general account.²

Upon further review of the concepts underlying bequests from decedent's estates, 3 the Commission has determined that the committee escrow plan as described above 4 would not be permissible under the Act. Although actual withdrawals for deposit into the 5 general account would be limited to \$5,000 per year, the entire amount of the bequest 6 would constitute a contribution at the time the funds were distributed by the estate. 7 Commission regulations provide that, for the purposes of the limits, a contribution is 8 . considered to be made when the contributor relinquishes control over the contribution: 9 this would be when it is delivered to the political committee or its agent. 11 CFR 10 110.1(b)(6). Not only would the estate relinquish control of all the funds at the time of 11 the delivery or distribution, but the committee would exercise control over the funds upon 12 13 its receipt, and this control would not be negated by placing the funds in an escrow account. The committee would have the power to decide which investments were best 14 for the escrowed funds and to modify these investments in order to maximize growth. 15 The committee could also decide to withdraw less than \$5,000 in a particular year as part 16 of an investment strategy. The Commission concludes, therefore, that the Council's proposal may be implemented only to the extent that the solicitee's bequest is no more 18 than \$5,000 and not more than \$5,000 is deposited in any committee accounts. To the 19 extent that Advisory Opinions 1988-8, 1986-24, and 1983-13 would permit the 20 implementation of the Council's plan for amounts exceeding \$5,000, those opinions are 21 hereby superseded. 22

The Commission understands that other political committees or other individuals may have made arrangements, based on the above three opinions, for the deposit of bequested funds, in excess of the Act's limits, into committee escrow accounts. The Commission concludes that if a committee is already drawing bequested funds from such an escrow account, or an individual has already died and the bequested funds will be distributed to the committee pursuant to a will, such arrangements may continue so long

² In those opinions, the Commission also delineated the recipient committee's reporting requirements based on such an arrangement. The amounts remaining in the escrow account were to be treated as

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as there is no material distinction from the situations presented in the three opinions.

See 2 U.S.C.§437f(c)(1)(B) and 11 CFR 112.5(a)(2).

The Commission notes, however, that its response to this proposal does not . 3 · preclude the establishment of another estate plan whereby the proceeds of an estate, in 4. excess of \$5,000, may be set aside by the bequester for future contributions to the 5 6 Council. In Advisory Opinion 1988-8, the Commission concluded that a testamentary trust which had several beneficiaries, including a political committee, could contribute up · 7 to \$5,000 per year to that political committee. See also Advisory Opinion 1983-13. The 8 Commission based its conclusion upon the previous opinions that had also permitted 9 bequests in excess of \$5,000 to a committee and the distribution of those amounts to 10 committee escrow account.³ Nevertheless, the Commission concludes that the Council H may ask its individual supporters to create testamentary trusts for the distribution of funds 12 to it, even if the funds in the trust exceed \$5,000, provided that certain conditions are met. 13

As stated in Advisory Opinion 1988-8, the Act and Commission regulations have no express or implied prohibition on contributions from a decedent's estate, including those distributed through a trust created by the decedent. As in that opinion, the Commission would construe the testamentary trust as the successor legal entity of the decedent, and subject to the same limitations and prohibitions applicable to the decedent in his lifetime. Because the committee would be the beneficiary of the trust⁴ and because of the concerns, expressed above, as to any control over the funds by the committee, any bequester must impose the following conditions for the trust. The trustee must exercise exclusive control over the trust, and there can be no committee control at all. This means that the trustee may not be a person who is an officer, director, or employee of the Council. Neither the Council nor any Council officer, director, or employee may provide any directions as to where the funds in the trust should be invested. Any Council

analogous to an obligation owed to the committee.

Advisory Opinion 1988-8 also permitted the alternative of the distribution by the trust of an amount greater than \$5,000 to the committee provided the committee establish the escrow account. That portion of the opinion has been expressly superseded, as stated above.

⁴ See, e.g., 11 CFR 9034.2(c)(2) (checks drawn on a trust account are matchable provided the contributor has equitable ownership of the account); 11 CFR 110.1(i)(2) (child may use proceeds of a trust to make a contribution to the extent the child is a beneficiary).

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solicitation for such testamentary arrangements must explicitly state the foregoing conditions.

The Commission recognizes that the Council may receive information that it has 3 been designated by a living person as the beneficiary of a trust that will provide the 4 Council with funds over a period of years. The inclusion by the living solicitee of such a 5 trust arrangement in his or her will, however, merely constitutes a promise that is 6 7 revocable at any time before death. A promise to make a contribution does not constitute a "contribution" under the Act. See 2 U.S.C. §431(8)(A); 11 CFR 100.7(b)(1).5 8 Nevertheless, in order to ensure that nothing of value is provided to the Council prior to 9 the death of the individual, the Commission further conditions its allowance of the 10 foregoing testamentary trust arrangement on the assumption that the Council will not use 11 12 such bequest promises to augment or otherwise add to the funds in the committee's accounts, e.g., through pledging, assigning or otherwise obligating such prospective 13 funds. Once the bequester has died and the testamentary trust has been established, the 14 receipt of funds from the trust is somewhat more assured. The Commission, therefore, 15 further bases its allowance of the arrangement on the condition that the Council will not 16 have access to the funds remaining in the trust to augment or add to the funds in the 17 committee accounts in the manner described just above. 18

The Council should report the contributions from the testamentary trust as received at the time of the actual receipt of the funds, and should disclose the name of the trust, with the name of the decedent. Unlike the requirements set out in previous opinions addressing funds held in a committee escrow account, the Council should not report the remainder of the trust funds as an obligation owed to the committee. See footnote 2.

The Commission cautions that this opinion relates only to testamentary bequests and should not be viewed as expressing any opinion on other estate planning procedures such as *inter vivos* trusts, guardianships, or powers of appointment or attorney, or any other methods by which a person may make gifts to a political committee. The

⁵ Prior to January 8, 1980, the Act defined "contribution" to include "a written contract, promise, or agreement, whether or not legally enforceable, to make a contribution for [the purpose of influencing a Federal election]." However, the Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-



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